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citizens. The learnings of this 
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of them today are crucial for 
every man, woman and child 
on earth. Now and in the 
future.”
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European Parliament for 
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“This timely book 
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information and analysis 
about the urgent threats the 
tech giants pose to the robust 
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are essential for individual 
liberty and democratic self-
government. It constructively 
explores potential strategies 
for restoring individual 
control over information 
flows to and about us. 
Policymakers worldwide 
should take heed!”
Nadine Strossen, Professor, 
New York Law School. 
Author, HATE: Why We 
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The only free cheese is in the 
mouse trap
Russian proverb1
1  The expression is mostly used in Russian but might originate from an 
apocryphal statement by Margaret Thatcher on communism.
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Introduction
This book sheds a critical light on the Internet, more specifi-
cally on the new circumstances it is creating for one of the 
most important basic principles of modern liberal democra-
cies: freedom of speech. The book has specific focus on the 
tech giants who, to a still larger extent, set the framework for 
and define the conditions of communication for most users 
online—Google, Facebook, Twitter, Pinterest, Amazon, etc.
The book came about during hectic times, not so much due 
to deadlines but because its subject matter unfolded franti-
cally while the book was being written, with new tumultuous 
events taking place almost every week. Not long before the 
plan for the book was drafted, when 2017 became 2018, a new 
law came into effect in Germany. It made it mandatory for 
social networks such as Facebook and Twitter to assume the 
government’s job of regulating content in accordance with 
German law. In March 2018, the Cambridge Analytica scan-
dal broke. It exposed how a shady British company special-
izing in spin and influencing elections had used the data of 
millions of Facebook users during the US presidential elec-
tion and the Brexit referendum, among others. In late March, 
Google announced its plans to spend 300 million USD on a 
new initiative which featured a “Disinfo Lab” aimed at 
removing misinformation from the search engine, the pur-
pose being to make sure serious journalism ranks high among 
Google’s search results. In April and May, Facebook’s CEO, 
Mark Zuckerberg, appeared in hearings with the US Congress 
and the European Parliament, where he managed to dodge 
most of the critical questions posed to him during the brief 
sessions. In late April, for the first time ever, Facebook made 
public its detailed and previously undisclosed guidelines for 
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the removal of content and blacklisting of users. In the middle 
of May, a Google internal video from 2016 named “The 
Selfish Ledger” was leaked, featuring Google’s take on the 
future—a society where information is crucial and each indi-
vidual demoted to a random container, from generation to 
generation carrying important information on into the future. 
In late May, the new EU legislation known as General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) entered into force. In June, 
the next Facebook scandal popped up: it turned out the com-
pany had given access to the enormous amounts of personal 
user data to more than 60 technological hardware manufac-
turers, among them Apple, Amazon, BlackBerry, Microsoft, 
and Samsung. Furthermore, this had apparently taken place 
despite the fact that Facebook had discovered, back in 2015, 
the Cambridge Analytica leaks and tightened its control with 
how data are handed over to app companies via Facebook. 
Around the same time, the development of a new law was 
started in France—with different means than the one in 
Germany, the French law attempts to make it legal to remove 
“fake news” from the Internet. In July, the European 
Commission gave Google (Alphabet) the biggest fine in EU 
history for activities bordering on monopoly. Later that 
month, Facebook announced that it had learned of a new 
political campaign using false Facebook pages, probably set 
up from Russia. In August, the biggest tech giants blocked 
access to a conspiracy site named InfoWars, all of them on the 
same day. At the end of that same month, it was discovered 
that since 2011, Iran has been behind a large misinformation 
campaign on Facebook targeting hundreds of thousands of 
users across the planet—the campaign managed to spread to 
both Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube. In October, an internal 
Google document was leaked, called “The Good Censor” 
where a new policy of stricter censorship is developed. That 
same month, a “troll farm” in Saudi Arabia was discovered. In 
November, it was revealed that Facebook had, during its 
many crises, hired a spin company in order to discredit com-
petitors and smearing critics. The same month, the company 
published new directions for censorship, adding to removal 
the technique of downgrading access to content not actually 
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removed but merely close to the borderline of removal in 
some way. Last but not least, in the Spring of 2019, increasing 
political pressure after the March massacre in Christchurch, 
New Zealand, prompted several states to sharpen removal 
policies regarding tech giants.
Writing a critical book in the midst of all these events is 
sort of like riding a tiger. One is never sure if, once published, 
new events will already have made some of the book’s claims 
and conclusions obsolete. Still, there seems to be no calm 
Archimedean vantage point in foreseeable future from which 
to lean back, observe, and analyze the growing problems with 
the Internet and the tech giants.
Moreover, these issues are in no way simple. The global, 
transnational nature of the tech giants, combined with their 
secrecy and lack of openness when it comes to their internal 
procedures, creates entirely new conditions for freedom of 
speech. All of this takes place in times when people are get-
ting used to one particular fact: when it comes to understand-
ing the nature of free speech, the classic scenario of state 
legislation confronted by citizens expressing themselves in 
certain ways will no longer suffice. Not if we aim to under-
stand free speech, that is. Rather, the scenario is now supple-
mented by religious and political threats of violence, which 
contribute to the drawing of the limits to freedom of speech. 
As the tech giants are turning into monopolies, and as large 
parts of younger generations use their platforms, on the plat-
forms’ terms and conditions, to access both news and the 
public sphere, the somewhat clandestine policies of these 
companies have begun to define what can be uttered and 
what information is available to ordinary citizens. The tech 
giants, originally noble endeavors carried out by college stu-
dents aiming to develop free services to enthusiastic users, 
have long evaded critical scrutiny.
This book gives a brief overview of how they became pow-
erful and wealthy monopolies; the questionable nature of 
their business models based on users’ more or less  involuntary 
consent to sharing personal data; how personalization of ser-
vices restricts information and creates filter bubbles, confir-
mation bias and echo chambers; how community standards 
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restrict what can be expressed based on the principle of the 
lowest common denominator; all of the problems related to 
the procedures for the removal of content on these services; 
the ominous collaborations between tech giants and govern-
ments towards forming new, automated censorship bypassing 
court proceedings; the first digital losers, victims of the giants’ 
lucrative business model; disturbances of the public sphere 
led by the giants’ automated algorithms; and much more.
The tech giants are global, and their influence is felt even 
in countries that fight them—such as China and a number of 
Muslim nations. But the giants remain based in California 
and their activities, policies, the debate on them, and the 
political forces they deal with are primarily American. 
Therefore, this book must focus primarily on the American 
situation—for the simple reason that local decisions, events, 
and social structures in the United States affect the public 
sphere and free speech elsewhere—not only in Europe but in 
large parts of the world.
As mentioned, we do not claim that this is a simple matter, 
and in no way do we claim that there is one simple solution. 
Tech giants are companies of a wholly new breed: sprawling, 
tricky to define, and hard to control. We tend to support 
emerging ideas of some sort of government regulation of the 
tech giants; as such, measures would call for openness about 
their operations and ensure freedom, legal rights, and privacy 
for people who express themselves and share their data. But 
regulation would also prevent these companies from acting as 
if the removal of “fake news” and political extremism by a 
simple automated control procedure could be done without 
serious consequences for freedom of speech. At the same 
time, antitrust regulation and control of monopolies are seri-
ous medications that should be handed out in careful doses. 
Or else, the cure may be worse than the disease. At present, 
only the United States and the European Union possess suf-
ficient political muscle to arm-wrestle the tech giants from a 
fundamentally democratic and freedom-oriented stance. In 
the final section of the book, we attempt to come up with 
some principles for developing regulation of tech giants in an 
attempt to ensure more freedom for their users.
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F. Stjernfelt, A. M. Lauritzen, Your Post has been Removed, 
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It is a well-known fact that the Internet represents a compre-
hensive and forceful media revolution. In only a few decades, 
it has connected billions of people all over the world and 
given them new access to large quantities of information. At 
the same time, it has put established media and information 
formats under pressure: newspapers, journals, CDs, radio and 
TV outlets, movies, books, etc. Still larger parts of the world’s 
marketing budgets migrate from these media to the online 
tech giants. To a large extent, the survival of established 
media now depends on whether they are capable of redefin-
ing themselves when faced with the Internet—either as 
dependent on it, by its terms, or as an alternative to it. This 
also creates new conditions for freedom of speech.
It seems safe to claim that the spirit of the infancy and 
youth of the Internet as a mainstream platform, in the 1990s 
and 2000s, was characterized by an optimistic ecstasy with a 
clear vision of a promising future ahead. The Internet would 
enlighten the earth’s population, connect it in ways that 
would soften opposition and even out differences. It would 
create whole new ways for people to practice their freedom 
of expression and empower them, even spread democracy 
and freedom across the globe. “Information wants to be free,” 
rejoiced tech-hippie Stewart Brand back in the 1980s. Another 
incarnation of the same early optimism appeared in 1996, 
when Grateful Dead lyricist John Perry Barlow published his 
moving hippie manifesto entitled The Declaration of 
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Independence of Cyberspace.1 In contrast, the 2010s have 
been a wake-up call. Skepticists, increasingly vocal during the 
2000s, turned out to be right; not everything was hunky dory. 
As more and more people get access to the Internet, it should 
be no surprise that tensions, strifes and battles of the real 
world are played out online as well. Manipulation, crime, cold 
war—not to mention political and religious extremism—have 
been given new places to unfold, with a full arsenal of com-
pletely new tools at their disposal.
Most likely, the years 2016–2018 will be viewed as a deci-
sive watershed to a new and gloomy way of regarding the 
Internet:
In 2016, the election of Donald Trump as new President of 
the US was accompanied by high online activity, in which 
a Russian “troll factory”—Internet Research Agency in 
Saint Petersburg, Russia—created false Facebook groups 
with many different extremist agendas. They sent carefully 
selected voters messages disguised as Twitter messages 
from American senders. This was a tremendous effort to 
affect the US elections and gave rise to heated debate on 
“fake news” and how to fight them.2 For obvious reasons, 
no one can determine to what degree these efforts helped 
Trump’s marginal victory.
In 2017, leading Western nations started seriously discussing 
regulation of tech giants such as Google, Facebook, 
Twitter, Amazon, Apple etc. The EU Commission ordered 
1 Barlow, J.P. “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace” 
Electronic Frontier Foundation. 02-08-96.
2 The concept of “fake news” exploded and quickly degenerated into a 
swearword used by many to insinuate that their opponents are down-
right liars. At its core, “fake news” referred to commercial websites (such 
as nationalreport.net and many others) who produce “fake news” to 
attract user searches in order to sell adverts—but it also refers to more 
or less elegantly planted “fake news” material by hostile powers. As 
early as 2017, one of the inventors of the concept, Craig Silverman, dis-
tanced himself from this now watered-down concept—C. Silverman “I 
Helped Popularize The Term “Fake News” And Now I Cringe Every 
Time I Hear It” BuzzfeedNews. 12-31-17.
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Google to pay a hefty fine for promoting its own products 
in its search results, Germany adopted its 
Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz—“Network Implemen-
tation Act”—to try to control social media content, high- 
level representatives of tech giants appeared in hearings in 
front of the US Congress and France began to draft its 
regulatory legislation.
And finally, in 2018 came the revelation of the Cambridge 
Analytica scandal, where it turned out that a private 
British consultant company specializing in political analy-
sis, spin and campaign support in a number of countries 
had gained access to the detailed personal data of 50–90 
million Facebook users.3 These data had enabled the com-
pany, up until the 2016 US presidential election, to very 
precisely direct their anonymous or pseudonymous voter 
influence to target selected, undecided voter groups in the 
decisive US swing states. It is indeed difficult to determine 
whether there is any truth to ostentatious claims put for-
ward by Cambridge Analytica that the company was in 
fact architect of the whole Trump campaign, and that it 
decided the outcome of the US presidential election. 
These claims were made by the company’s top representa-
tives and caught on hidden camera by Channel 4, a British 
news outlet, whose reporters disguised as Sri Lankan poli-
ticians interested in buying similar efforts in order to win 
their national elections.4 This affair put new focus on how 
tech giants collect user data, both openly and candidly, and 
how they protect these data and the different ways they 
use them. In the aftermath, Facebook CEO Mark 
Zuckerberg himself was summoned to hearings in the US 
Congress in April 2018 and in the EU Parliament the fol-
lowing month. This period in time witnessed growing inter-
3 Strictly speaking, Cambridge Analytica was a subsidiary of British cor-
poration SCL Group, which had its offices in the United States as a way 
to circumvent the ban on foreign actors intervening financially in US 
elections. The company was founded by tech investor Robert Mercer 
and Breitbart chief editor and Trump campaign leader Steve Bannon.
4 “Data, Democracy and Dirty Tricks” Channel4. 03-19-18.
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est in the political regulation of tech giants, forcing tech 
giants to take on a more defensive position, launching—to 
loud fanfare—a series of changes in attempts to anticipate 
regulatory measures.
The problems with the Internet are manifold. They include 
a lack of protection of private data; lack of compliance with 
copyright legislation; extensive transfer of resources from 
media actually producing content to platforms simply repro-
ducing said content; creation of huge tech companies which 
solemnly declare transparency and openness while keeping 
their internal procedures hidden to the public yet retaining 
control and ownership in the hands of a tight clique of 
tycoons in Silicon Valley; the same multinational tech giants’ 
sneaky efforts to minimize their tax payments in tax havens; 
the Internet’s increasing opportunities of international crime, 
fraud, drugs, child pornography, hacking, extortion etc.; the 
role of the Internet as a way to communicate with and recruit 
people for political or religious terrorist movements, often-
times via the hard-to-control Dark Net; the Internet as a 
platform for systematic disinformation campaigns and the 
spread of “fake news”; the Internet as a forum for a new 
cyber Cold War led by military hackers—just to name a few.
This book does not set out to discuss all these downsides 
to the brave new online world. We choose one specific area: 
freedom of expression. This does not mean that we will ignore 
these other issues—they are all connected. But it does indeed 
mean that we will embark on an analysis of what the Internet 
has opened up for in terms of new conditions, possibilities 
and problems related to free speech.
“Freedom of speech” is itself a hotly debated topic—espe-
cially after the heavy debates following the Muhammad car-
toon crisis, which began in Denmark in 2006 and put Islamic 
threats to free speech on the agenda. As a concept, freedom 
of speech often refers to freedom of speech guaranteed by 
law, as central parts of the democratic constitutions of many 
western countries, following the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 and the American 
Bill of Rights of 1791. Both documents acknowledged free-
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dom of speech as one of the basic principles on which to base 
modern constitutions. This point does not mean, however, 
that such constitutional protections are absolute. Most coun-
tries have exceptions regarding for instance threats, personal 
defamation, the right to privacy, false product claims—not to 
mention that certain public officials can renounce their free-
dom of speech on certain topics. Others have exceptions 
regarding blasphemy, pornography, “hate speech”5, etc. But 
those are nothing more than exceptions, which means that in 
modern democracies freedom of speech is seen as a funda-
mental ideal to strive for in legal and political terms and 
should only be limited by explicit and specifically motivated 
legislation on specific exceptions.
When it comes to freedom of speech guaranteed by law, a 
distinction is made between formal and material freedom of 
speech, according to Danish legal philosopher Alf Ross. The 
former is concerned with whether a system of censorship is in 
place—in the absence of censorship before or after the fact, 
we have formal freedom of speech.6 The latter concerns the 
presence of statements with a particular content, which—
once put forward in the public sphere—can be ruled on post 
hoc or in some other way treated as crimes. In this sense, no 
countries can claim to have full freedom of speech—even 
though a significant decrease is observed in what types of 
statements are criminalized. As an example, many countries 
decriminalized blasphemy and pornography during the twen-
tieth century.
This basic understanding of freedom of speech focuses on 
the government—on how and to what extent it defends the 
rights of each individual citizen to express him- or herself as 
he or she wishes. This does not, however, fully cover what one 
might call “actual” freedom of speech. There are also border-
line cases, such as pressure from another state or a terrorist 
5 In this book we put “hate speech” in quotation marks to signal that in 
our opinion it is a vague category which does not refer to any well-
defined group of utterances, cf. the review of “hate speech” legislation in 
Strossen (2018).
6 Cf. Mchangama & Stjernfelt (2005) pp. 756ff, 774ff.
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group against people who express themselves, be it in the 
form of violence or threats, for political or religious reasons. 
Strictly speaking, Iran’s 1989 fatwa against author Salman 
Rushdie, which is still active, is a successful attempt to extend 
the Iranian jurisdiction to apply to citizens of other nations. It 
is successful insofar as Iranian agents and sympathizer activ-
ists outside Iran have taken it upon themselves to persecute 
Rushdie in an attempt to carry out the Iranian death sentence 
which serves, simultaneously, as an instant warning to others 
who might consider following his footsteps. An example from 
Denmark is international pressure originating from both 
Muslim states and Islamist activists. This pressure has indi-
rectly but efficiently forced Danish media to refrain from 
publishing caricature drawings of the Prophet Muhammad 
since 2010. This constitutes an actual restriction of Danish 
freedom of speech, with no regard to the Danish state 
monopoly on violence or the country’s legislation. In a multi-
cultural world, times could lie ahead where jurisdictions of 
different countries and groups may overlap or collide, result-
ing in lack of clarity or even conflict as to the limits on free-
dom of speech.
A third usage of the concept freedom of speech relates to 
whether there are even media available to spread certain 
content. During the later years of the absolute monarchy in 
Denmark, for a long time a few specific publications had the 
privilege of disseminating political news. For a while 
Statstidende, the official government journal, even had 
monopoly on the publication of such news. It meant that no 
media were allowed to communicate political news or politi-
cal discussion not acknowledged by the regime. This was 
government policy—but also other circumstances can cause 
such restrictions. If for instance all media in a given country, 
spontaneously or coordinated, agreed to keep out certain 
content, then there would in fact be no freedom of speech 
regarding this content, despite the absence of explicit bans on 
it. If certain media gain in-practice monopoly control on 
 communicating the news, then the editorial policies of said 
Chapter 1. What Is Freedom of Speech?
7
media would define the limits of the freedom of speech 
practiced.
Freedom of speech can also refer to topics broader than 
the opportunity of individuals or organizations to express 
themselves freely. It can refer to the right to search for infor-
mation freely and obtain it freely. In this usage of the concept, 
the rights holder is not the active and expressing party, but 
the passive and receiving party. If the media of a given coun-
try are strictly controlled—be it control of the formal, mate-
rial or actual freedom of speech—then the audiences who use 
these media do not enjoy freedom of speech in this broader 
understanding of the term (even though these users them-
selves do not necessarily attempt to practice that expression 
and are hindered). Thus, the UN’s Declaration of Human 
Rights includes this information search aspect in its article on 
freedom of expression: “Everyone has the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold 
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media and regardless of 
frontiers.”7 A similar choice of words can be found in the 
European Convention on Human Rights. This broader under-
standing of free speech includes anything which might 
impede the free exchange of information for citizens and civil 
organizations.
A number of classical freedoms— often referred to as 
“first generation” human rights—are closely connected to 
freedom of speech. This goes especially for the freedom of 
religion or belief, which is the right of individuals to define 
their faith and affiliation to a religious community. Sometimes 
this is confounded with libertas ecclesiae, which is when 
churches call for exemption from certain legislations, but that 
is an entirely different matter (and possibly in opposition to 
freedom of speech). The freedom to believe was among the 
principal motivations behind the fight for freedom of 
 expression in Europe between the seventeenth to nineteenth 
7 “UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)” Amnesty 
International.
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centuries, and it is still a disputed and restricted right in many 
countries, for instance in China and the Muslim world. 
Freedom of the press and freedom of thought are closely 
related to free speech, and both are often used synonymously 
with freedom of speech. The same goes for the freedom of 
assembly and association, which underpin the citizens’ right 
to gather physically and in organizations to share information 
and points of view.
In the following chapters, we will examine all these aspects 
of freedom of speech online—and we will do our best to 
make it clear which forms of this concept we are discussing 
and when.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative 
Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecom-
mons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distri-
bution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give 
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In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, freedom of 
expression emerged as a central theme of the dawning Age of 
Enlightenment. This was caused not least by churches and 
princes maintaining strict political control of expressions of 
divergent opinions. The new Protestant state churches, 
Lutheran as well as Calvinist, turned out not to offer more 
freedom than the Catholic church. In fact, it was often less, 
which meant that religious, philosophical and political dissi-
dents regularly ran into serious problems when expressing 
their ideas publicly. Thus, ideas of freedom of expression 
began to surface. One of the first urgent calls for freedom of 
expression came from Dutch-Jewish philosopher Baruch 
Spinoza, who in his “Tractatus Theologico-Politicus” (1670) 
called for libertas philosophandi—freedom of thought. As 
stated by British historian Jonathan Israel, Spinoza was the 
first major philosopher who was also a democrat. Spinoza 
believed it important to distinguish politically between peo-
ple’s actions and their views and expressions. Whereas the 
former should be governed by legislators, the latter should 
not. This would create a more free and peaceful society—and 
if people had the possibility to influence the laws they were 
subject to, they might be more inclined to respect them.
Similar thoughts would gradually propagate in the “learned 
republic” of associated philosophers, journalists, publishers, 
bookstores, collectors, encyclopedists, writers, editors and 
others that emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
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 century. Compared to our day’s focus on digital networks, it 
is thought-provoking that this “Republic of Letters” was in 
fact a self-organized “grassroots” network that challenged the 
ecclesiastical and absolutist hierarchies of the times. Historian 
Niall Fergusson (2017) gives a detailed mapping of historical 
periods in which networks have been able to threaten, upset 
or recalibrate established political hierarchies. This was made 
possible by new media, among them cheap printing of books 
and quicker transport of mail, but also by intensifying tradi-
tional procedures such as transcription, book loans and travel. 
These networks held the germ of many characteristics which 
are intensified in today’s much larger and faster networks. 
They constituted a crucial historical sanctuary outside the 
reach of states and churches, a precursor of civil society. This 
naturally led states and churches to try to restrict and pursue 
these networks. In turn, the networks could react by organiz-
ing themselves in closed cliques, lodges, secret societies—
focused gatherings where expression was freer, but which 
also subjected people to the dangers of echo chambers and 
information bias. In these networks, freedom of expression 
was increasingly practiced and expounded, to foster enlight-
enment based on the first-hand experience of believing, 
thinking or expressing oneself freely. Well-known names 
from the Enlightenment tradition include encyclopedists 
Pierre Bayle and Denis Diderot, English freethinkers like 
Anthony Collins and Matthew Tindal and German dissidents 
like Lorenz Schmidt or Theodor Ludwig Lau. But Christian 
dissidents also saw the need for free speech—an example is 
radical pietist Johann Konrad Dippel, alchemist, freethinker 
and a good candidate for a real-life Dr. Frankenstein. In 1706, 
he published Ein Hirt und eine Heerde, demanding full free-
dom of religion and expression as the only path to true faith. 
His writings were burned by the Danish government, and he 
was even sent to prison on the island of Bornholm for his 
outspokenness.1
During the 1700s, freedom of expression became one of 
the key issues for this emerging international network, which 
1 See Mchangama and Stjernfelt (2016) p. 135ff.
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eventually spread to large parts of Europe and to its 
American colonies. The ideas of the Enlightenment Age were 
at the heart of the most important political upheavals of the 
late 1700s, such as the American and French revolutions in 
1776 and 1789, respectively. They both resulted in influential 
articulations of freedom of speech: the French Human Rights 
Declaration of August 1789 and the American Bill of Rights 
from 1791. The former pronounced: “The free communication 
of thoughts and of opinions is one of the most precious rights 
of man: any citizen thus may speak, write, print freely, except 
to respond to the abuse of this liberty, in the cases determined 
by the law.”2 The latter and more radical one, not containing 
the French restrictions regarding abuse, reads as follows: 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the govern-
ment for a redress of grievances.”3 This is the famous First 
Amendment. The emerging networks of the Enlightenment 
Age had managed to anchor freedom of expression in the 
constitutions of two large Western countries. These laws are 
fundamentally formulated in the negative, that is, in contrast 
to the absolutist and ecclesiastically dominated states of the 
time, these new states influenced by the Enlightenment 
refrained from preventing their citizens from expressing 
themselves freely. In his influential article “What is 
Enlightenment?”, German philosopher Immanuel Kant gave 
a more positive definition of the importance of freedom of 
expression in the Enlightenment movement.
In this article from 1784, Kant suggests that enlightenment 
is man’s “emerging from his self-imposed immaturity”4, that 
2 Our translation of “Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen 
de 1789” Conseil Constitutionnel. Last visited 08-04-18: conseil-constitu-
tionnel.fr/—Translations in the book are our own, except when citing 
already translated works.
3 “First Amendment” Legal Information Institute.
4 “Immaturity” translates German “Unmündigkeit”, literally referring to 
the nonage state of underage citizens without full autonomy and citizen 
rights.
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enlightenment consists of the public use of reason, in which 
the individual as an intellectual being may express what he 
cannot do in his official capacity: “[…] the public use of one’s 
reason must be free at all times, and this alone can bring 
enlightenment to mankind. On the other hand, the private 
use of reason may frequently be narrowly restricted without 
especially hindering the progress of enlightenment. By ‘pub-
lic use of one’s reason’, I mean that use which a man, as 
scholar, makes of it before the reading public.”5 Private use of 
reason refers not only to private life but especially to those 
appointments and offices that may impose restrictions upon 
the individual concerning what may be said—something less 
common today, but which we recognize from the professional 
confidentiality upheld by doctors and social workers, among 
others. Kant argues that, contrary to such restrictions on one’s 
office, when addressing a general public, anyone should be 
able to make public use of their faculty of reason in front of 
an audience—thus making such a freely addressed public 
sphere the framework of an enlightened society.
Historically, the “general public” Kant refers to had 
emerged from the learned networks of the Enlightenment 
Age as a self-organized communications forum with its own 
media, outside of and across the narrow public spheres main-
tained and controlled by churches and courts. In principle, 
this general public, beyond the control of governments and 
religions, now lends legitimacy to the new democratic states. 
The general public, as in the civil society and their networks, 
organizations and the media which thrive off them, enables 
enlightenment to take place. Mistaken ideas are corrected; 
arguments are developed and contradicted; new ideas and 
science are formed; viewpoints clash; criticism of and protests 
against policies are articulated; political agreement and dis-
agreement can be formulated, and last but not least: informed 
elections can take place. It is well known that the realization 
of this ideal public sphere has shown its disadvantages, as 
mapped by disciplines such as mass psychology and cultural 
criticism: fads, seduction of the masses led by charismatic 
5 Kant (1784) pp. 484–85.
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figures, the public impact of culture and pop industries, not to 
mention what we today refer to as echo chambers and filter 
bubbles. However, despite these built-in disadvantages, most 
theories of democracy agree that free debate is a fundamen-
tal condition for modern liberal democracies.
The Kantian argument for freedom of expression is closely 
linked to his idea of the autonomy of the individual: Human 
beings possess a particular dignity because they have the abil-
ity to take a step back and morally judge their own opinions 
and actions. This autonomy may only be expressed fully if 
political circumstances allow everyone to think and express 
themselves freely. In this sense, freedom of expression has a 
central place among the natural rights of humans—in the 
tradition of natural justice going back to the seventeenth 
century and all the way back to the Stoic view of humans as 
creatures of reason and political equality.6
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Jeremy 
Bentham criticized this very idea of natural rights as “non-
sense upon stilts”—to him the only legitimate rights were 
those guaranteed by a political authority. This led to an alter-
native, utilitarian justification of free speech that found its 
classic articulation in John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty from 
1859. To him the utility of freedom of expression is the mea-
suring stick and the central argument is that if a given society 
lacks freedom of expression, not all possible suggestions for 
the solution of a given problem will be expressed, and it will 
then not be possible to reach the best solution. Obviously, this 
basic reason for having freedom of expression is completely 
different from the one found in Kantian thought—but this 
should not block our understanding that the two reasons are 
oftentimes in agreement with each other, and that in most 
concrete cases, they work well together. As it is notoriously 
difficult to measure utility, at the end of the day the utilitarian 
argument is hardly less speculative than the Kantian one. Is it 
useful for a democratic society to accept anti-democratic 
statements from Nazis, Communists and Islamists? At first 
6 See the chapter on “Homo humanitatis” in Budtz Pedersen et  al. 
(2018).
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glance, probably not. But the counter-argument goes: Such 
acceptance might be useful after all, since the knowledge of 
anti-democratic views may help immunize the public against 
those very views. It is generally useful to have an uncensored 
public sphere that assures people that others mean what they 
say and are not forced to pretend or lie because of legislation. 
Unlike the Kantian definition, the utilitarian one emphasizes 
the pragmatic, social benefits of free expression. In a sense, 
this dimension complements a rights- and individual-based 
definition so important for this book, which has as its core 
topic the tech giants’ transformation of the public sphere. 
However, the emphasis on benefit to the public must always 
be counterbalanced by freedom of expression as an individ-
ual right. In cases where the two definitions clash, in our 
opinion the latter should outweigh the former.
Both theories are compatible with the idea of  freedom of 
expression as a means of testing authorities and established 
legislation—and ultimately breaking with them. Two of the 
many examples from modern times are the decline of slavery 
around 1800 and women’s right to vote around 1900—both 
changes became possible through extensive public debate 
prior to their realization. In this sense, a free public sphere 
enables the articulation and breakthrough of new political 
views and movements in a democracy.
The abolition of censorship in most modern democratic 
states took place from the 18th to the twentieth centuries and 
has, as a tendency, gone hand in hand with a greater tolerance 
of divergent views and opinions—be they religious, political, 
ethnic, etc. As mentioned earlier, this does not mean that 
freedom of expression is absolute. In a certain way, the ongo-
ing negotiation of its boundaries is a central theme in modern 
democratic politics, due to the idea of freedom of expression 
as a fundamental right, which should only be limited in cases 
where very convincing counter-arguments to do so are pres-
ent. Threats, explicit incitement or planning of violence and 
false personal defamation belong in this category. More 
debated examples include “hate speech”, which is not a crime 
in the US, but which has been criminalized in many European 
countries in various ways. Other controversial examples are 
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criticism of religion and blasphemy, which are no longer pro-
hibited in most modern democracies since the Enlightenment. 
This is not the case in many Muslim countries, which are 
working on enacting such laws internationally through the 
UN and by formally or informally pressuring public opinion 
in countries without such prohibitions.
In a certain sense, freedom of expression is counterintui-
tive—why not just silence abhorrent statements? The toler-
ance that freedom of expression implies is not easily achieved. 
It includes the duty, both of the government and of the indi-
vidual, to tolerate views, statements, pictures and books 
which may be considered abominable and grotesque, but 
which also have a right to reach the public. As has so often 
been said, tolerating views one agrees with is the easy part. 
But the fact that also Nazis, Islamic extremists or Communists 
should have the right to express their views on reality and the 
future is something that many people need a certain degree 
of self-reflection to accept. Something similar applies in the 
case of “hate speech”, which is why some argue that it should 
be tolerated and not banned. “Hate speech” is a notoriously 
ill-defined category, and in the laws of many countries, it is 
only described by simply listing a number of somewhat ran-
domly selected groups of people—labelled for example reli-
gious, ethnic, sexual, racial, etc. These groups cannot be 
criticized beyond a certain limit, but it is a difficult limit to 
define accurately—“insult”, “mockery”, “degradation”, etc. are 
imprecise terms often used. Compared to threats, which are 
usually covered in a separate clause, “hate speech” is less 
clearly defined. “Hate speech” legislation is not just a collec-
tive libel clause either. Most often, the definition of “hate 
speech” differs from that of libel in that it does not involve 
any assessment of the veracity of the statement (in the case 
of libel, charges may be dropped if the allegations are proven 
to be true, which is usually not the case with “hate speech”). 
Very often, “hate speech” legislation and verdicts end up 
applying also to the political criticism of the behavior of such 
groups. Such criticism is not necessarily untrue or politically 
illegitimate; most political activity naturally includes the dis-
cussion and changes of the general conditions of different 
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groups in society (rich, poor, public employees, entrepre-
neurs, refugees, retirees, etc.) who are therefore addressed in 
general terms. It is therefore difficult and maybe even impos-
sible to maintain “hate speech” legislation and at the same 
time avoiding its misuse to silence legitimate political stand-
points and even true statements about problems concerning 
different groups in society. As Professor at Law Nadine 
Strossen remarks, the introduction of “hate speech” legisla-
tion very often results in its use against those marshaling it, 
because different governments may use it to try to silence 
their opponents, once a “hate speech” law is accepted.
However, it is a defining feature of modern, liberal democ-
racies that the very discussion itself of such boundaries must 
take place in full public view. Such discussion makes use of 
freedom of expression, which guarantees people the ability to 
cite examples of prohibited content or of what others would 
like to see prohibited. This is unlike what happens in dictator-
ships or absolutist states. Here, both the general boundaries 
of statements and their translation into individual decisions 
and decrees may be decided secretly in the government appa-
ratus without legal trial or public insight or discussion. In this 
sense, the limits of freedom of expression are and should be 
the subject of ongoing, public and free debate.
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For a long time during the 1990s and 2000s, positive stories 
about the Internet prevailed. A growing number of people 
with online access, first in the Western world, then gradually 
across the globe, would start a new era of Enlightenment with 
freedom of information and freedom of expression in a new 
radical sense. An unprecedented number of individuals 
would gain easy access to the large amounts of information 
uploaded by many different players, from individuals to 
media outlets, to organizations and government authorities. 
As a growing number of free search engines came about, it 
became easier to seek out information. There is no doubt that 
much of the elementary optimism was actually correct: the 
world has become a significantly more enlightened place 
thanks to the Internet, in the basic sense of “enlightenment” 
as the increased dissemination of information and knowl-
edge—but also in the sense of Enlightenment as empower-
ment of the individual.
However, it was almost as if the Internet called upon 
people’s science fiction fantasies, both dystopian ones of a 
dark future characterized by over-technification, surveillance 
and control, and utopian ones seeing the network as a solu-
tion to almost all key human problems. In 1997, Danish sci-
ence journalist Tor Nørretranders prophesized about “the 
radical information democracy”1—editors, publishers, 
1 Nørretranders (1997) p.141.
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 broadcasters of all kinds became the emblem of evil, whom 
he accused of doing nothing more than manipulate, stream-
line and even suppress the flow of information. Now, with the 
internet, they could be phased out and made redundant, as 
online individuals would be able to put together their own 
newspaper, journal, book or TV show based on information 
searched for, found and combined by—themselves. The fact 
that there might still be need for organizations to sift, fact- 
check and synthesize the steadily growing amount of online 
information did not seem to worry promoters of such radical 
optimism, who saw a whole new, utopian, collaborative and 
responsive community emerge on the Internet. It would even 
replace the cumbersome electoral procedures of representa-
tive democracy, because ongoing, maybe even daily, online 
referenda would represent a more sensitive mapping of the 
people’s will. In this view, there was no room for doubt that 
the will of the people would always be democratic and could 
never turn into terrifying spontaneous decisions. Today, sup-
porters of “disruption” argue that, since the Internet can very 
accurately map the actual preferences of voters based on 
their “likes” and other search behavior, one could just draft 
policy according to such knowledge: “What if ... local authori-
ties did not need the opinions of citizens but instead mea-
sured their behavior and got to know their preferences that 
way?” Then this could be supplied by online polls as “a good 
way to wrap up something which sometimes becomes endless 
debate”, to quote the anti-parliamentary choice of words laid 
out in “Five Technological Themes”, a report from Danish 
consultant DareDisrupt.2 Others—for instance American 
2 DareDisrupt: “Fem teknologiske temaer” (Five Technological Themes), 
p. 70 and 135, 2018. The report was made on behalf of Local Government 
Denmark in 2018 and can be found on www.kl.dk (Danish version only). 
Most recent visit 08-04-18: http://www.kl.dk/ImageVaultFiles/id_85157/
cf_202/Kommunernes_Teknologiske_Fremtid_-fuld_version-.PDF. It is 
indeed unsettling to realize that an association such as Local Government 
Denmark is considering bypassing local elections. However, DareDisrupt 
and Local Government Denmark miss the fact that people do not vote 
based on preferences only but also based on ideals and ideologies.
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innovation consultant Lewis Perelman—thought that schools 
would become superfluous once everyone had a computer in 
their home to search and get the information they needed. If 
everyone were connected in one and the same open and 
transparent network, eternal problems of humanity such as 
ignorance, conflict, crime and war would simply disappear.
Other hopeful voices spoke about how the Internet would 
foster people’s generous drive towards collaboration, that is, 
they saw the Internet as a gift economy in the sense of Marcel 
Mauss and other anthropologists. CEO of Facebook, Mark 
Zuckerberg, has applauded this idea of giving your informa-
tion and services away for free and in return receiving equally 
free information and services from others.3 It seems that the 
gift economists of the online world did not study Mauss’ ideas 
in full, namely the part where exchanging gifts becomes a 
competition, obliging people to give a gift in return, in an 
attempt not to lose face. The reciprocal gift overbidding of 
the Kwakiutl indigenous tribes could result in aggressive 
“destruction feasts”, the so-called “potlatch”. In extreme cases, 
a chief could publicly destroy all of his property, including his 
food supplies, weapons, holy copper objects, canoes, even 
slaves, in order to ultimately put his opponent in a checkmate 
position, by giving him a gift that was impossible to recipro-
cate—and if the other could not reciprocate, that chief and 
his tribe would be enslaved to the opponent.
Other early Internet enthusiasts imagined that the grow-
ing collaboration among users within the network might form 
a whole new shared global brain where the many users con-
nected via the Internet would become the brain cells of a 
whole new higher-order consciousness at a planetary level 
that would surpass human consciousness when it comes to 
both intelligence and sensitivity. Few people discussed 
whether such a sensitive superintelligence would be morally 
good or politically open in any known sense, let alone adopt 
a kind stance toward the people who constituted it—or if it 
3 Kirkpatrick (2010) p. 287.
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might pursue completely other goals, goals incomprehensible 
and not necessarily pleasant to us as individuals.
In the 2000s, when social media such as MySpace, 
Friendster, Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Instagram and others 
emerged and grew, they were regarded as “power tools to the 
people” with radical social benefits. They would inaugurate 
not only a democratic redistribution of knowledge, but also 
new and intensified connections between people who would 
soon share most or all of their data with a growing circle of 
contacts and “friends”, ultimately with anybody. The big tech 
companies seem to have started as playful experiments, imag-
ining themselves as charitable initiatives to make the world a 
better place, rather than actual firms. In any case, it is safe to 
say that they became able to spread highly optimistic, gener-
ous and beneficial tales about themselves, about how they 
would supply the world with information under the motto 
“Don’t be evil” (Google), or about how the real goal was to 
make the world a more open and transparent place by con-
necting as many people as possible under the motto “Don’t 
be lame” (Facebook)—rather than monetizing these services, 
which was almost regarded as a slightly annoying side effect 
to take into consideration.4 Even during the April 2018 hear-
ings before Congress, Mark Zuckerberg displayed that atti-
tude. This is as believable as if big oil companies tried to 
convince us that their primary task is really to help people 
transport themselves comfortably to visit their friends and 
make the world a more connected place—and that any prof-
its derived from that were merely a secondary detail. However, 
the fact that Zuckerberg has also hailed the motto “Move fast 
and break things” is indicative of tolls and downsides to the 
fast growth of users and free services. After ten years of 
growth and becoming the world’s biggest corporations, the 
big tech companies now find themselves in need of taking not 
one but two basic considerations into account: One, they have 
4 At least according to Kirkpatrick’s (2010) biography on Zuckerberg. 
Martínez’ (2016) critical insider account of Facebook supports the claim 
that the company’s ads department had low priority and low prestige 
within the organization all the way up until the 2010s.
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to consider their users, of course, who need an enjoyable and 
useful free service to compensate for the time, attention, 
uploaded data and digital traces they put at the companies’ 
disposal, all free of charge; two, they must increasingly serve 
shareholders and the tech giants’ clients, that is, the advertis-
ing companies who pay for the whole party by buying an 
ever-increasing amount of banner advertisements of ever- 
increasing types and kinds.
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As early as the 1990s, there were critical voices with a skepti-
cal and even gloomy view of the beneficial effects of the 
Internet. Cultural critic and media theorist Neil Postman was 
generally skeptical towards technological solutions to politi-
cal problems. He understood technology through Goethe’s 
classical metaphor of the Faustian pact with the Devil. He 
believed the Internet would only add to the information con-
gestion that he already saw as one of the most important 
issues of modern society, and which makes it increasingly dif-
ficult to distinguish important from unimportant information. 
In hindsight, it is obvious that critics like Postman developed 
a highly limited and erroneous view on the possibilities of the 
Internet: “To put it plainly, I think the Internet is something 
like power steering or cruise control in cars. I mean, not that 
it’s not useful, but once you invent the basic car, you’ve got it. 
Now these things are useful, and the automobile companies 
add them on to the cars and then they convince consumers 
that they absolutely have to have them. I’m not saying that 
they’re completely useless—of course, they’re not. But the 
Internet doesn’t help us address the problems that we need to 
address.”1 Postman went as far as to dismiss the entire com-
puter and Internet revolution as a mere diversion from the 
real problems of society. “The Internet and computer tech-
1 Clark, N. “Home Alone With Technology: An Interview With Neil 
Postman” Iowa Journal of Cultural Studies (1996): pp. 151–159.
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nology are just distractions.”2 He basically considered it a new 
form of commercial entertainment technology with very 
limited utility; cf. his famous diagnosis: “We’re amusing our-
selves to death.” It is obvious that this kind of neo-Luddism 
completely missed its target and did not acknowledge the 
Internet’s already then burgeoning potential for education, 
dissemination of information, intellectual empowerment and 
cooperation.
Even so, Postman had glimpsed some critical issues that 
would prove very real. One was the commercialization of the 
Internet. Another was the difficulty of controlling a 
 phenomenon of such extensive international scope, as long as 
the control was only exercised on a national level: “... it's too 
international to be controlled.”3 Postman was asked about the 
potential advantages conveyed when a user’s computer col-
lects only information and knowledge that in fact suit the 
user’s individual interests, and he gloomily replied, in what 
turned out to be a foreshadowing of Google’s personalization 
strategy fifteen years later: “I can see your point, except in 
itself it does tend to increase fragmentation.”4 This is another 
important point, today captured in terms such as echo cham-
bers, confirmation bias, and filter bubbles. It is not a given fact 
that increased connectivity online in itself entail transpar-
ency, agreement, gift economy and cooperation, as tech giant 
leaders are repeatedly chanting. Increased connectivity may 
just as well lead to disagreement, tunnel vision, fragmenta-
tion, tribalism, shitstorms, online bullying and violence. 
Where these matters are concerned, Postman clearly foresaw 
the contours of problems that today appear abundantly clear.
As early as the mid-1990s, Postman was opposed by radical 
tech optimist Nicholas Negroponte,5 and in fact, an entire his-
tory dissertation could be written on the back and forth 
between pessimists and optimists during the 2000s and 2010s. 
2 Clark, N. “Home Alone With Technology: An Interview With Neil 
Postman” Iowa Journal of Cultural Studies (1996): p. 154.
3 Ibid., p. 156.
4 Ibid., p. 155.
5 Negroponte (1996).
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We shall not elaborate on that but instead draw attention to 
the fact that even though most tech pessimists radically 
underestimated the possibilities of the Internet and overesti-
mated its shortcomings, they often had a better understand-
ing of the nature of its concrete problematic issues. This was 
in stark opposition to the intoxicated apologists who tended 
to believe that the good side of the Internet would automati-
cally win out and marginalize or eradicate the bad. Our rec-
ommendation is, therefore, to be optimistic but to listen 
carefully to the pessimists.
There is some irony to the fact that many of the fantastic 
possibilities the Internet holds for public enlightenment, free 
speech and intellectual empowerment have run into still 
more problems. First, these problems have to do with a pro-
cess of commercialization that is changing the Internet. What 
once was a decentralized, anarchistic and relatively transpar-
ent platform for the interaction of many parallel, individual, 
small actors became a place where most interaction occurs 
via the opaque commercial platforms of a few gigantic com-
panies. Second, the problems have to do with the fact that the 
Internet is increasingly becoming a forum for already existing 
powers and power struggles between commercial, religious, 
political and state actors. As a result, freedom of expression is 
under pressure. The first issue implies that freedom of expres-
sion may be suspended the moment it is convenient to com-
mercial interests. Tech giants like Facebook, Twitter and 
Google have gained a powerful position that increasingly 
allows them to adapt and restrict access to information and to 
the rules of public conversation based on various political 
and commercial considerations.6 In other words, they are 
monetizing freedom of expression. The second issue implies 
6 Throughout the book, we address the western tech giants, especially 
Google and Facebook, but also Twitter, Amazon, etc. Government-run 
Chinese alternatives such as the social media WeChat and Weibo, search 
engine Baidu and internet retailer Alibaba (which interestingly enough 
means “thief” in Arab) have even more free speech issues than their 
western counterparts, but they—still?—have little muscle outside of 
China.
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that the very same incentives to suppress an adversary’s voice 
in “real life” now repeat themselves online, only with a great 
number of new technological possibilities at hand. In addition 
to traditional repressive censorship that attempts to suppress, 
prohibit or cleanse the public space from unwanted opinions 
and statements, new forms of censorship have been created 
aiming to prevent statements and opinions from spreading. 
These forms also include harassing, threatening and “doxx-
ing” senders or destroying their credibility. The idea of the 
Internet as the tool that would bring about a new Golden 
Age of Enlightenment has been turned on its head.
This distortion is closely linked to the fact that the Internet 
is increasingly dominated by huge companies like Google, 
Facebook and Twitter. Google was founded in 1998 by two 
PhD students at Stanford, Larry Page and Sergey Brin. The 
company name was inspired by the word “googol”, which 
means the number 10 to the 100th power. The company's 
many activities are centered around the search engine 
Google Search, which eventually outcompeted the Internet's 
many early search engines with its feature PageRank, which 
ranks search results according to how often the website is 
linked and the importance of the links. The company’s stated 
goal was “to organize the world's information and make it 
universally accessible and useful”. Google went public in 2004, 
and they have gradually developed or acquired a wide range 
of free services that facilitate collaboration (Google Docs), 
file storage (Google Drive), social networking (Google +), 
video sharing (YouTube), access to books (Google Books, 
Ngrams), email (Gmail), topographic maps (Google Maps), 
mobile telephony (Android), browsing (Google Chrome) 
and others. The company’s growing research department 
explores a plethora of things from flying cars to advanced AI 
and to conquering death. In 2015, all the company’s activities 
were gathered in the parent company Alphabet (which is, 
however, still often referred to as Google). In 2000, the com-
pany started showing ads based on the search history of users, 
which swiftly became its main source of income. From 2005, 
Google started generating tremendous revenue, and in recent 
years, the company has ranked as the world's second largest 
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after Apple. The company is among the most ingenious tax 
avoiders and channels its money out of the US via Ireland, 
the Netherlands and Bermuda.
Facebook was founded in 2004 by Mark Zuckerberg and a 
handful of fellow students at Harvard, initially just as a digital 
version of the University’s yearbook, showing photos and 
information about new students, called TheFacebook. The 
idea was to give students a free tool to keep in touch with 
their friends and different interest groups as defined on the 
platform.
The first serious investment came the same year from 
Silicon Valley legend Peter Thiel. The concept spread, first to 
other universities, then to regular users in the United States 
and later to a growing number of other countries. In 2006 
came the addition of news feed, which showed news, first 
from the user’s circle of friends, later from different media 
and advertisers. In 2008, after settling a lawsuit filed by other 
Harvard students who claimed Zuckerberg had stolen their 
idea, Facebook was free to expand and develop the product. 
They now became able to add news, a messenger service, 
acquisition of photo sharing service Instagram, chat service 
WhatsApp and much more. The first many years, the focus 
was on scaling, increasing the number of users, which was 
indeed skyrocketing. This number is today estimated around 
2 billion worldwide. It was not until recruiting Sheryl Sandberg 
from Google in 2008 that the company began aiming to run 
ads as its source of revenue. This method took form in 2010 
using the extensive collection of data on users obtained from 
their behavior on Facebook and from other sources—a busi-
ness model which rapidly turned the company into one of the 
largest in the world. Facebook went public in 2012. In the 
years following the 2016 US presidential election, Facebook 
was accused of being one of the main sources of “fake news”. 
And after the revelation in 2018 that the propaganda com-
pany Cambridge Analytica had had access to the data of 
more than 50 million users, Facebook has initiated a highly 
publicized restructuring of the platform. This naturally also 
aims to preempt regulations threatened by a number of 
political forces.
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Twitter was founded in 2006 by programmer Jack Dorsey 
and a handful of his friends. It offers quick and free dialogue 
through short statements —tweets—with a maximum length 
of 140 characters (increased, in 2017, to 280 characters). The 
service quickly came to serve as a conduit for the exchange of 
breaking news and opinion, and increasingly for brief public 
statements made by politicians, celebrities and others. 
Twitter’s success led Facebook to integrate similar features 
on its platform, but Twitter withstood the competition, and 
though they are not nearly as big as Google or Facebook, 
they remain a strong social network, carrying great influence 
in the world of politics. We thus see heads of state around the 
world launching political initiatives through a tweet. Twitter, 
too, generates revenue through advertising.
With their effective free service, these tech giants and their 
relatives such as Pinterest, Tumblr, Yahoo, Snapchat and 
many others have attracted huge numbers of users who make 
it possible to generate growing revenues through advertising. 
The changing commercial and political focus of these compa-
nies is, however, radically changing the public sphere and has 
gradually challenged the digital Enlightenment project of the 
Internet.
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On September 11, 2001, Internet users searched Google for 
information on the unfathomable events taking place in 
Manhattan. But the search “New York Twin Towers” came up 
with no hits. A full month had passed since the words “twin 
towers” had last been indexed. This meant that at this crucial 
moment, the term as a search object had not been updated. 
All the search results Google came up with were frustratingly 
irrelevant for the acute needs of the users. As an emergency 
solution, Google created a breaking news page featuring 
“News and Information on the US Attacks”, which was placed 
on top of the search list. The page featured links to the web-
sites of news outlets and other news organizations as well as 
useful links to aid organizations, emergency aid, phone num-
bers of airlines and hospitals. This episode made Google, dur-
ing the following year, develop a news filter as part of its 
search algorithm. This meant that current headlines now 
came up on top of the search list when a user entered the 
relevant search words.1
A lot has happened since. For a long time now, as a com-
pany Google has gained an indispensable position as a public 
utility. The company offers everyone free information. 
Equipped with a smartphone or an Internet connection, any-
1 Lafrance, A. “The Power of Personalization” Nieman Reports. 10-18-17.
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one can get an immediate answer to any lexical question. But 
the information met by the user is no longer the same. It is 
now ordered according to radically different principles than 
what we have seen previously. Somewhat unwittingly, people 
all over the world have invited Google and the other tech 
giants in on the most private spheres of their lives. These 
giants see this development as a data race for relevance—rel-
evance for the individual user and for the voracious 
advertisers.
The growing integration of digital experiences into every-
day life is not the result of one isolated shift. It is the conse-
quence of gradual changes. The Internet of today is often 
described as the third wave. First came the Web 1.0 of the 
1990s, which was merely built around websites, email and 
simple search engines. Then came the Web 2.0 of the early 
2000s with its expansion of blogs, wikis and social networks 
and where Google started to sell ads associated with search 
words.2 Starting around 2010, the Smart Web 3.0 has taken 
over—this third wave is driven by big data and smartphones.3 
Big data refers to three overlapping ways of using data. It 
simply refers to the massive and increasingly available 
amounts of data. It also covers the analytical techniques used 
to extract useful information from data. And finally, it is asso-
ciated with companies such as Facebook, Twitter and Google, 
who use extensive data analyses on user behavior as a core 
part of their business model.4
Meanwhile, the algorithms on which tech giants base their 
businesses have become more and more complex. An algo-
rithm is simply a rule-governed procedure aimed at solving a 
class of problems—parallel to a recipe where one keeps add-
ing ingredients in the form of data. The term dates back to 
ancient Greek mathematics, the name derived from al- 
2 “Web 2.0” was the title of a conference hosted by e-book publisher Tim 
O’Reilly in 2004.
3 Lynch (2016) p. 7.
4 Lynch (2016) p. 8.
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Kwarizmi, an Arab mathematician from the ninth century. 
Computer software became a readily available way to 
 formalize, develop and further automatize algorithms for 
many different purposes. In the context of tech giants, the 
word refers to central complexes of computer software which 
govern searches and rankings of search results (Google) or 
networks of “friends” and followers and what information 
flows through a given network (Facebook, Twitter) etc.—all 
while gathering user data for advertising purposes.
Algorithms function on the basis of data inputs and 
require those inputs to be sorted in specific data categories. 
Just like a cake recipe requires rule-bound input of e.g. flour, 
eggs, yeast, sugar, etc. in a certain sequence, algorithms pre-
suppose certain types of data, which it is able to recognize: An 
algorithm for the determination of prime numbers accepts 
integers as input only; an algorithm for birthday wishes 
requires dates as input; an algorithm for image comparison 
uses pixel sequences, etc. This implies that an algorithm 
requires a world categorized in specific data categories. If 
those categories are insufficient for the purpose at hand, 
there may be certain things wished for, which the algorithm 
may not be able to accept or express – or, conversely, there 
may be things unwished for, which it produces as output.
The algorithms are continuously updated by software 
engineers, and their ability to recognize, identify and catego-
rize data is constantly trained through machine learning in 
which humans present the algorithms with a series of exam-
ples of a given category (e.g. pornography) for the algorithms 
to recognize. Part of such an “ability to learn” can also be 
automatized through so-called deep learning, where data are 
filtered through self-adjusting networks. For instance, it is 
possible to create several varieties of a given procedure (e.g. 
the same ad in different colors), which are then launched 
simultaneously in order to choose the one that turns out the 
most effective. During this process, big tech algorithms 
become ever more comprehensive and complex and it is 
unlikely that any one programmer can get an overview of 
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them in their entirety. The tech giants have been criticized for 
only giving very few and specially skilled people—program-
mers—access to these algorithms, without seeking input from 
other types of experts.5 Algorithms are manmade and thus 
not necessarily fair, objective or neutral—their categoriza-
tions may contain many different kinds of biases, intended or 
unintended, e.g. of race, gender, politics and many others. 
Cathy O’Neil has famously called such harmful kinds of mod-
els for “Weapons of Math Destruction”. The models are opin-
ions embedded in mathematics and technology.6
December 4, 2009 was a decisive day for the third wave of 
the Internet, as it marked a radical shift in how information is 
consumed. That day, Google launched a fundamental modifi-
cation of its search function, “Personalized Search for 
Everyone”.7 Up until then, the key to Google’s success had 
been the famous algorithm PageRank, named after one of 
Google’s founders, Larry Page. It ranked key word search 
results based on the number and popularity of connections a 
given website had to other websites. It was inspired by the 
ranking of scientific articles based on how many times they 
had been quoted. The most well-connected websites came up 
at the top of the search list—no matter who entered the 
search word. But from that day on, in 2009, the objective cri-
terion was supplemented by subjective ones, tied to the indi-
vidual user. That made the platform personalized, and since 
then, two users no longer get the same results from the same 
search. Now Google tracks user behavior to generate and 
store massive amounts of data based on geographic location, 
search history and other demographic information. 
Furthermore, personalization provides insight into user 
behavior based on the dizzying 3.5 billion searches entered 
5 A deeper characterization of artificial intelligence and algorithms can 
be found in a guide published by Wired magazine: Simonite, T. “The 
Wired Guide to Artificial Intelligence” Wired. 02-01-18.
6 O’Neil (2016).
7 Google “Personalized Search for everyone” Google Blog. 12-04-09.
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every day.8 New algorithms enable Google to come up with 
ever more sophisticated guesstimates about who the user is 
and what information is personally relevant to that  individual. 
There are two fundamental purposes to this data collection. 
First, these data are supposed to bring to the top of the search 
list the news and search results that are most relevant to the 
individual user. But at the same time, these data help adver-
tisers find people likely to buy their products. The latter is the 
key to understanding the tech giants’ business model. Ads 
targeted according to this information are bought by market-
ers, enabling them to present, on the Google list of pages 
found, ads which are adapted to the detailed personal prefer-
ences of users. In practice, this means that each user is pre-
sented with different, personalized versions of the Internet. 
Many people might still assume that when a word is googled, 
the results will be objective and the same for everyone—that 
they are simply the most authoritative results. That was 
indeed the case in the early days of search algorithm 
PageRank, but that standard version of Google is long since 
outdated.9
Personalization, and the data collection that goes with it, 
has not only become the main strategy for Google but also 
for other tech companies such as Facebook, Twitter and many 
others. That same year, in 2009, Facebook introduced its like 
button, which made it possible for users to express a simple 
accept of some presented content or other. It also made it 
possible for the people who had posted the content to use the 
number of likes as a measuring stick of their individual popu-
larity. Facebook and Twitter record an extremely detailed 
portrait of each individual user based on things like clicks, 
likes, words, movements and networks of “friends”.10 Facebook 
COO, Sheryl Sandberg, explains the idea behind the strategy 
in this way: “People don’t want something targeted to the 
whole world—they want something that reflects what they 
8 Galloway (2017) p. 5.
9 Pariser (2011) p. 2.
10 Galloway (2017) p. 99.
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want to see and know”.11 This is smart and not least very con-
venient for the user. It enables you to dive directly into 
 specialized news and stories about exactly the topics that are 
especially important to you—more easily than ever before.
Gradually, personalization has moved closer to many parts 
of an individual user’s life.12 To begin with, only ads were 
tailor- made, then came news and then the entire flow of 
information: essentially, large chunks of the user’s online life. 
The business formula is simple: The more personally relevant 
information the tech giants can offer, the more personally 
targeted ads they can sell, and the higher the probability of 
the user buying the product offered.
From the moment news was adapted to the user, suddenly 
it was possible to get news in real time, customized to the 
individual user. Many people still get their news through TV, 
radio, newspapers or digital news sources other than social 
media. But the figures from “Reuters Digital News Report 
2017”, mapping out news consumption in more than 36 coun-
tries, among them Denmark and the US, show that more than 
half of users—54% to be exact—get news via social media, 
with an even higher percentage among younger generations. 
In all countries involved, 33% of youth between the ages of 
18 and 24 now primarily get their news from social media, and 
in many countries, news consumption via messengers such as 
WhatsApp are growing fast. In these statistics, Facebook is by 
far the most important source of news.13 As early as 2007, 
founder Mark Zuckerberg boasted that Facebook might be 
the biggest news source in the world: “We’re actually produc-
ing more news in a single day for our 19 million users than 
every other media outlet has in their entire existence.”14 Since 
then the number of users has increased a hundredfold. 
11 Kirkpatrick, M. “Facebook Exec: All Media Will Be Personalized in 3 
to 5 Years” ReadWriteWeb. 09-29-10.
12 Pariser (2011) p. 8–9.
13 “Digital News Report 2017” Reuters Institute for the Study of 
Journalism, Oxford University.
14 McGirt, E. “Hacker. Dropout. CEO”. Fast Company. 01-05-07.
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However, the word “producing” is overstating things quite a 
bit, given the fact that Facebook does not produce researched, 
investigative, fact-checked journalism. The company does not 
produce news in any standard public sense but limits itself to 
passing on news produced by and financed by other organiza-
tions—not to mention tidings of the more private kind about 
cats, food, love and hate, which users exchange among them-
selves. But even this softer news category is not produced by 
Facebook, but by its users. Even in its section Trending Topics, 
Facebook does nothing but forward news coming from oth-
ers—some of which are important, some less so.
Personalizing the entire flow of information means that 
the tech giants’ algorithms have come to orchestrate large 
parts of the user’s life. The user consumes gossip alongside 
status updates, news alongside entertainment and ads. The 
idea is for the user to live and move inside the current: add-
ing, consuming and redirecting information. In an interview 
with Wall Street Journal on the future outlook of the com-
pany, Google CEO Eric Schmidt notes: “I actually think most 
people don’t want Google to answer their questions […] They 
want Google to tell them what they should be doing next.”15 
It may sound bizarre, but Schmidt elaborates by using a leap 
of imagination. Picture yourself walking down the street. 
With the information Google has gathered about you, the 
company knows more or less who you are, what your interests 
are and who your friends are. Within only a few meters, 
Google also knows your exact location. Now imagine you 
need milk and there is a place nearby where milk is sold. This 
is the moment Google will remind you that you need milk. 
Moreover, Google will let you know if you’re also near a shop 
that sells precisely those horse track betting posters you 
recently searched for online. Or it will let you know if it turns 
out that the nineteenth century assassination you just read 
about took place across the street. In short: the objective is 
15 Jenkins, H.W. Jr. “The Weekend Interview with Eric Schmidt: Google 
and the Search for the Future” The Wall Street Journal. 08-14-10.
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that the user will live in a world where personally relevant 
information is presented everywhere.
It is nothing new that information and news are adapted to 
the user. For instance, traditional media are often shaped 
according to opinions and interests of the individual reader, 
who belongs to a specific segment. Consider a phenomenon 
such as the sometimes heavily lauded Danish “four newspa-
per system” from the early twentieth century. It made sure 
that everyone read a newspaper published by the party they 
voted for—with news and opinions tailored to each party’s 
electorate. Today the difference is that it is possible to specify 
all the way down to the individual level. Secondly, the send-
er’s intention is profit, which is connected to the market, and 
not political orientation, which is connected to society. 
Naturally, the result of this adjustment is that the remaining 
media landscape may be ignored. Tech giants help you handle 
the infinite amount of information available online. They give 
you an individual news diet. The problem is that this individ-
ual tailoring of information automatically creates filter bub-
bles.16 Filtering out all things with no direct immediate 
personalizable relevance creates a bubble of what one 
already knows, is already interested in, already likes. Generally 
speaking, a filter bubble has three characteristics: it causes 
isolation, it is invisible, and it is imposed.17 The user may thus 
be left alone, placed in a sort of intellectual isolation. With 
search results and news feeds completely tailored to each 
user, we all see radically different versions of the Internet. 
Furthermore, the factors that determine the ranking of search 
results change constantly. This also happens with the algo-
16 The existence of filter bubbles is disputed because it may ascribe tech-
nology too much power, as long as people believe that such bubbles are 
an automatic consequence of algorithms. It can be viewed as three lev-
els: filter bubbles are the result of personalized algorithms, which again 
are the result of programmers, their decisions and more or less conscious 
principles and values. In this light we see no reason to dismiss the exis-
tence of filter bubbles  – with the addition that their existence is not 
unconditional but may be mitigated by an active effort of users.
17 Pariser (2011) p. 9.
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rithms themselves, many of which are programmed to auto-
matically generate variations of themselves in order to get 
even better results in the form of attention and clicks. It is, 
therefore, impossible to know exactly how one user’s search 
results differ from those of others.18 Because the filter bubble 
is invisible—in the sense that the tech giants avoid drawing 
attention to the filtering process—one may easily be fooled 
to believe that it is objective, neutral and true. That is not the 
case. As tech giants keep the black box of their algorithms a 
secret, it is difficult or even impossible to notice biases in it, 
that is, whether it leaves out crucial information. Who does 
the algorithm believe the individual to be? And why does it 
show the results it ends up showing?
Lastly, whether the user wants to live in a filter bubble or 
not is not up for discussion. The filter bubble is imposed—
albeit to a lesser extent on Twitter. Neither Facebook nor 
Google allows for the user to make an active choice about 
how their world is filtered. Twitter is more open about the 
fact that it goes through the “profile and activity” of users in 
order to find out their interests and about the fact that they 
sell ads based on these interests. As opposed to the two other 
companies, Twitter allows to opt in or out. It is even possible 
to see how many advertisers are tracking the user. But even 
though it is possible to opt out of the “interest-based adver-
tisements” in personalization and data settings, it is not pos-
sible to remove oneself entirely from the advertisers’ target 
audience. For instance, Twitter tracks which apps, apart from 
Twitter, are on the device and which websites (with Twitter 
integration) the user visits.19 In the default settings this fea-
ture is enabled, which could be a sign that Twitter has already 
shared the information with potential advertisers. But at least 
Twitter has allowed for an opt-out. It should not be underes-
timated, however, that deciding default settings beforehand 
18 Lafrance, A. “The Power of Personalization” Nieman Reports. 
10-18-17.
19 Fox-Brewster, T. “Creepy Or Cool? Twitter Is Tracking Where You’ve 
Been, What You Like And Is Telling Advertisers”. Forbes. 05-18-17.
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gives a certain power to the tech companies—a strategy many 
online companies use based on the observation that very few 
users consider their settings, not to speak of changing them. 
Rather, the users rush past the dire and complicated legal text 
they must accept in order to even get started. The users are 
busy, they have only so much attention available to make 
decisions, and in general they trust everything to be okay 
when no one else seems to take a deeper look at the settings. 
More often than not, the standard settings give the companies 
very deep access to data and digital traces left by the user. 
Such trust in the companies seems misplaced.
But why are filter bubbles such a big problem if it has the 
convenience of tailoring the information flow to one’s own 
preferences? Because the user risks being misinformed. It 
may lead people to believe that factually false beliefs are in 
fact true. Inside the filter bubble, users risk getting trapped—
or trapping themselves—in a closed chamber of conspiracy 
theories, lies and “fake news”, designed especially for the 
individual user. For example, if you join an anti-vaccine group 
on Facebook, the algorithms will redirect you to many other 
groups which also flirt with conspiracies: Why not join an 
anti-GMO group as well? Or what about the Flat Earth 
Society (yes, it does exist)? Or how about a group that has the 
recipe for healing cancer naturally? The recommendations 
can drag the user into isolating communities, which see their 
own realities through their own “facts”. The system of algo-
rithms may calculate that a given user is the anxious type, 
finding solace in conspiracies. This is likely to have dangerous 
consequences. In 2016, many Brazilians believed that the 
authorities lied when they said the dangerous zika virus could 
lead to damaged fetuses. Rumors were all over the social 
media, and no one was sure if the true cause of the damage 
was vaccines, pesticides or mosquitoes.20 In Europe and the 
US, between 2014 and 2017, Russian bots and trolls spread 
misinformation about vaccines via Twitter. The campaign was 
20 Worth, K. “As Brazil Confronts Zika, Vaccine Rumors Shape 
Perceptions” Public Broadcasting Service. 02-16-16.
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an attempt to weaken public confidence in vaccination and 
expose users to contagious diseases. In August 2018, the 
World Health Organization announced that a record high 
number of people were affected by the measles in Europe. 
According to experts, this wave of infections is the result of a 
decline in the number of people being vaccinated. In the US, 
the number of parents refusing to vaccinate is also on the 
rise.21 On Twitter, one might get the impression that this oth-
erwise safe and efficient vaccine is extremely disputed. 
Theories and ideas found online lead both highly and less 
highly educated people to believe that they are capable of 
seeing through the pharmaceutical industry and professional 
health recommendations.
Inside the filter bubble, the users find confirmation in their 
already existing points of view, or at least in the un-activated 
ones rooted in exactly their particular personality type. This 
tendency is called confirmation bias, and today this is boosted 
by algorithms automatically sorting aside information that 
might challenge the user’s existing views of the world.
The filter bubble not only traps users inside a confine of 
already established interests and positions, but it also keeps 
them out of the other bubbles. Here, a person is no longer 
presented with alternative world views, let alone enabled to 
see how the bubbles of others actually look. You may not 
meet the worlds, ideas and arguments of opponents, be they 
political, religious or other. You may lose the beneficial habit 
of attempting to understand why others have the opinions 
they have and fall back on assuming that other viewpoints are 
simply crazy, stupid, pathological or evil. Sometimes, when 
outside bubbles, we may realize that an opponent is right, 
other times it’s necessary to know the details of the oppo-
nent’s position to be able to find compromise. The filter 
bubble does not support such crucial social options—quite 
the contrary.
21 BBC News “Russia trolls ‘spreading vaccination misinformation’ to 
create discord” BBC News. 08-24-18.
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The years 2015–16 saw a vicious example of filter bubbles 
at work. Google-owned video sharing service YouTube 
became a key place for the Alt-right movement to organize 
their extreme rightist views, of white supremacy, malicious 
racism and the like. This went unnoticed by many users, 
because it was happening in a growing bubble of enthusiastic 
users whose activity most other users did not discover—
unless they actively searched for those kinds of videos. The 
YouTube algorithm sent viewers of the extremist material 
still more videos of the same kind, oftentimes even more 
extreme ones (more on this later). Some users with many fol-
lowers were even paid a cut of the on-screen ad revenues 
their videos would generate. Selected super-users were even 
paid to produce more videos featuring their political extrem-
ism and upload them to their “preferred” YouTube-channel.22 
In the spring of 2017, this was revealed by traditional media, 
leaving YouTube with almost as much explaining to do as 
Facebook would have in 2018. Quickly, a number of patch-
work solutions were introduced to reassure the public and 
advertisers, but even though YouTube probably no longer 
decidedly pays fascists for their views, the structural problem 
is here to stay: big, problematic, crazy movements can germi-
nate in the shadows of tech giants without the general public 
finding out. The media ought to hire investigative journalists 
to continuously check a variety of dissuasive keywords on the 
different platforms in order to identify such filter bubbles.
Nevertheless, empirical studies of polarization show that 
the aforementioned problems caused by filter bubbles will be 
developed in full only in a future where the vast majority of 
news coverage takes place online. During the 2016 presiden-
tial elections in the US, the most important news sources 
were still television networks such as CNN and Fox News 
22 Moser, B. “How YouTube Became the Worldwide Leader in White 
Supremacy. When Google promises to “curb” extremism on its lucrative 
video platform, it means nothing more than keeping advertisers happy” 
New Republic. 08-21-17.
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(which can also cause bubble effects, to be sure, if a person 
sticks to one single channel only). According to a 2017 survey, 
the groups of people in the US who spent the least amount of 
time online were also the groups who had seen the highest 
increase in political polarization from 1996–2012. Such a 
result is a compelling reason not to conclude that the full 
effects of filter bubbles are already here.23 This does not 
exclude, however, the existence of bubbles related to knowl-
edge, news, etc. Maybe the result tells us that people with less 
online experience are more prone to wind up in a filter bub-
ble, whereas people who spend more time online have 
become more capable of withstanding the effects of bubbles? 
Despite these important findings, the general diagnosis of 
filter bubbles is presumably a forecast, admonishing a possi-
ble future trend.
Generally speaking, personalization has given the tech 
giants a very powerful position—they have indeed become a 
camera lens between user and reality. The user may live 
inside the filter bubble, where freedom of choice has been 
replaced by free selection between items on a highly person-
alized menu only. The filter bubble controls what we see and 
what we do not see. It is indeed convenient that Google 
comes up with exactly the right recommendation and pres-
ents ads for things the user is actually interested in. But it 
happens at the expense of the user’s freedom. In order for 
people to act freely, the future must be open and information 
freely available. In the data race for relevance, tech giants 
have in fact turned into predictability machines. To a large 
extent, the giants’ harvest of big data makes it possible to 
predict human behavior, and this means that the future can 
be calculated and controlled. In the third wave of the Internet, 
23 Cf. Oremus, W. “The Filter Bubble Revisited” Slate. 04-05-17; Boxell, L; 
Gentzkow, M; Shapiro, J.M. “Is the internet causing political polariza-
tion? Evidence from demographics”, Working Paper, Brown University. 
Last visited 12-19-18: https://www.brown.edu/Research/Shapiro/pdfs/
age-polars.pdf.
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users risk having to give up their freedom in order to achieve 
convenience. This presents a big danger for freedom of 
expression, understood in the accompanying sense: freedom 
of information. This is not so much a matter of censorship and 
removal of certain topics—that happens as well, more on this 
later—but the fact that the user is led to believe that the indi-
vidual’s bubble makes up the whole relevant world.
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In January 2017, George Orwell’s futuristic dystopian novel 
1984 was brought back to life. The reason this 70-year-old 
classic all of a sudden became a no. 1 bestseller on Amazon is 
likely to be found in the White House. But in focusing too 
much on the dangers forecast in 1984, we should not forget an 
older and less famous vision, Aldous Huxley’s Brave New 
World (1932). It is at least as relevant as the Orwellian dysto-
pia. Its content easily translates to today’s criticisms of tech-
nology, as it describes how people will love the very same 
technology that deprives them of their ability to think clearly 
and critically. Both visions of the future have been put face- 
to- face by cultural and media critic Neil Postman: “What 
Orwell feared were those who would ban books. What 
Huxley feared was that there would be no reason to ban a 
book, for there would be no one who wanted to read one. 
Orwell feared those who would deprive us of information. 
Huxley feared those who would give us so much that we 
would be reduced to passivity and egoism. Orwell feared that 
the truth would be concealed from us. Huxley feared the 
truth would be drowned in a sea of irrelevance. Orwell feared 
we would become a captive culture. Huxley feared we would 
become a trivial culture, preoccupied with some equivalent of 
the feelies, the orgy porgy, and the centrifugal bumble 
puppy.”1 Postman’s presumption, that Huxley’s future vision 
1 Postman, N (1989) p. 11–12.
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was not the least relevant of the two, rings truer today than 
ever before. In the Information Age, there is an abundance of 
information and competition over our attention. This has cre-
ated an attention economy in which tech giants compete for 
harvesting the most attention and reselling it to third party 
advertisers.2 But this war over attention has its victims. First, 
it has led tech giants to develop still smarter designs whose 
purpose it is to create dependence. The idea is for users to 
spend as much time as possible on the platforms and click, 
like, share as often as possible—to engage. Second, compa-
nies add targeted, usually secret, ingredients to their algo-
rithms, which then reward the content that attracts the most 
attention and traffic. This has led to a knowledge deficit in an 
online world dominated by emotions. We have long been 
blind to the negative consequences of this attention-based 
infrastructure and have come to love a technology that gob-
bles up our ability to think reflectively.
Information has never been as easily available and all- 
embracing in its offerings as it is today. As IT guru Mitchell 
Kapor once put it: “Getting information off the Internet is 
like taking a drink from a fire hydrant.”3 Such an overwhelm-
ing amount of available information has caused a deficit of 
attention. All the way back in 1971, a Nobel Prize winner in 
Economics, Herbert Simon, warned of this: “[I]n an 
information- rich world, the wealth of information means a 
dearth of something else: a scarcity of whatever it is that 
information consumes. What information consumes is rather 
obvious: it consumes the attention of its recipients.”4
Today, attention should be considered a limited resource. 
The Internet has become a chaotic marketplace, where the 
price of information is not paid with dollars and cents, but 
with attention. Unlike financial means, however, attention is 
2 “Attention economy” became a widespread concept after Davenport 
and Beck cam out with their book The Attention Economy in 2001.
3 Hansen and Hendricks (2011) p. 13.
4 Simon (1971) p. 40–41.
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distributed more evenly among people.5 Furthermore, atten-
tion cannot be accumulated like money. We are constantly 
more or less attentive to something. But the common denom-
inator between attention and money is that if the resource is 
used on one thing, it is at the expense of something else.6 
Philosopher and psychologist William James pointed to this 
back in 1890, with his well-known definition of attention: 
“[Attention] is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and 
vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously 
possible objects or trains of thought. […] It implies with-
drawal from some things in order to deal effectively with 
others.”7 The brain, of course, has a limited capacity to handle 
information. Many perceptions are eliminated, if they take 
place outside one’s field of attention. The phenomenon is 
called ‘inattentional blindness’ and has been exposed by 
Daniel Simons and Christopher Chabris in a famous psycho-
logical experiment, “The Invisible Gorilla”.8 The participants 
watched a video where some basketball players threw two 
balls around among each other. Participants were asked to 
count how many times the balls were thrown by one team 
and at the same time say if they discovered anything unusual. 
The interesting thing was that while they were busy focusing 
their attention on the ball and on the players, about one in 
5 An important measure of attention is of course time—how much time 
does a user spend on a website and how many ads can the user deal with 
in that period of time? Attention as a resource, however, is not entirely 
evenly distributed, as different people can process different amounts of 
content in the same amount of time, and experienced and intelligent 
Internet users can visit a lot more websites in a given period of time than 
less skilled users. Tech giants take this into account by sometimes using 
other measuring sticks than time, especially the number of sites visited 
and the number of clicks made; thus, ads can be paid for according to 
number of visitors and number of clicks.
6 Wu, T. “Attention Brokers” NYU Law. 10-10-15.
7 James, W. (1890) The Principles of Psychology. Chapter 11: Attention. 
Classics in the History of Psychology, Green, C.D. (ed.) Last visited: 
05-08-18: http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/James/Principles/prin11.htm.
8 Simons, D. J. & Chabris, C. F. “Gorillas in our midst: sustained inatten-
tion blindness for dynamic events” Perception, vol. 28. 05-09-99.
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two test subjects completely overlooked something: a person 
in a gorilla costume walked straight through the middle of the 
group of players, stopped in the middle, beat his chest and 
wandered off. The experiment shows spectacularly how atten-
tion is a scarce resource. There is a lot we sense but do not 
actually see.
On tech platforms there is high demand for attention. To 
advertisers, attention is a valuable resource because it is nec-
essary in order to nurture demand for a product, raise aware-
ness about a certain news story or gain political influence.9 
The advertisers’ high interest in this scarce resource has led 
to fierce competition between the tech giants over who can 
harvest the most attention. Facebook, Twitter, Google and 
other tech companies can be seen as middle men locked in 
rivalry, wedged in between the attention economy and the 
monetary economy, because what they resell is user attention. 
In a way, the attention economy is no new thing. Studies from 
as early as the 1970s saw ad-driven American TV networks 
through a similar lens: their business concept is selling their 
clients’ attention to advertisers. A parallel to this are free 
newspapers: they also lure clients to give away their attention 
free of charge, only for it to be capitalized in the form of ad 
sales. But on the Internet, the attention economy is taken 
much further, with the help of new means such as addiction 
and personalization.
Google started this game early, in 2000, by applying the 
rather obvious idea of offering ads associated with keywords 
entered by users. Facebook seems to have had significantly 
more trouble finding out how their accumulated data about 
users, their likes, their posts and their networks could be used 
for advertising purposes. According to Facebook insider 
Antonio García Martínez, it was only in 2013 that the com-
pany really cracked the code by opening up a user’s news 
feed to ads that could be targeted to that individual user.10 
That was the result of a combination of ideas. These included: 
9 Wu, T. “Attention Brokers” NYU Law. 10-10-15.
10 Martínez (2016) p. 292, 384–88, 394.
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extracting user behavior in many general categories (e.g. “hip 
hop music” instead of the more specific “Eminem”); supply-
ing Facebook’s own data with massive amounts of external 
personal data purchased from data brokers, who had—since 
the 1960s—built a large industry of targeted print ads via the 
postal system in the US; identifying the user across indicators 
such as name, address, phone number, email and IP-address; 
and retargeting, i.e. continuously following browser and shop-
ping behaviors in real time and registering not only whether 
they clicked on or merely looked at the ads, but also whether 
they actually acted upon them.
In this race for attention, the winner is the tech giant who 
is able to exploit a user’s time and attention to the maximum. 
Therefore, the giants fight to keep the user glued to the 
screen. Google’s former product manager, Tristan Harris, has 
become a strong critic of the methods his former employer 
and others deploy to keep user attention. In his opinion, the 
giants’ computer engineering designs have become so sophis-
ticated that they actually hijack the users’ brains.11 Or to put 
it less dramatically, the systems have become better at 
exploiting the users’ instincts than the users themselves are at 
controlling them.
Consumers have always been convinced and persuaded by 
a variety of sellers, town criers or advertisers. But what is new 
about the attention economy is that the tech platforms are 
designed to cause outright dependence. That way they har-
vest the maximum amount of the users’ attention in what 
turns out to be a very unequal struggle because the individual 
user is up against corporate programmers and psychologists 
using advanced personalized data, all of whom work hard to 
predict how the individual user is likely to respond to differ-
ent temptations. Take for example YouTube’s auto-play fea-
ture. It is designed to make users spend as much time as 
possible on the platform by placing—immediately after the 
end of the video chosen by the user—a related video not 
11 Thompson, N. “Our Minds have been Hijacked by Our Phones. Tristan 
Harris Wants to Rescue Them” Wired. 07-06-17.
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chosen by the user. It is undoubtedly entertaining when 
YouTube sucks the user into a current of lol cats, finding ever 
funnier and crazier versions. But YouTube is not preoccupied 
with the fact that this can divert users not only from attending 
to their personal wellbeing in the form of sleep, family time 
and work, but also from serious news, debates and public life. 
In similar fashion, the teaser clickbaits work by holding back 
interesting information in order to make users click through 
more ads in order to reach the wanted information.
In line with Tristan Harris, Facebook co-founder Sean 
Parker has revealed that Facebook was developed from the 
idea of maximum exploitation of users’ time and attention. 
Parker explains how the Facebook like button is designed to 
give the user “a little dopamine hit”, which motivates the user 
to upload more content and spend more time on the website. 
The same hit is released by comments to posts and images. 
Parker elaborates: “It’s a social-validation feedback loop … 
exactly the kind of thing that a hacker like myself would 
come up with, because you’re exploiting a vulnerability in 
human psychology.”12 This makes “liking” the fundamental 
connection made between “friends”: it is all about social 
acceptance. But what if the button instead said “important” 
and referred to something a person found important for his 
“friends” to see?
There is an interesting myth about the like feature — that 
it supposedly can be traced back to French philosopher René 
Girard, who is even referred to as the “Godfather of the like 
button”. The element of truth to this myth has to do with Peter 
Thiel, Facebook’s first big investor, board member and one of 
the most prominent opinion leaders of Silicon Valley. Thiel is 
famous for his libertarian critique of government in all its 
forms and for his vision of stateless societies forming on inde-
pendent islands, ships and the like. Thiel is claimed to have 
based his early investment in Facebook on an analysis of the 
12 Solon, O. “Ex-Facebook president Sean Parker: site made to exploit 
human ‘vulnerability’” The Guardian. 11-09-17.
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business concept’s opportunities built on René Girard’s the-
ory of “mimetic desire”.13
The idea is that unlike human needs, human desires are 
not spontaneous or given but mediated through other people, 
as they are largely directed at what the person observes oth-
ers to desire. People want what others have. Facebook is 
designed to do exactly that, mediate between people’s desires: 
you continuously update your knowledge of what others 
“like” and respond to it by hitting “like” yourself  — and 
exposing to your “friends” an image of yourself as someone 
who has attained the coveted objects of desire. Thiel himself 
took Girard’s classes when Girard was a professor at Stanford 
University. Thiel saw Facebook as a technology that was 
based on the mimetic nature of humanity and which gave 
mimetic desire new ways to flourish and spread.
In the year Facebook was founded, 2004, Thiel sponsored 
a symposium with and about Girard, entitled Politics and 
Apocalypse. It was held at Stanford near Silicon Valley, and 
Thiel himself participated with his talk “The Straussian 
Moment”, referring to the German-American political thinker 
Leo Strauss.14 That talk showed Thiel’s awareness of the mul-
tiple components of Girard’s theory. The mimetic desire 
implies that everybody wants what others have. That of 
course leads to infinite strife and conflict between people—
occasionally culminating in a “mimetic crisis”, gang battles, 
rebellion, persecution, civil war, revolution, war, etc. Girard 
now claims that the traditional way of overcoming such a 
crisis and re-establishing peace is to designate a scapegoat 
who is then obliged to bear all responsibility for the crisis and 
who is consequently imprisoned, exorcised, killed or other-
wise sacrificed and pacified, so peace can prevail. But, of 
course, peace does not last because the war was never really 
the scapegoat’s fault, and the constant crises require a 
13 Shullenberger, G. “Mimesis and Violence Part I: Peter Thiel’s French 
Connection” Cybergology. 08-02-16.
14 The symposium was later published as a book, cf. Hamerton-Kelly 
(2007).
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 constant supply of scapegoats. Girard, who was a Catholic, 
claimed that Christianity, in its right interpretation, is the only 
cure against ongoing strife and exorcism of scapegoats, since 
the Crucifixion of Jesus is the last and definitive sacrifice, 
which is why Christians must turn the other cheek. This is 
where Thiel strays away from his master. In his essay, combin-
ing Girard with Carl Schmitt, Thiel rages against Enlightenment 
ideas which he accuses of hiding the true, violent nature of 
humanity—and which, nevertheless, are in the process of 
being exposed in a disclosure that will once and for all over-
throw modernity itself. In this view, the Enlightenment proj-
ect is mistaken in that “... the whole issue of human violence 
has been whitewashed away by the Enlightenment.”15 
Enlightenment, according to Thiel, caused a shutdown of all 
discussion of human nature (which is actually pretty inaccu-
rate, seen from the point of view of intellectual history).16 He 
also blames the Enlightenment movement for the vulnerabil-
ity of the West when up against terrorist violence, because 
Western principles stand in the way of a hard and efficient 
response from the West. We therefore need “...to awaken from 
that very long and profitable period of intellectual slumber 
and amnesia, that is so misleadingly called the 
Enlightenment.”17
Thiel then considers what a Christian prince or statesman 
is supposed to do, once the Enlightenment project runs dry. 
But he comes up with no clear answer other than that leaders 
must be prepared to bravely lead a world completely differ-
ent from the Enlightenment version of the modern world, 
with its peaceful but entirely elusive and ineffective discus-
sions which Thiel so adamantly mocks the Enlightenment 
project for having promoted. With his martial preference for 
Schmitt and his insistence on a society that can only be politi-
cally united if it singles out a common enemy, Thiel does not 
15 Thiel (2007) p. 209.
16 The eight conceptions of humanity currently at odds with each other, 
as mapped out in David Budtz et al. (2018) are all to varying degrees 
rooted in Enlightenment ideas.
17 Thiel (2007) p. 198.
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seem to share Girard’s pacifism. They do share, however, the 
drive to expose humanity’s true nature. Thiel compares Leo 
Strauss to Girard, pointing to time as what separates the two. 
While Strauss is hesitant to reveal the dark side of humanity, 
Girard is more impatient as to how quickly modernity should 
be overthrown by the disastrous revelation of humanity’s 
violent nature. On this matter, Thiel is on Girard’s side: as 
soon as possible!
A month after Thiel’s symposium on Girard, he went on to 
invest the decisive 500,000 dollars in Facebook. Why this 
investment? Empirically, it is true that the existence of 
Facebook actuates the next steps of Girard’s theory: battle 
and strife are coming thick and fast, tribalization is increasing, 
not least because the attention economy naturally focuses on 
the most striking and click-amassing aspects: fear, anger, 
hatred, rage, balkanization, violence, etc. It is also evident that 
the scapegoat logic thrives on the platform, in the form of 
more or less organized social media shitstorms directed at 
select victims. As noted by writer Geoff Shullenberger, these 
somewhat violent Facebook phenomena might be more than 
simply unexpected side effects; they may in fact be Facebook’s 
key defining “features”.
Did Thiel consider Facebook an opportunity to start an 
enormous mimetic crisis, so that the Enlightenment project 
could end as soon as possible? In the essay he references 
Girard: “However, the new science of humanity must thrive 
the idea of imitation, or mimesis, much further than it has in 
the past.”18 In Thiel’s short 2014 manifesto, Zero to One, 
Girard’s name is absent  — but not his theory. In the final 
chapter, the heroes and idols of different cultures are ana-
lyzed through Girard’s theory—inherent in these persons are 
18 Thiel (2007) p. 209. It is a thought-provoking fact that several of the 
tech giants’ principles seem to be traceable to more or less well-under-
stood humanistic and philosophical doctrines, e.g. political communitari-
anism, Mauss’ gift economy and Girard’s theory of desire. Although the 
effects of humanists on the Internet might come off more as “grimpact” 
than impact, they can hardly be held responsible for the use of half-
baked versions of their doctrines.
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both potential gods and scapegoats. The heroes of our times 
are the founders of technological start-up companies, notes 
Thiel with little modesty. At the same time, he warns against 
“The Founder’s Paradox”: the fact that the heroic status of 
the founders may quickly be reversed and turned against 
them, resulting in scapegoat persecution.19 In Shullenberger’s 
eyes, Thiel thinks of Facebook—in the absence of effective 
authorities—as an effective way to channel mimetic violence. 
This gives Facebook a powerful arsenal of violent means in its 
battle against the authorities, which would also protect the 
heroic tech entrepreneurs like himself from being singled out 
as scapegoats.20 Such a perception of Facebook is, needless to 
say, in some contrast to his friend Zuckerberg’s rosy ideas of 
“a global community”.21
Regardless of how well the tech giants have or have not 
understood the basic nature of human beings, they have 
indeed obtained large, data-driven psychological powers. Dan 
Ariely, a Professor of Psychology and Behavioral Economics, 
believes that irregular reward systems such as likes, tweets 
and comments can be seen as an updated version of American 
behavioral psychologist B.F. Skinner’s work from the 1930s.22 
Skinner placed rats in specially built boxes, where they 
19 Thiel (2014) p. 173ff.
20 Schullenberger, G. “Mimesis and Facebook Part 2: Harnessing 
Violence” Cyborgology. 08-09-16.
21 Thiel’s connection to people like Steve Bannon has aggravated 
Facebook’s current image problems. Cambridge Analytica whistle-
blower Christopher Wylie claims that top men from Thiel’s intelligence 
tech giant Palantir took active part in processing the leaked Facebook 
data at Cambridge Analytica, without any official contract between the 
two companies. Thiel has publicly declared his support for Trump, but 
Palantir denies having had any collaboration with Cambridge 
Analytica—cf. Karpal, A. “Palantir worked with Cambridge Analytica 
on the Facebook data it acquired, whistleblower alleges” CNBC.com. 
03-27-18. Palantir does, however, admit that their company’s analyst 
Alfredas Chmieliauskas collaborated with Cambridge Analytica, alleg-
edly as a private individual, cf. Lomas, N. “Palantir confirms a staff link 
with Cambridge Analytica” TechCrunch. 03-28-18.
22 Ariely, D. “Apple should use the iPhone to stop distracting us” Wired. 
04-17-18.
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learned to press buttons to get food as a reward. Skinner dis-
covered that the most effective way of maintaining a particu-
lar behavior is by giving out the rewards randomly. One might 
think that the rat in Skinner’s box would press the button less 
if reward was not certain. But in the experiment, it turned out 
that the rat pressed harder and longer than when the reward 
followed automatically. Even when the reward disappeared, 
the rat would continue to press. Today, users hammer the 
keyboard or drum on the touch screen hoping for virtual 
reward in the form of recognition through new emails, 
retweets and likes. Similarly, the rat would hammer the but-
ton on the Skinner Box hoping for food. The information that 
ticks in on a phone may often be uninteresting—and only 
rarely is it indispensable. But suddenly something important 
or useful could pop up. Therefore, the phone must be checked 
100 to 150 times a day. Deducting six to seven hours of sleep, 
that equals six to eight times an hour.23 The same technique is 
known from the classic slot machines, or one-armed bandits: 
the player never knows if the next move will trigger nothing, 
pennies, or maybe the big jackpot. There is still no clear defi-
nition of smartphone addiction. But some countries have 
begun, little by little, to recognize the problem: In France, a 
total ban on smartphones in schools has been introduced, cit-
ing public health as an argument. The United States now has 
rehabilitation centers for children who cannot let go of the 
screen. Spain recently recognized the phenomenon as disor-
der requiring treatment on par with ludomania and alcohol-
ism—that is, a pathological condition that restricts the users’ 
freedom and prevents them from acting and expressing them-
selves freely.
It is tempting to believe that the huge amounts of freely 
available information have made the world a wiser place. 
After all, information may be a source of learning. In 2007, 
Clive Thompson from tech magazine Wired even blessed the 
new opportunities that Silicon Valley memory equipped the 
very act of thinking with: “[…] the cyborg future is here. 
23 Guldager, D.H. ”Du tjekker den 150 gange i døgnet – sådan slipper du 
af med afhængighed” TV2 Nyheder. 01-11-18.
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Almost without noticing it, we’ve outsourced important 
peripheral brain functions to the silicon around us. And 
frankly, I kind of like it. I feel much smarter when I’m using 
the Internet as a mental plug-in during my daily chitchat.”24 
But in the Information Age, it is more important than ever to 
differentiate between knowledge and information. Tech 
giants do not take into account that these two concepts are 
different. Knowledge implies information, but information 
does not necessarily imply knowledge. First, the difference is 
that knowledge is accompanied by a truth requirement. Facts 
must be respected. As a requirement, this cannot be satisfied 
only by being informed about what others like, think, believe, 
hope or feel. Second, there is a difference in the way informa-
tion is processed. Pure information is obtained easily, quickly 
and cheaply. But knowledge cannot simply be collected, it is 
a systematic practice with a given purpose. It is based on 
organizing, processing and formatting information. And it 
requires tools, will, judgment and audacity. Users may be 
fooled by information, but it is harder to be fooled when they 
have knowledge.25
In its abundance, the Age of Information has led to a form 
of knowledge collapse: To the tech giants there is no differ-
ence between content elements. There is nothing but content. 
It’s all about attention and traffic, aimed at something, no 
matter what. But this happens at the expense of truth and 
facts. The user is flooded with information and opinions—
easily produced, sometimes even completely free of charge, 
and they do not have to deal with facts and truths. No distinc-
tion is made between cute cat videos, ISIS propaganda, ads, 
conspiracy theories, scientific insights or breaking news. It 
turns out that since it is only about attention and traffic, pro-
ducing and distributing disinformation has become easier 
than ever before. A well-known example is the by-far most 
virally active piece of online news during the 2016 US presi-
dential campaign: The Pope Supports Trump. It generated 
24 Thompson, C. “Your outboard brain knows all” Wired. 08-25-07.
25 Hansen and Hendricks (2011) p. 11–14.
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960,000 shares, reactions and comments on Facebook. But 
the news was fake, fabricated and produced in Macedonia for 
the purpose of generating ad profits.26 By comparison, the 
most popular piece of mainstream news got 849,000 reac-
tions. It came from The Washington Post and was about 
Trump’s history of corruption charges: “Trump’s history of 
corruption is mind-boggling. So why is Clinton supposedly 
the corrupt one?”27 As early as 2013, the World Economic 
Forum announced that disinformation is the new global chal-
lenge. Citizens, politicians, academics, and reporters can all be 
misled. When misinformed, people believe that factually false 
convictions are in fact true. Disinformation may be distor-
tions of facts, fact-denying conspiracy theories, lies or false 
news stories.28 Obviously, the challenge of navigating through 
this maze has always been there. But on the Internet, it hap-
pens on a new scale and at a new pace.
American professors Jonah Berger and Katherine 
Milkman set out to investigate what types of ads, videos, news 
stories, etc. go viral in the infinite offerings of online informa-
tion. What does it take to win jackpot in this advanced algo-
rithm system? By studying data from all the New York Times 
articles published over a three-month period, they found that 
feelings are what makes content go viral.29 More specifically, 
content driven by activity-mobilizing emotions wins, by elicit-
ing both negative ones like anger and fear and positive ones 
such as awe and fascination. The reason is that they incite 
action in the form of likes, retweets, shares, debates, counter- 
26 Craig Silverman has done a great deal of work mapping out websites 
that fabricate “fake news” in order to attract advertisement traffic; at the 
time of writing his list is comprised of 169 such websites, see 
“BuzzFeedNews/2017-12-fake-news-top-50”. Last visited 07-30-18: https://
github.com/BuzzFeedNews/2017-12-fake-news-top-50/blob/master/data/
sites_2017.csv
27 Silverman, C. “This Analysis Shows How Viral Fake Election News 
Stories Outperformed Real News On Facebook” BuzzFeed. 11-16-16.
28 Hendricks and Vestergaard (2017) p. 98.
29 Berger, J. & Milkman, K.  L. (2012) “What Makes Online Content 
Viral?” Journal of Marketing Research, vol 49: pp. 192–205.
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arguments, etc. They make an effective fuel to activate the 
algorithm system and set an agenda. This explains President 
Trump’s unstoppable viral success: People get excited when 
he tweets that Mexicans are rapists and killers or proposes to 
ban all Muslims from entering the United States. Both sup-
porters and opponents contribute to spreading this on the 
web. On the tech platforms, emotions set the pace. Apart 
from emotions, in his book Contagious: Why Things Catch On 
(2013), Berger points to five other ingredients which help 
accelerate social transmission: A story must give users who 
share it social currency; it must be able to trigger, such as 
when the word “beer” causes one to think of salted peanuts; 
it must be of public interest to the general public; it must have 
practical value, e.g. by saving time or offering something; and 
finally, it must be a good story that is easy to reproduce.30 It is 
worth noting the complete absence of concepts such as true 
and false.
Information has been commercialized to such an extent 
that all expressions have become a sort of commodity where 
the user must supply the right elements. Dry and complex 
problems, no matter how important, rarely find an audience. 
The users’ audience can easily press the like button, but no 
one has developed a challenging but really important story 
button and given it the same opportunities for exposure in 
the algorithms’ scoring system. Incited by the company’s 
adversity, Facebook started to offer more expression possi-
bilities. In 2015, a change was made, so the user—in addition 
to liking a post—was also able to hand out a heart, a sur-
prised emoji or a sad face. But overall, all is about making the 
story trend—regardless of whether it is true or false, difficult 
or easy, new or old, relevant or irrelevant.
A consequence of the algorithm systems of the tech giants 
is that your ability to stand out and reach an audience is lim-
ited to your ability to reap and spread attention. Expressions 
with the most attention get the highest degree of exposure 
and thus the most advertising payments, while expressions 
30 Berger (2013) pp. 21–24.
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with less drown in the noise. The limelight-stealing stories are 
short-lived and characterized by fleeting emotions with high 
entertainment value, conflict and sensation. The story of 
35-year-old Twitter user Eric Tucker is a spot-on example. On 
November 9, 2016, he tweeted to his mere 40 followers that 
paid protesters were taken by bus to protest rallies against 
newly elected Donald Trump: “Anti-Trump protestors in 
Austin today are not as organic as they seem. Here are the 
busses they came in. #fakeprotests #trump2016 #austin.” The 
tweet quickly went viral, adding lots of fuel to the national 
conspiratorial fire. It was shared 16,000 times on Twitter and 
more than 350,000 times on Facebook. The dubious origin of 
this piece of “news” was smoothed out little by little. At first, 
Reddit was referenced as a source of this breaking news. 
Then, suddenly the source was conservative debate forum 
Free Republic. Soon after, there were various Facebook 
pages such as the hardliner conservative publisher Robertson 
Family Values with more than a million followers and it was 
eventually promoted in a confirming tweet from the White 
House itself: “Just had a very open and successful presidential 
election. Now professional protesters, incited by the media, 
are protesting. Very unfair!” There was just one small prob-
lem: These buses with paid protesters did not exist. The story 
was simply not true. After two days, when Tucker had realized 
the effects of his provocation, he deleted the original tweet 
and posted a picture of the very same tweet with FALSE 
stamped in red on top of it. But not surprisingly, the correc-
tion notice got minimal attention—only 29 retweets and 27 
likes within the following week, to be exact.31 The truth is 
simply not as entertaining and stimulating as red-hot rumors. 
This is also well known from traditional print media, where 
the correction notice pertaining to a front-page story is usu-
ally written in fine print somewhere deep inside the paper. 
But on the web, the possibilities for the penetration of misin-
formation are multiplied.
31 Maheshwari, S. “How Fake News Goes Viral: A Case Study” New York 
Times. 11-20-16.
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Sociologist Danah Boyd has also noted how certain feel-
ings achieve viral success. She explains how people consume 
content that simply stimulates their minds and senses. That is 
the reason why users are drawn to content that excites, acti-
vates, entertains or otherwise elicits emotional response. This 
content is not always the “best” content  – in the sense of 
acquiring knowledge. But in the same way that the body is 
programmed to crave fat and sugar because they are energy 
boosts and are rarely found in nature, humans are also pro-
grammed to pay attention to things that stimulate and 
awaken passions: Obnoxious, violent or sexual content; 
humiliating, embarrassing or offensive gossip.32 The tech plat-
forms have, in other words, become the dictatorships of emo-
tions—especially negative ones. The algorithm system rewards 
what is fleeting and short-lived. As a consequence, content 
that does not match such uncurbed emotional release simply 
risks drowning in the noise. Again, an infringement upon 
freedom of speech takes place—both in the sense of freedom 
of information and the right to freely express one’s point of 
view.
32 Boyd, D. “Streams of Content, Limited Attention: The Flow of 
Information through Social Media”. Conference: Web 2.0 Expo. 11-17-09.
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In 2017, The Australian published a confidential document 
leaked from Facebook. It revealed how the company had 
offered advertisers the opportunity to target ads to 6.4 mil-
lion Facebook users as young as 14 who were going through 
psychologically vulnerable phases of their lives. In these 
phases, the teenagers felt “worthless”, “insecure”, “stressed” or 
“anxious”, among other things. To track these emotional 
downturns, Facebook had monitored the messages, images, 
interactions and activity of their users on the Internet.1
Using big data harvested from user behavior and analyzed 
by sophisticated algorithms, Facebook, Twitter, Google and 
other tech companies can predict large parts of people’s pref-
erences and behaviors. This is tremendously valuable for 
advertisers who want to control and manipulate consumer 
behavior. Internet guru Jaron Lanier, who in his recent book 
recommends for people to shut down their accounts on social 
media, calls the real objective of the attention economy 
“behavioral modification”. The tech giants quite simply strive 
to change people’s behavior.2 Generally speaking, advertising 
is not necessarily manipulative. But when very specific parts 
of the personal information of the consumers are used 
against them to lure them to buy products that they would 
1 Tiku, N. “Get Ready for the Next Big Privacy Backlash Against 
Facebook” Wired. 05-21-17.
2 Lanier (2018).
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not otherwise buy, then it is. When an ad for slimming tea 
targets teens right at the moment they feel the most down, or 
when ads for liquor brands can be directed at easy-to-tempt 
alcoholics, then it is. The concerns of today not only revolve 
around how much information the tech giants have on us. The 
question is also to what extent this information can be used 
as a weapon against the users without us having—or get-
ting—a chance to even find out.
Facebook, Twitter and Google have different and, to vari-
ous degrees, idealistic points of departure. Google’s mission is 
to organize the world’s information and make it universally 
available and useful. Twitter wants to give all people the pos-
sibility to create and share ideas and information—at any 
time and without any hindrance. The third giant, Facebook, 
wants to give people the possibility to engage in friendships, 
create communities and make the world more open and con-
nected. But the bottom line for all three tech giants depends 
on the same elementary business model: targeted, relevant 
advertising.
Google’s main source of income is the ads placed at the 
top of search results, next to the search results and on the 
searched websites. At the congressional hearing in April 2018, 
in front of a rather slow-witted Senator, Mark Zuckerberg 
made it clear: “Yes, Congresswoman, we run ads. That’s the 
business model […].”3 That was not how things were to begin 
with, but in 2008, Facebook recruited Sheryl Sandberg from 
Google as second in command. In hiring her, Facebook got a 
hard-working ad broker who finally managed to crack the 
code and radically expand the company’s advertisement 
foundation. According to international media agency 
GroupM, Facebook and Google together now control 84% of 
the digital ad revenue in the US, giving them a de facto 
 duopoly on the advertising market.4 And at Twitter, ad reve-
3 Transcript courtesy of Bloomberg Government. “Transcript of 
Zuckerberg’s appearance before House committee”. The Washington 
Post. 04-11-18.
4 Garrahan, M. “Google and Facebook dominance forecast to rise” 
Financial Times. 12-04-17.
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nue makes up roughly 86% of the total income of the 
company.5
The core of the three companies’ business models makes 
them ad brokers rather than the IT companies of their origin. 
Their main task is to monetize their services by the use of 
very detailed user profiles to capitalize on the opportunity to 
accurately target advertising to highly specific and selected 
user groups—characterized by anything from age, race, gen-
der, housing, income, looks, religion, health, location, psychol-
ogy, problems, hobbies, detailed music preferences, literature, 
movies, food, make-up, anything. The advertisers are the real 
clients of the tech giants, and the user is but the product. With 
this massive monitoring of user behavior, both online and 
offline, companies can make accurate and automated predic-
tions about what ads, news and political messages users are 
most susceptible to, and about what content will make them 
click, like, share and scroll down the endless feed. Whether or 
not tech giants in fact sell data is a matter of semantics. If you 
claim that they do, they furiously refer to the fact that they do 
not hand over user data to advertisers and they might file a 
court case against you for libel. But they do sell data in the 
sense that they give advertisers data-based access to hyper- 
accurately target their advertising.
In an academic article written for Stanford University 
back in 1998, Google founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin 
explain the problems involved when combining search 
engines and advertising: “The goals of the advertising busi-
ness model do not always correspond to providing quality 
search to users. […] we expect that advertising funded search 
engines will be inherently biased towards the advertisers and 
away from the needs of the consumers.”6 It was meant as a 
criticism of the advertising setup of the day, which—lacking 
targeted focus—would bombard users with as many ads as 
possible. Instead, Page and Brin wanted to target their efforts 
5 Beers, B. “How does Twitter Make Money?” Investopedia. 04-25-18.
6 Brin, S. & Page, L. “The Anatomy of Large-Scale Hypertextual Web 
Search Engine”. Last visited 04-26-18: http://infolab.stanford.
edu/~backrub/google.html.
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at specific users with fewer and increasingly customized ads.7 
No doubt, it was a significant improvement for users, not to 
mention advertisers. Combined with new algorithms that 
quickly sorted through what was and was not useful online, 
the search engine became a success. But the two partners did 
not pay attention to their own criticism as they suddenly 
faced the choice between what was good for the users versus 
what was good for the company. The popular and highly 
admired PageRank algorithm was modified and instead, from 
2009, personalized searches became the core strategy, result-
ing in more opportunities and skyrocketing interest from 
advertisers. Today, Google together with Apple, Microsoft, 
Amazon and Facebook are the top five biggest corporations 
in the world.8
When Facebook, Twitter, Google and others offer free 
services for users, there are two sides to this. From a user 
point of view, it is obviously attractive to have a good and 
well-organized service for information and friend contacts, 
and not to mention free. Speechifying in flowery terms, the 
CEOs of these companies boast that their real purpose is to 
assist users and improve the world. However, from an eco-
nomic point of view, the primary motive is to entice potential 
users into a digital panopticon, one which is incredibly skilled 
at harvesting data.
Users do not really sense they are being watched. They 
may be surprised once in a while, when they find a remark-
ably relevant ad on their screen. The platforms present them-
selves as networks of unlimited freedom and communication, 
offering nothing more than posts, search results, tweets and 
comments. But let us for a moment zoom in on the example 
of Facebook. The company registers every single click, every 
7 Blumenthal, P. “Facebook And Google’s Surveillance Capitalism 
Model Is In Trouble” Huffington Post. 01-27-18.
8 In 2006, the five biggest were Exxon Mobil, General Electric, Microsoft, 
Citigroup, Bank of America; in 2016 only Microsoft remains in the top 
five: Apple, Alphabet (Google), Microsoft, Amazon, Facebook. The 
source is S&P Dow Jones Indices, quoted from Taplin, J. “Is It Time to 
Break Up Google?” New York Times. 04-22-17.
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“like” and every comment. However, the collection of data is 
not limited to content the users explicitly choose to upload 
(and which they recently, after numerous protests, have the 
opportunity to remove). It also collects browser history, what 
the user has been doing on Facebook and outside Facebook, 
and achieves external personal data such as geographic, 
financial, medical and other information about the user by 
purchasing large amounts of data from lesser-known but 
huge data broker companies, e.g. Acxiom, DataLogix, Epsilon 
and Experian (European countries have laws to partly block 
data brokers, especially since May 25, 2018, when GDPR 
came into force). These are large but not very publicly-
known companies, which, ever since the 1960s, have provided 
detailed personal data to an already extensive industry of 
targeted traditional paper advertisements by mail. These 
players now gained new digital customers. After the 
Cambridge Analytica scandal of early 2018, Facebook 
declared that the company would stop brokering such per-
sonal data, but not that the company would eliminate 
already brokered data.9 The company even creates so-called 
shadow profiles of people not yet on Facebook, if all they 
have done is contact someone who is indeed on Facebook, or 
if they visit a website featuring a like and share button.10 At 
the congressional hearing, Zuckerberg was forced to admit 
that the company follows user movements around the 
Internet, even when they are logged out of their Facebook 
accounts.11 With this massive surveillance, tech giants have 
the opportunity to gather large amounts of raw data on users 
and translate the data into personal information. At the con-
gressional hearing, Zuckerberg was unable to give an esti-
mated average amount of data per user, but it is estimated 
that Facebook has developed more than 52,000 categories 
9 Following this, several of these companies took a stock dive, which 
indicated how they had largely acted as data collectors for Facebook.
10 Tufekci, Z. “Facebook’s Surveillance Machine” New York Times. 
03-19-18.
11 Plougsgaard, H. ”Facebook samler også data fra personer, der ikke 
bruger Facebook” Jyllands-Posten. 04-11-18.
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for organizing these data.12 The data broker Acxiom, one of 
Facebook’s biggest business partners, is said to have 1500 
data points on each and every one of more than 500 million 
individuals across the globe, most of them in the US.
These data are categorized and converted into information 
and thus become a valuable asset for advertisers trying to 
predict, direct and manipulate consumer behavior. In the 
digital panopticon, the user becomes a commodity—in the 
form of a data package—to be processed and negotiated for 
financial use. Big Brother and Big Business have formed an 
unholy alliance. The detailed personal data are not forwarded 
to the advertiser, but it is the access to users by way of these 
data that is being sold. In that way tech giants can claim that 
they do not sell data—and even sue anyone who claims that 
they do.
An interesting aspect to the digital panopticon is that it 
comes off as a friendly kind of power. No explicit threat, com-
mand, prohibition, or physical punishment is involved. On the 
contrary, the panopticon is based on positive benefits and 
convenience: free communication, information, community, 
knowledge sharing and searching. The worst sanction a user 
can meet is exclusion: without accepting the terms of service 
(that is, without surrendering data or complying with the 
community standards), access is denied. This is a very subtle 
form of coercion, based on the user’s fear of missing out. This 
seeming kindness has turned out to be an incredibly effective 
strategy for harvesting data. In the eyes of the tech giants, it 
is a question of connecting with people’s psyches. This kind 
power motivates the user to constantly disclose, share and 
participate, to communicate points of view, wishes and prefer-
ences. According to German cultural philosopher Byung- 
Chul Han, this “friendly” power is to blame for the user’s 
crisis of freedom: this is not freedom repressed, but freedom 
12 The list of person categories offered to advertisers for targeting their 
ads has 29.000 categories (2016 numbers); Angwin, J. & Mattu, S. & 
Parris, T. “Facebook Doesn’t Tell Users Everything It Really Knows 
About Them” ProPublica. 12-27-16.
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exploited.13 In order to gain convenience, users subject them-
selves to a form of self-surveillance, because they willingly 
hand over their information to the platforms and thus also 
indirectly to the hungry eyes of the advertisers. In 2019, pro-
fessor Shoshanna Zuboff developed an analytical conception 
of the business model – “surveillance capitalism”.14
Usually, involuntary surveillance is seen as a problematic 
or even criminal invasion of privacy. But in the digital panop-
ticon, the surveillance takes place voluntarily because it is 
considered a mutual advantage – a partnership. This is what 
makes this form of surveillance so effective and relatively 
uncontroversial. But in a sense, this partnership is an illusion. 
The users take part without real informed consent. They may 
have accepted the terms of service, but they never know how 
they are categorized and measured when profiled and resold 
to advertisers. The users participate without knowing exactly 
what they are participating in. Once consent is given, the tech 
giants are free to continuously modify the terms of service—
for instance they can change the algorithms without having to 
ask the user to acknowledge such modified conditions.
13  Han (2017) p. 15.
14  See Zuboff (2019).
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One thing is difficult to decipher: to what degree do tech 
giants actually see themselves as saving the world, and to 
what degree do they see themselves as capitalizing on it? 
Obviously, one does not exclude the other, but how do the 
two sides balance and what is the actual improvement the 
tech giants bring? In an interesting interview, Mark 
Zuckerberg defended the company’s treatment of user data 
by framing it as a historical philosophical trend where people 
are becoming more open and more willing to share data 
about themselves with friends, with companies, ultimately 
with anybody. But the trend is also a normative one: accord-
ing to Zuckerberg, people must be brought to realize that 
they only have one identity.1 Not only does Zuckerberg here 
exalt himself as a philosopher but he apparently feels com-
pelled to accept highly normative consequences of his own 
ideas—and to claim that these consequences should be 
acceptable to his users, imposing this philosophy on them. 
Everyone should know everything about everyone—this is the 
moral imperative Zuckerberg uses to legitimize his business 
model. Such an idea would erase the distinction between 
public and private, which has played an important role in 
1 “You have one identity (…) The days of you having a different image for 
your work friends or co-workers and for the other people you know are 
probably coming to an end pretty quickly (…) Having two identities for 
yourself is an example of a lack of integrity”. Kirkpatrick (2010) p.199.
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modern societies where privacy has been considered a funda-
mental political good, and where the elementary freedoms of 
expression, of thought, of beliefs have been articulated to 
protect individuals and their sphere of privacy against gov-
ernment abuse and regimentation. The moral consequence of 
Zuckerberg’s dictum—beyond the very handy legitimization 
of his business model’s unlimited data collection—is that 
people should not behave differently in different contexts. 
You cannot be one person to your friends, then another to 
your family, and a third to your colleagues, etc. You cannot 
run away from your past, either, if suddenly something more 
preferable comes up. And neither can you evolve and develop 
your personality, put past mistakes behind you. In Zuckerberg’s 
line of thought, people bring their detailed digital identity 
with them everywhere and, what is more, that identity should 
be fully available to anyone. It is curious that he does not see 
how this would cause a tremendous loss of personal free-
dom—the freedom to evolve, change, apply different skills in 
different contexts. During the congressional hearings in April 
2018, one Senator took a shrewd look at this data gathering 
and innocently asked Zuckerberg what hotel he was staying 
in while in Washington. Zuckerberg preferred not to disclose 
that information. Perhaps he did not want fans, journalists or 
assassins lurking around. But that would indeed be the col-
lateral damage if he took his own medicine.
Mark Zuckerberg’s philosophical considerations may 
appear amateurish, but we must take them seriously, coming 
from a man who controls the conditions framing the online 
activities of billions of people. It is no wonder that his reflec-
tions have shifted, looking at the enormous growth and 
change Facebook has seen over the past fifteen years since 
Zuckerberg started out from his college dorm room in 2004. 
As New York Magazine editor Max Read points out, it is 
doubtful whether Zuckerberg—or anyone at all—even knows 
what Facebook really is anymore.2 Read elaborates by noting 
that it is the very same company that sends birthday remind-
ers while at the same time striving to ensure the integrity of 
2 Read, M. “Does even Mark Zuckerberg know what Facebook is?” New 
York Magazine. 09-01-17.
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the German elections. Zuckerberg’s initial goal was for infor-
mation to flow as freely as possible, captured by the slogan 
“Information wants to be free”—in Facebook, this developed 
into the slogan “making the world more open and connected”. 
In Facebook’s onboarding information for new employees, 
their “Little Red Book”, it is described in this way: “Facebook 
was not originally created to be a company. It was built to 
accomplish a mission—to make the world more open and 
connected.”3 In the 1990s, “Connecting People” was the slo-
gan of then mobile phone giant Nokia. But in the spring of 
2018, the phrase became associated with Facebook. It turned 
out that in a 2016 internal memo entitled “The Ugly”, 
Facebook deputy director Andrew Bosworth had presented 
the company’s strategy for growth at any price, including 
death victims, by concluding, in mantra-like fashion: “We con-
nect people. Period.”4
As British historian Niall Ferguson states, in his book The 
Square and the Tower, it is naive to believe that new technolo-
gies connecting people with each other outside of existing 
power structures will automatically and seamlessly lead to 
peace and agreement. His counterexample is when the mod-
ern printing press was invented around 1450, leading to a 
media revolution even greater than the Internet and proba-
3 Quoted from Ferguson (2017) p. 354.
4 R.  Mac, C.  Warzel & A.  Kantrowitz: “Top Facebook Executive 
Defended Data Collection In 2016 Memo—And Warned That Facebook 
Could Get People Killed” BuzzFeed. 03-29-18—here, Bosworth’s memo 
is quoted in extenso. Bosworth’s memo documented a surprising aware-
ness inside Facebook of the dangerous sides to the growth strategy: “So 
we connect more people”, he wrote in another section of the memo, 
“That can be bad if they make it negative. Maybe it costs someone a life 
by exposing someone to bullies. Maybe someone dies in a terrorist 
attack coordinated on our tools. And still we connect people. The ugly 
truth is that we believe in connecting people so deeply that anything that 
allows us to connect more people more often is ∗de facto∗ good”. 
Bosworth thus found that terrorism and death were consequences that 
one had to accept to realize the growth strategy: ”In almost all of our 
work, we have to answer hard questions about what we believe”, he 
wrote in his memo. ”We have to justify the metrics and make sure they 
aren’t losing out on a bigger picture. But connecting people. That’s our 
imperative. Because that’s what we do. We connect people”.
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bly one of the most important facilitators of the Reformation 
of the following century. It made deviant theologians and 
other dissidents capable of quickly publishing their new 
thoughts without having to get permission from neither 
Church nor King. As an example, Martin Luther is believed 
to have published a new text around every two weeks 
throughout his adult life.5 This led to a large clash with the 
church authorities—but in and of itself it did not lead to freer, 
more democratic or even peaceful conditions, quite the con-
trary. Many of the new protestant theologies were even more 
authoritarian and belligerent than the Catholic Church, and 
the many competing churches often found themselves in con-
flict with each other, all of which led to the vast religious wars 
of sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe, culminating in 
the Thirty Years’ War. Connecting people.
After the discovery that Facebook had been used as a key 
tool to spread false news and manipulate democratic elec-
tions, Zuckerberg is now in a process of changing this philoso-
phy. On February 17, 2017, he issued a creed entitled “Building 
Global Community”. Here, the concept of “community” 
replaces that of free information and of connecting ideas as 
key elements of Facebook philosophy. It is the largest public 
manifestation of Facebook principles thus far. It seems as if 
Zuckerberg has now realized that connecting people is not 
enough. The manifesto keeps to positive feel-good terms, but 
the backdrop is “fake news”, Russian bots and cyber warfare. 
People do not automatically become friendly and peaceful by 
being more connected. More likely, the many links between 
people open new paths for misinformation, outgrouping, bal-
kanization, hostility, crime and war. Apparently, this needs to 
be solved through moral sermons with a call for values. Now 
Zuckerberg says: “... the most important thing we at Facebook 
can do is develop the social infrastructure to give people the 
power to build a global community that works for all of us.”6 
This is then elaborated into five aspects of “community”: sup-
5 For more on the not so peaceful sides of Luther’s workings, see 
Stjernfelt (2017).
6 Zuckerberg, M. “Building Global Community” Facebook. 02-16-17.
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port, security, information, civil society and inclusion.7 “Global 
community” comes off as if everyone is connected to every-
one, resonant of McLuhan’s idea of “global village”—but 
there is quite a gap between an average user’s circle of 
“friends” and any kind of global connectedness. In the US, 
almost 80% of Facebook users have fewer than 500 “friends”.8
This quaint philosophy of a global community is based on 
a repeated reference to values; to ideas of “our values”, “col-
lective values” and “our common values”. It appears to be a 
redundant argument, insofar as it presupposes the very global 
community of values that should first need building. But the 
whole problem is that large groups of people do not agree to 
share common values. The vocabulary of “community” and 
“values” is derived from the American political philosophy 
known as communitarianism with its emphasis on 
 self- organized communities sharing values. Conveniently 
enough, those ideas enjoy support from both the right and 
left (the Republicans love to pit local communities against 
the Washington elite; Democrats love self-organized protest 
groups). It builds on the idea of local communities whose 
7 Zuckerberg, M. “Building Global Community” Facebook. 02-16-17.
“1. How do we help people build supportive communities that strengthen 
traditional institutions in a world where membership in these institu-
tions is declining?
2. How do we help people build a safe community that prevents harm, 
helps during crises and rebuilds afterwards in a world where anyone 
across the world can affect us?
3. How do we help people build an informed community that exposes us 
to new ideas and builds common understanding in a world where 
every person has a voice?
4. How do we help people build a civically-engaged community in a 
world where participation in voting sometimes includes less than half 
our population?
5. How do we help people build an inclusive community that reflects our 
collective values and common humanity from local to global levels, 
spanning cultures, nations and regions in a world with few examples 
of global communities?”
8 The statistic is from 2016: “Average number of Facebook friends of 
users in the United States in 2016” Statista. Most recent visit 06-25-18: 
https:/ /www.statista.com/statistics/398532/us-facebook-user- 
network-size/
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possibility to pursue politics is based on sharing pre-political 
values. But Zuckerberg overlooks the fact that communitari-
anism, with the village as its political ideal, easily inherits the 
downsides to the village: social incestuousness, strait- 
lacedness, xenophobia, gossip, conformity, hate towards other 
villages.9 As is well known, you can’t be friends with everyone; 
maybe you can’t even be “friends” with everyone. Significantly 
enough, as a political philosophy communitarianism is not 
kindly disposed towards political liberalism, universal rights, 
free speech and the idea that even if people do not share 
values, they may share principles for the coexistence of differ-
ent values. Nor are Facebook’s principles—termed commu-
nity standards—kind to freedom of speech, see below. There 
are thus local versions of the “global community” in which a 
person can easily get trapped. Zuckerberg continues: “What 
is your limit when it comes to nudity? To violence? To rough 
content? To profanity? Whatever you decide, those will be 
your personal settings. We will regularly ask you these ques-
tions to increase participation and so you do not need to go 
dig for them yourself. For those who choose not to decide 
anything, the default settings will be what the majority of 
people in your region have chosen, just like in a poll.”10 
Knowing how difficult it is to change personal settings online, 
the vast majority of users will simply decide to accept the 
local default settings. This effectively indoctrinates them to 
have the same opinions as the majority of people in their 
local region (it remains unknown if by “region” Zuckerberg 
means village, city, county, country or continent). But the 
communitarian aspect is clear: people should share values 
with their local society, with their “community”.
Just below the surface of the community ideals, the gears 
of the capitalist machinery keep turning. Tech giants have 
complicated algorithm-based advertising systems where 
advertisers quickly and automatically buy access to highly 
specific user groups. Advertisements are traded in an online 
9 As argued by Jett Heer in “Facebook’s Promise of Community is a Lie” 
The New Republic. 09-07-17.
10 Zuckerberg, M. “Building Global Community” Facebook. 02-16-17.
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auction, where the price is automatically calculated, after 
which the ads immediately appear tailor-made to the plat-
form profiles of the meticulously selected users. Users them-
selves enjoy the targeted content, but often they are not 
aware of the principle of how the tech giants’ handle their 
data. Tech platforms generally do not involve the users or the 
public in how data are handled: what the data are used for, 
how one is profiled as a user and how that profiling is associ-
ated with third parties. Algorithms are like the Coca-Cola 
recipes of the big tech companies. But when pious preachers 
of transparency, openness, mutuality and community keep the 
very core of their own business models hidden from public 
inspection, investigation and critique, it rings hollow.
Most of us know the simple recommendations on the plat-
forms. People who have bought The Matrix will probably also 
buy The Matrix 2. If you are interested in yoga books, you 
may also be interested in buying yoga gear. These are exam-
ples of recommendations that focus on the product. 
Consumption patterns are analyzed, and the information is 
used to calculate what the next potential purchase might be. 
This is relatively harmless and follows a classic and well- 
known logic of marketing. But it’s only the tip of the market-
ing iceberg. Today, not only the product can be personalized, 
but also the very type of argument that makes the user 
choose one product over another. The strategy behind this is 
called persuasion profiling.11
Two PhD students from Stanford University, Maurits 
Kaptein and Dean Eckles (the latter was also a researcher at 
Facebook from 2012 to 2015), made an experiment where they 
started an online bookstore and encouraged customers to 
browse through titles and mark the books they would be most 
likely to buy.12 They experimented with different sales strate-
gies and found that it is possible to track what kind of argu-
mentation seems the most convincing to a given person. Some 
consumers prefer expert reviews, others fall for promotional 
11 Pariser (2011) p. 120.
12 Pariser ”Welcome to the Brave New World of Persuasion Profiling”. 
Wired. 04-26-11.
Chapter 8. Improving the World or Capitalizing on It?
74
offers and others react to recommendations of friends. They 
also found that certain pitches are counterproductive. One 
consumer hurries to buy a product on discount, while another 
believes that discounts are a sign that the very same product 
has lost value. Eckles and Kaptein themselves claim that they 
can increase the impact of recommendations by 30–40% by 
eliminating the types of arguments that are counterproductive 
to the individual consumer. These are very big numbers. But 
more importantly: The experiment also shows that one and the 
same person responds to the same type of argument in widely 
different contexts. A consumer’s persuasion profile can be 
relatively easily transferred from one commodity group to 
another. This means that these profiles are worth a lot of 
money because they are extremely attractive to advertisers.
Also, new methods within sentiment analysis are 
employed.13 Data analysis tools are now so advanced that 
they can generate highly detailed data and even measure 
what mood a user is in. By analyzing text messages, Facebook 
updates and emails, it is possible to distinguish between good 
days and bad, or sober messages from drunken ones. The lat-
ter is based, among other things, on the number of spelling 
mistakes. Facebook is familiar with the methods: In 2015, 
“Danmarks Radio”, a public service media outlet, broke the 
following news: “Facebook updates featuring suicidal 
thoughts are being studied closely by Facebook.”14 The idea 
was that Facebook would help the potentially suicidal person 
find appropriate treatment online in order to avoid self-harm. 
It is indeed commendable that Facebook suggests that kind 
of help. But it is also unsettling: A company can now measure, 
on a relatively detailed level, what state of mind a given user 
is in—including hard times and even clinical depression. 
Strangely enough, this news was not followed by any notice-
able pushback over the massive amounts of surveillance 
enabled by big data.
13 Pariser (2011) p. 121.
14 Villarreal, K. ”Facebook-opdateringer med selvmordstanker bliver 
nærlæst af Facebook” DR indland. 02-26-15.
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Undoubtedly, extremely customized and relevant content 
is quite convenient. A good example is DirectLife, a Philips 
device featuring a fitness tracker and a virtual trainer.15 It can 
figure out which argument makes a person eat healthier and 
exercise more regularly. For example, if the user is the kind 
who responds to positive feedback, the virtual trainer will say: 
Nice work! This is brilliant, but can we expect all companies 
trading these profiles to have good or even relatively unprob-
lematic intentions, such as improving the health of users or 
trying to prevent them from suicide? Potential buyers of such 
profile information are not necessarily limited to commercial 
companies, but could also include religious, political and 
other movements with intentions of a rather different nature. 
Whether they celebrate a good cause is one question, another 
is the methods behind the cause. In the wrong hands, persua-
sion profiling enables the buyers to manipulate individuals 
and take advantage of the psychological traits of a person 
through sentiment analysis.
Within the algorithm-based advertising system, examples 
abound of the abuse of big tech tools. In 2017, US nonprofit 
organization ProPublica revealed that Facebook allowed 
landlords to discriminate against tenants based on ethnicity, 
disability, gender, and other characteristics when listing their 
properties for rent.16 The algorithms automatically generated 
the categories based on data from user profiles. It became a 
scandal. Nine months later, nothing had changed. ProPublica 
tested Facebook’s new advertising rules and tools, freshly 
updated and explicitly declared “diversity-enhancing”, but 
they found that it was still possible to buy rental housing ads 
and place them outside the view of certain categories of 
people: African Americans, people in need of wheelchair 
ramps, Jews, Hispanics, people interested in Islam, and so on.17 
15 Pariser (2011) p. 121.
16 Angwin, J. & Tobin, A. “Fair Housing Groups Sue Facebook for 
Allowing Discrimination in Housing Ads” ProPublica. 03-27-17.
17 Angwin, J. & Tobin, M. & Varner, M. “Facebook (still) Letting Housing 
Advertisers Exclude Users by Race” ProPublica. 11-21-17.
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In some sense this is a natural consequence of targeted mar-
keting—when targeting ads to certain selected groups, other 
groups do not see them and are not informed about the offer. 
In March 2019, Facebook accepted to overhaul their advertis-
ing system to attempt to rule out discriminatory ads in job, 
housing and loan ads.18
This can be exploited in numerous unsympathetic ways. 
Google has sold ads associated with racist and highly preju-
diced keywords, and the service has even automatically and 
unintentionally recommended several bizarre words during 
the process, as revealed by BuzzFeed, an online media outlet. 
Advertisers could target ads based on keywords such as 
“black people ruin neighborhoods”, “Jewish parasites” and 
“Jews control the media”—keyword combinations targeting 
racists and anti-Semites. Google responded that they would 
work hard to stop these offensive ads which violate their 
policy of abusive speech. This happened right around the 
time when Facebook was struggling to customize their ads 
platform, which allowed advertisers to target messages to 
“Jew haters”.19 From a free speech perspective, one could 
argue: Nazis have a horrific worldview, but they also buy stuff, 
so should an advertiser be forbidden to address them specifi-
cally? The above-mentioned case of rental housing ads is 
downright illegal, as these groups of people are protected 
under the US Federal Fair Housing Act. However, ads associ-
ated with racist content are not illegal in and of themselves. 
They are unsympathetic to the bone, but not criminal. The 
problem is rather that the companies themselves have an 
advertising policy which they believe has been violated. Both 
cases show that abuse of information is not unique to one 
company. These issues are tightly interwoven the complex 
and automated advertising system that has made Facebook 
and Google two of the world’s most valuable companies. The 
18 Jan, T. & Dworskin, E. “Facebook agrees to overhaul targeted advertis-
ing system for job, housing and loan ads after discrimination complaints” 
Washington Post. 03-19-19.
19 Kantrowitz, A. “Google Allowed Advertisers To Target People 
Searching Racist Phrases” BuzzFeed. 09-15-17.
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problem is also found on Twitter. Also here, it has been 
revealed that advertisers were able to target ads based on 
users’ racist and patronizing comments.20 Google and 
Facebook get most of the criticism because of their dominant 
position in the advertising market. However, the extent of the 
problem is more difficult to determine in Google’s advertis-
ing system, where advertisers target users by associating ads 
with keywords that they expect the user to search. On 
Facebook, however, advertisers can choose criteria for target-
ing people and their characteristics from a large catalog of 
information. In 2016 alone, Google removed 1.7 billion ads 
that violated the company’s ad policy.21
In July 2018, Danish public radio show P1 Orientering 
reported on a particularly controversial categorization based 
on sensitive personal information within the Facebook ad 
system. Facebook had categorized 65,000 Russians as inter-
ested in “treason” and 130,000 Nigerians as interested in 
homosexuality. It may seem innocent to allow ads targeted to 
such groups and their particular interests. However, this 
meant that both groups could easily be identified by the 
authorities of those countries via their Facebook profiles, 
which could put people in danger. In most countries, treason 
is illegal. Russian authorities in particular take a strong inter-
est in the category, and in Nigeria, homosexuality is penalized 
by up to 14 years in prison.22 With no intention of it whatso-
ever, Facebook’s categorization has given intelligence agen-
cies in all countries a golden opportunity to comb the 
population in much more detail than what is allowed under 
most democratic constitutions. If a user is categorized on 
Facebook with a behavior showing an interest in “treason”, 
then the Russian authorities can quite easily identify that 
user. It only requires the following bait: In Facebook’s adver-
20 Maheshwari, S. & Stevenson, A. “Google and Facebook Face Criticism 
for Ads Targeting Racist Sentiments” New York Times. 09-15-17.
21 Kantrowitz, A. ”Google Allowed Advertisers To Target People 
Searching Racist Phrases” BuzzFeed. 09-15-17.
22 Ledegaard, F.  H. & Pedersen, R.  M. ”Facebook har stemplet 65.000 
russere som interesserede i ‘landsforræderi’” DR Udland. 07-11-18.
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tising system, they pretend to be advertisers wanting to target 
every user who lives in Russia and whom Facebook has regis-
tered as interested in ‘treason’. In the ads, users must be lured 
to click a link that sends them to a specially designed website 
owned by the advertiser. The ad needs not have the slightest 
thing to do with treason. It could be for something as innocent 
as a discount on new gardening tools. But it allows the adver-
tiser to learn that the user clicking on the link lives in Russia 
and is interested in “treason”. The link sends the user to a 
website where a traceable IP address is automatically left, 
which makes it easy to identify the person. The process is a 
special variety of phishing, a method to con Internet users to 
reveal their name, bank account, phone number, email, post 
address, etc.23 In a place like Russia, the consequence is that 
the Russian intelligence agencies may, in principle, systemati-
cally monitor users and record those they consider as poten-
tial traitors. This advertising trick not only enables government 
agencies to identify potential victims; the trick also lies open 
to other forces wishing to shame or harass specific groups.
Facebook has explained that “treason” was thought of as 
an ad category because of its historical significance. But since 
it is also an illegal act, the company has acknowledged that 
the category is problematic. The criticism raised by P1 
Orientering made Facebook remove “treason” from its cate-
gory system worldwide. On previous occasions, Facebook has 
felt it necessary to remove “communism”, “shia Muslim” and 
“Islam” because religious beliefs and political inclinations are 
seen as sensitive information subject to special protection. At 
the same time, however, it is still possible to target ads to 
people who are interested in “Christianity”, “homosexuality” 
and “anxiety”’.24 Facebook’s advertising policy is far from 
consistent, and the giant should consider whether health 
information or sexual orientation ought to be considered as 
sensitive personal information, only to be made publicly 
available after getting the user’s consent.
23 Ledegaard, F.  H. & Pedersen, R.  M. ”Facebook har stemplet 65.000 
russere som interesserede i ‘landsforræderi’” DR Udland. 07-11-18.
24 Ledegaard, F. H. & Pedersen, R. M. “Efter DR-afsløringer: Facebook 
fjerner “islam”, men ikke “kristendom”” DR Indland. 05-22-18.
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The consequence of this categorization is that Facebook 
users will need to be very acutely aware of how they express 
themselves so as not to get labeled as something they might 
not like. The users must be extremely aware of what they 
like, comment or click on, share, etc. It is a consideration 
that may naturally lead to self-censorship. But even cautious 
users never have complete control over, let alone access to, 
the categories Facebook foists upon them. This restriction of 
free expression is not censorship in the sense of rules-based 
content removal. Rather, it is a kind that thrives because the 
users have no access to which categorizations their behavior 
leads to. As a consequence, they may have good reason to 
hesitate to speak out digitally, even in front of close friends 
or “friends”. Facebook’s own website states: “Your interests 
are based on your Facebook activity and on other actions.” 
Other actions are exactly what constitutes the business 
secret, but it probably includes click behavior, browser his-
tory plus additional data acquired from data brokers. 
Facebook itself emphasizes that advertising interests and 
sympathies are not the same. The 65,000 Russians were thus 
not categorized as “traitors” but as interested in “treason”, for 
example, as a topic of historical research interest. A distinc-
tion should be made between the user’s online activity and 
the user’s personal characteristics. According to Facebook, 
the company only has information about the former, not the 
latter. On a conceptual level, this distinction is clear, but it 
seems very likely and indeed very possible to reason from 
one to the other. Research in the field shows that it is pos-
sible to guess, with up to 88% certainty, the sexuality of a 
user based on the individual’s likes on Facebook—similar 
possibilities hold for the user’s ethnicity, religious beliefs, 
political attitude, personality traits, intelligence, mood, con-
sumption of addictive substances, parents’ separation, age 
and gender.25 There is an increasing number of revelations 
of how the tools of tech giants are used in many ways where 
25 Kosinski, M. & Stillwell, D. & Graepel, T. “Private traits and attributes 
are predictable from digital records of human behavior” PNAS. 
04-09-13.
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the line between use and abuse is extremely difficult to 
draw. Big data enable quick and targeted access to the weak 
spots of each individual user.
Marketing strategies used on the giants’ platforms are gen-
erally difficult to decipher. They operate at their best when 
invisible to the user. Consider for a moment the virtual per-
sonal trainer DirectLife yelling out: “You’re doing a great 
job! I’m telling you this because you respond well to positive 
feedback!” It would probably not have quite the same 
effect.26 And the problem gets still worse: Marketing strate-
gies, of course, work in the same way when promoting ideas 
as they do with products. The 2016 US presidential campaign 
bears witness to this. The Cambridge Analytica scandal would 
later, in March 2018, clear the front pages. Through the work-
ings of Cambridge Analytica, the Trump campaign had 
gained unique insight into the lives of voters. Huge amounts 
of data were collected, as part of a psychological research 
project at Cambridge University, and resold by researcher 
Aleksandr Kogan to the UK consultant company Cambridge 
Analytica. The consultant was able, by using for instance the 
just-quoted Kosinski article, to map how users made deci-
sions and subsequently figure out how their efforts could 
affect a decision-making process. The results were very pre-
cise voter profiles divided into 500 different psychological 
categories. The profiles were then used to target anonymous 
or pseudonymous campaign messages—shaped in accor-
dance with these categories—at selected swing voters in the 
few but crucial US swing states. It was not necessarily obvious 
to these people that they were exposed to election propa-
ganda. And it was certainly not clear to them that they were 
the subjects of targeted campaigns. After all, they have no 
access to information about which other users receive the 
same information and which do not. These voters do not, in 
principle, enjoy freedom of expression in the sense of free-
dom of information, in which they can choose freely from a 
given quantity of available information.
26 Pariser, E. “Welcome to the Brave New World of Persuasion Profiling”. 
Wired. 04-26-11.
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According to Cambridge Analytica’s own top manage-
ment—and as captured on hidden camera by British network 
Channel4—what made the difference and what wound up 
deciding the 2016 US elections was the company’s micro- 
targeting ads directed at only 40,000 wavering US voters in 
the decisive swing states. Of course, we do not know how 
accurate the campaign’s boasts are, or whether this was just a 
sales pitch made to Channel4’s journalists posing as poten-
tially interested clients. But it is, however, thought-provoking 
that Facebook, in a piece of research from before the scandal 
broke, boasted about the company’s ability to influence voter 
turnout.27 Speaking of Facebook’s much mentioned transpar-
ency and openness—when The Guardian began to unveil the 
scandal in March 2018, Facebook’s first reaction was to file a 
lawsuit against the British newspaper and shut down the pro-
file of Christopher Wylie, the central whistleblower and for-
mer research director at Cambridge Analytica. Not exactly a 
role model for transparency and freedom of expression. In 
2011, the US Federal Trade Commission made an agreement 
with Facebook regarding privacy practices and is expected, in 
2019, to charge Facebook with a 5 billion dollars fine for vio-
lations of the agreement.28
However, not only the Trump team has used micro- 
targeting. It happens across the board and has been going on 
for many years. The first political campaign that used massive 
data from Facebook was the 2012 Obama campaign. In the 
Trump campaign, Cambridge Analytica was able to collect 
user data from as many as 87 million Facebook accounts via 
Aleksandr Kogan, who had 300,000 users actively sign up for 
and give their consent to a psychological test, which made 
27 Corbyn, Z. “Facebook experiment boosts US voter turnout: Mass 
social-network study shows that influence of close friends raises partici-
pation” Nature. 09-12-12. If you are able to influence the voter turnout 
in a positive way, you can probably also do the opposite. The latter is 
what Trump’s campaign manager and vice president of Cambridge 
Analytica, Steve Bannon, was explicitly interested in, according to 
whistleblower Christopher Wylie.
28 Wong, J. C. “Facebook expects FTC fine up to $5bn in privacy investi-
gation” Guardian. 04-24-19.
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him able to harvest data not only from themselves, but also 
from all their “friends”. To this day, it remains unknown 
whether Kogan, who also has ties to the University of St. 
Petersburg, Russia, passed on this data to Russian authorities. 
In 2012, the Obama campaign had about a million of their 
Facebook supporters provide access to data from all their 
“friends”. According to one of the campaign leaders, this 
allowed the campaign to reconstruct the entire Facebook 
social graph (i.e. the chart displaying all connection relation-
ships between the users). This was significantly more users 
than what Cambridge Analytica got access to in 2016. But 
contrary to the Cambridge Analytica campaign, the Obama 
campaign had its one million active supporters mold their 
“friends”, who were then influenced politically by people they 
at least already knew. In the other campaign the 300,000 
intermediaries knew nothing, and the campaign messages 
appeared in people’s news feeds out of nowhere. In that 
sense, the Obama campaign’s use of large amounts of 
Facebook data was more honest—but still it highlights 
another problem. The day after the Cambridge Analytica 
revelations on March 18th, 2018, Obama campaign leader 
Carol Davidson made the following statement: “They 
[Facebook] came to office in the days following election 
recruiting & were very candid that they allowed us to do 
things they wouldn’t have allowed someone else to do 
because they were on our side.”29 The Obama campaign was 
allowed to use massive amounts of Facebook data because 
the company sided with one of the candidates against the 
other (Republican candidate Mitt Romney). Thus, access to 
this scarily effective political micro-targeting based on big 
data can both be based on economics (who can afford to buy 
the relevant ads?), on fraud (who manages to trick data out 
of gullible tech giants?) and on the companies’ own depar-
ture from their expressed neutrality (“Facebook is a platform 
for all ideas,” as Zuckerberg repeatedly, but not very convinc-
29 Quoted from Rogers, J. “Obama 2012 campaign ‘sucked’ data from 
Facebook, former official says” Fox News. 03-20-18.
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ingly, chanted during the congressional hearings). It all 
depends on what the political situation requires. Other 
options for obtaining access to such data include legislation, 
persuasion, hacking, espionage, pressure, bribery, etc. 
However, if only one political party out of several has access 
to such powerful instruments in their campaign, it constitutes 
a break with the fundamental norm of political equality and 
fairness in the electoral process. Voters affected lose their 
freedom of expression, understood as their freedom to seek 
out and compare information independently and for the pur-
pose of forming their opinions.
As already mentioned, Cambridge Analytica had used 
Facebook data to categorize users into 500 different specified 
psychological profiles on which to base the targeted affecting. 
Through micro-targeting, politicians can access the voters’ 
private lives and psyches, thus affecting carefully selected seg-
ments of voters. German philosopher Byung-Chul Han calls 
this phenomenon data-driven psychopolitics.30 Micro-targeted 
messages to voters are hardly much different from micro- 
targeted ads. In both cases, sophisticated algorithms make it 
possible to predict people’s behavior very precisely and opti-
mize a candidate or product profile. Today we see, according 
to Han, an increasing amalgamation of the citizen and 
 consumer, of the state and market, of the vote and the 
purchase.31
Orientation towards market demands increasingly seem to 
pull tech giants away from what might be left of their early 
idealism, prompting them to behave like the more seedy 
examples of greedy companies employing dirty tricks. In 
November 2018, New York Times published a long piece of 
investigative journalism32 on the tactics of crisis management 
30 Han (2017) pp. 62–63.
31 In the book “Democracy Hacked”, Martin Moore describes three types 
of hackers who successfully distorted the 2016 US election: individuals, 
plutocrats and foreign states. See Moore (2018).
32 Frenkel, S., Confessore, N., Kang, C., Rosenberg, M. and Nicas, J. 
“Delay, Deny and Deflect: How Facebook’s Leader Fought Through 
Crisis” New York Times.11-14-18.
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chosen by the Facebook leadership—particularly Mark 
Zuckerberg and Sheryl Sandberg. Under the headline “Delay, 
Deny and Deflect”, the article showed how the company had 
used denial and smear campaigns to conceal the extent of the 
problems with data privacy and political disinformation. In 
October 2017, Facebook hired the political spin company 
Definers, which has a history of making aggressive political 
campaigns for Republican candidates, but increasingly 
expanding into business spin. This company had disseminated 
rumors about Facebook competitors like Google and Apple 
in order to “muddy the waters” (in the words of a Definers 
leader) and divert critical focus away from Facebook. 
Simultaneously, Definers had spread articles trying to portray 
protesters as anti-Semites because of a protest poster show-
ing Zuckerberg and Sandberg as a world-embracing octopus 
at the congressional hearings. This was a reference to the 
antitrust case against Standard Oil in the 1900s, but Definers 
claimed that singling out the two Jewish top Facebook per-
sons was anti-Semitic. In an incredible show of hypocrisy, 
Definers simultaneously published papers attacking Facebook 
critics for being paid marionettes for the liberal Hungarian- 
Jewish philantropist billionaire George Soros, a staple target 
for right-wing, anti-Semitic conspiracy attacks. All this activ-
ity, of course, appeared in public with no direct connection to 
Facebook’s name and was only revealed through the New 
York Times article. Facebook immediately cut its ties to 
Definers, and the Facebook top claimed not to have been 
informed about the Definers contract. Simultaneously, 
Facebook defended itself in the following way: Definers was 
“[...] useful to help respond to unfair claims where Facebook 
has been singled out for criticism, and to positively distin-
guish us from competitors.”33—in the words of Elliot Schrage, 
former head of communications and policy, who went on to 
take the blame.
33 Facebook: “Elliot Schrage on Definers” Facebook newsroom. 
11-21-18.
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The growing number of issues springing from the advertis-
ing system make it seem like the tech giants are unable to 
handle the problems themselves. In connection with the 
Cambridge Analytica scandal, Facebook actually discovered 
the leak as early as 2015, long before the US elections. The 
company responded by asking Kogan specifically to delete 
the data in question (which he did not) and more generally by 
blocking all apps active on Facebook from gaining access to 
the data of their users’ “friends”. As was revealed in June 2018, 
however, the sharing of massive volumes of user data with 
hardware developers like Apple, Samsung, and BlackBerry 
continued even until after the Cambridge Analytica scandal 
broke in March 2018. The trick was to get like buttons and 
automatic Facebook connectivity integrated into their devic-
es.34 A new scandal, in July-August 2018, was less intentional. 
Here, Facebook publicly admitted that the company was 
aware of new infiltration attempts up to the US midterm elec-
tion in November 2016. It included 32 fake Facebook 
accounts that reached nearly 300,000 users with ads, posts 
and organized political events, rallies, protests, all on topics 
such as race, feminism, mindfulness, and resistance to Trump. 
What they all had in common was that they were efforts to 
create division and disagreement. It is believed that the pages 
may once again have been created by Russian activists from 
the Internet Research Agency, but this time in a way that may 
be more difficult to detect.35 New cases of data misuse con-
tinue to surface. In December 2018, a British parliamentary 
committee on online misinformation confiscated a batch of 
Facebook documents, which was in the possession of an 
employee of software company Six4Three during a visit to 
London. Here, it appeared that Facebook from 2012 to 2015 
gave privileged access to user data to companies such as 
34 Dance, G. & Confessore, N. & LaForgia, M. “Facebook Gave Device 
Makers Deep Access to Data on Users and Friends” New York Times. 
03-06-18.
35 Dwoskin, E. & Romm, T. “Facebook says it has uncovered a coordi-
nated disinformation operation ahead of the 2018 midterm elections” 
Washington Post. 07-31-18.
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Netflix and Airbnb in order to boost traffic and engagement 
on Facebook.36
Just like the relationship between code-makers and code 
breakers, data collection vs. data protection is a case of dog- 
eat- dog. On the horizon we are seeing the contours of a fun-
damental and interminable war between the owners of 
growing data masses on the one hand, and on the other many 
different stakeholders who use various means (hacking, 
espionage, trade, pressure, persuasion, partnerships ...) to 
seek to get their hands on data that can be used for political 
turnover. Through their massive surveillance structure, tech 
giants possess extremely personally sensitive data. That does 
not mean, however, that they automatically possess the rele-
vant and increasingly demanding mechanisms to protect 
those data. It does not seem difficult to invent ever new 
abuses of the system, as long as it makes use of an automated 
ad system that allows for the aggressive, detailed and targeted 
marketing we have seen in recent years.
36 Satariano, A. & Isaac, M. “Facebook Used People’s Data to Favor 
Certain Partners and Punish Rivals, Documents Show” New York Times. 
12-05-18.
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As mentioned above, the UN Declaration of Human Right 
states that “everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions with-
out interference and to seek, receive and impart information 
and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” This 
is freedom of expression in a broad sense, as the wording 
contains both individuals’ and organizations’ freedom to 
express themselves and their right to seek out information 
freely and search for information freely.
In today’s online world, freedom of speech is under pres-
sure, because the tech giants have been given a position 
where they can lay down the rules of public conversation and 
access to information. This is a consequence of freedom of 
expression having been capitalized by tech giants. The right to 
express one’s opinion and seek out information is no longer 
exercised without interference, because the tech companies 
adapt and limit the free information exchange of individuals 
and organizations, based on commercial interests as well as 
supercilious, paternalistic ideas. First of all, and as discussed 
in previous chapters, interference takes place, and it takes 
place automatically and opaquely through the platforms’ 
algorithm systems. But there is also a manual, censoring inter-
ference taking place, based on policies formulated by the 
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giants in order to create an information environment which 
aims to reflect their own ideals. These policies are vaguely 
and hazily worded. The phrasings reduce complex legal 
 decision making, which we will elaborate on in the following 
chapters. This interference means that who and what is gain-
ing ears today is increasingly determined by large private 
technological players.
There is no doubt that the creation and spread of the 
Internet initially caused a landslide towards increased real 
freedom of expression. Any user could now create their own 
website or blog from which to preach their incontestable 
opinions about nothing and everything and participate in 
many different debate forums and commentary threads and 
make serious or less serious comments about other people’s 
statements, positions and personalities. If you were smart or 
lucky, you could get in touch and debate with a brand new 
and broad readership—and moreover, you were exempt from 
the objections of opinions editors. In the classic media setup, 
the opinion editor was responsible for combing through writ-
ten pieces submitted “to the editor” by ordinary people in 
order to decide which ones to promote and expose. Of course, 
one was still subject to the laws of one’s country and its par-
tial restrictions on freedom of expression—although it has 
taken most states a long time to adjust, not only to monitor-
ing the printed word but also the digitally communicated 
word.
The advent of the Internet also meant highly increased 
freedom of speech in the broader sense, the one about seek-
ing out information: the ever-increasing data volumes avail-
able on the web allow the user to access news, search 
information, gain knowledge, get informed about debates, 
positions and controversies, all at an incredibly fast pace. The 
top tech representatives never fail to mention, in manifestos 
and speeches, how much they believe their companies con-
tribute to this increased freedom of expression. In November 
2010, at the doorsteps of the “Arab Spring”, Eric Schmidt and 
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Jared Cohen from Google rejoicingly described how dedi-
cated they were to “promote freedom of expression on the 
Internet and protect privacy.”1 They even envisioned rebels 
equipped with cell phones able to summon “flash mobs” and 
“... shake repressive governments, building new tools to skirt 
firewalls and censors, reporting and tweeting the new online 
journalism, and writing a bill of human rights for the Internet 
age.”2 It sounds like a Diderot or a Tom Paine of the twenty- 
first century—eloquent and ecstatic declarations of 
Enlightenment, hard not to be moved by.
But are these giants really defenders of freedom? As early 
as 2010, significant slippage was already well underway. The 
anarchist utopia of the early Internet, with its many individ-
ual players and their self-organized structure, had proven just 
as illusory as the free liberal market of classic liberalism with 
its multiple parties with equal status. Both phenomena share 
one and the same reason; in an open market, the best provid-
ers can invest profits to become even better and, in many 
cases, they can eradicate enough of their competitors to 
approach monopoly. Tech giants such as Amazon (founded in 
1994), Google (founded in 1998), Facebook (founded in 2004) 
and Twitter (founded in 2006) became some of the world’s 
largest companies during the 2000s and 2010s. Not only did 
they thrive on the Matthew Effect—“for whoever has, to him 
more shall be given”—but also on the even more important 
network effect; the sheer size of the network is in itself part 
of its attractiveness, so that the largest networks naturally 
attract new clients who are eager to get in touch with as many 
other users as possible. At the same time, the marginal cost of 
adding new users is incredibly small. A new user, however, 
continues to be just as valuable to the company as when they 
boarded, because advertisers are willing to pay in proportion 
1 Quoted from Ferguson (2017) p. 372.
2 Ibid. p. 366.
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to the number of users reached, the number of times viewed 
and the number of clicks.
An important aspect to this attention economy is, of 
course, maintaining the users once they sign up. This is done 
by offering them useful, convenient and free services—but 
also by not scaring them away. Among other things, this 
means not showing them content they might find offensive. 
This basic trait means that from early on, the big tech compa-
nies formulated policies for content removal as part of their 
“user policies”, “terms of service” or “community standards”, 
on how the user was expected to behave on the platforms. If 
users did not comply with these rules, their posts could be 
deleted and their access blocked—temporarily or perma-
nently. More often than not, these rules were only described 
scantily and in generic or hazy terms—but in all cases they 
were significantly tougher and more narrow than the legal 
restrictions on freedom of expression in most democratic 
countries.
This uncertainty is multiplied by the fact that individual 
tech companies have different versions of these rules. 
Oftentimes they will begin with a general version, the “terms 
of service”, which is the legally binding description of the 
mutual obligations of both service provider and user.3 
Secondly, a more detailed version is outlined in the commu-
nity standards. And thirdly, a considerably more detailed ver-
sion in the form of the internal staff guidelines, a document 
3 The American “Safe Harbor Act” (see below) to a large extent exempts 
Internet companies from responsibility for the utterances of their 
users—at the same time the act guarantees that even if an Internet com-
pany in fact, by its own initiative, monitors and controls the utterances 
of users, that will not take away their protection of the “Safe Harbor 
Act”. Controlling users does not mean that you are required to report 
them for offenses. Most other Western countries of the Western world 
have conditional liability, which means that the companies are not 
responsible for user behavior, as long as they do not have any current 
knowledge of it; while countries such as China and many Middle 
Eastern countries maintain strong liability, which makes it the responsi-
bility of the companies to prevent circulation of illegal material, cf. 
Gillespie (2018) p. 33.
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not available to the public and which is usually only known if 
leaked by a whistle blower.4 For a long time, such control of 
what can be expressed on the tech giants’ platforms could 
seem completely unproblematic. They are private companies. 
In a sense, they run a new kind of media in mutual competi-
tion with each other. Their community standards then corre-
spond to the editorial policies of newspapers. Thus, they 
correspond to the fact that—as a mere matter of course—we 
expect a difference between what can be published in The 
New York Times and in The New York Post. In a competitive 
market, private companies have the full right to set their 
course as they wish and exclude points of view they do not 
like to bring. No one’s freedom of speech is violated, if a 
newspaper turns down, removes or ignores a letter or op-ed, 
because people can always take their statements elsewhere—
on the Internet, people even have abundant ways of making 
their own websites, deciding on the editorial line themselves.
The problem with such an analysis of tech giants as mutu-
ally competing media is that their enormous success of recent 
years has in fact rid them of real competition—they are 
increasingly bordering on de facto monopoly. In practice, 
Microsoft and Apple have a duopoly in the field of software, 
while Google and Facebook are on their way to becoming a 
duopoly when it comes to their core business: selling ads 
based on free digital services. As mentioned above, together 
the two have more than 80% of the American online adver-
tising market and are only threatened by Amazon. But they 
are also monopolies seen from a user point of view: As of 
April 2018, Google had 90,61% of the world’s search activ-
ity—distant followers are Bing (3,24%), Yahoo! (2,09%) and 
the search engine of the Chinese government, Baidu (2,04%); 
4 Gillespie (2018) ch. 3 goes over the “community guidelines” of a num-
ber of social media and finds a confusing affirmation of a mixture of 
freedom of expression, respect, community and policies—most often 
without reflecting on the inherent contradictions of such an affirmation, 
and instead presented in facetious and inaccurate jargon.
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all other search engines have less than 1%.5 Google is esti-
mated to have more than 2 trillion searches per year, which 
corresponds to 2.5 million searches per second. By 2016, 
Google’s parent company Alphabet had six other platforms, 
each with more than a billion users: Gmail, Android, Google 
Chrome, Google Maps, YouTube and Google Play Store. For 
some years now, Facebook has had between 65% and 85% of 
the social media market share; as of January 2017, it was 
87,3%, dropping to less than 70% in the spring of 2018, pos-
sibly due to the Cambridge Analytica scandal of March 2018. 
Competitor numbers are substantially lower: Twitter and 
YouTube (owned by Google) have around 7% and 8% 
respectively, while Pinterest, who specializes in photo sharing, 
now has 15%.6
Companies which have a de facto monopoly can easily 
overcome pressure from the competition. Getting new users 
is cheap for them; they can name prices themselves (in this 
case for advertisers), because no other players can offer such 
extensive market penetration; and they can continuously buy 
out hundreds of emerging competitors. In that way Google, 
among many other deals, have purchased Android (2005), 
Measure Map (2006) YouTube (2006), DoubleClick (2007), 
Ebook (2011) and Motorola (2011); their most recent larger 
acquisition is GIF search engine Tenor (2018). As part of a 
long list of other acquisitions, Facebook took over FriendFeed 
(2009), Friendster’s patents (2010), Instagram (2012) and 
WhatsApp (2014); the most recent large acquisition is 
Confirm (2018), an identification verifier.7 Facebook has even 
5 “Search Engine Market Share Worldwide  – May 2017-May 2018” 
Statcounter. Most recent visit 06-25-18: http://gs.statcounter.com/
search-engine-market-share
6 “Social Media Stats Worldwide – May 2017-May 2018” Statcounter. 
Most recent visit 06-25-18: http://gs.statcounter.com/social-media-stats.
7 How an acquisition procedure tends to proceed is vividly described by 
Martínez (2016), who personally sold the startup AdGrok to both 
Twitter and Facebook.
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developed a tool by the name of Onavo Protect, which is 
marketed as a service to protect user data but which in fact 
maps the online behavior of users; that makes it possible to 
monitor whether new apps or services are becoming popular 
among Facebook users. If that is the case, Facebook will sim-
ply acquire the new company, which is what, most famously, 
happened with WhatsApp.8 In August 2018, however, the 
Onavo app was excluded from the App Store, because it did 
not comply with Apple’s policy for data collection and pri-
vacy. On previous occasions, Apple CEO Tim Cook has criti-
cized Facebook’s approach to privacy, but this was the first 
time Apple actually acted upon it by excluding a Facebook 
app.9 Later we shall discuss the possibility of subjecting tech 
giants to anti-monopoly regulation.
When companies such as Google and Facebook are 
approaching de facto monopoly status, it is no longer such an 
innocent matter what statements are prohibited, marginal-
ized and removed from their sites, as a breach of their com-
munity standards. Especially for younger generations, services 
such as these have become the main source, for many the 
only source, of news and public debate. But regardless of how 
much their top managers say so, eloquently phrased when 
glasses are raised, the community standards no longer reflect 
an ambition of free debate, in the sense of inclusion of all 
points of view and protection of the freedom to also tolerate 
provocative, strange, and unpopular expressions. Rather, the 
community standards reflect an ambition of not scaring off 
users. And an ambition not to offend advertisers by showing 
their ads anywhere near controversial content. This puts them 
right between two opposing considerations: on the one hand 
8 Bloomberg editorial board “Don’t Break Up Facebook” Bloomberg 
Opinion. 07-16-18. Most recent visit 07-30-18: https://www.bloomberg.
com/view/articles/2018-07-16/don-t-break-up-facebook).
9 Tsukayama, H. “Facebook’s Onavo app booted from Apple’s App Store 
over privacy” Washington Post. 08-23-18.
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the freedom of expression, which is often praised in odes to 
openness, transparency and access for all persons and points 
of views. And, on the other hand, a detailed policy for the 
removal of content, a policy which, however, does not enjoy 
the same openness but which generally is kept hidden, both 
when it comes to detailed guidelines and what motivates the 
practical interpretation of them.
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In a Danish context, the first time the public was exposed to 
these flaws was in 2012. It was the seemingly banal case of 
documentary writer Peter Øvig Knudsen, who published the 
two-volume book Hippie about the Danish hippie movement 
and their so-called Thy Camp in 1970. The photo documenta-
tion of these books included photos from the camp, where 
hippies walked around naked, swam undressed and the like. 
It was, of course, a central part of the hippie movement. These 
seemingly innocent documentary photos, however, turned 
out to violate several standards of several tech giants.
On November 1, 2012, it became apparent that Apple 
refused to market Øvig’s Hippie 2—referring to the fact that 
the book contained photos of naked people, making it an act 
of indecent exposure. Øvig stated about Apple’s iBookstore: 
“If Apple becomes the most dominant book store in Denmark, 
we have a situation where censors located in the US, across 
the Atlantic, decide what books can be bought in the biggest 
book store in Denmark.” He then added: “This makes for a 
very unsettling future outlook. We have no influence over 
Apple, and our attempts at dialog with them reveals that they 
have no interest whatsoever in discussing this with us.”1 
Subsequently, the only reason the book could be purchased 
through Apple’s bookstore was that the publisher Gyldendal 
1 Ritzau “Peter Øvig: Apple-censur er grotesk” Ekstra Bladet. 11-01-12.
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prepared a censored version, covering the more sensitive 
parts of the images. As an ironic reference to Apple, tiny red 
apples were placed across genitals and breasts on the photos. 
Danish Minister of Culture, Uffe Elbæk, declined to do any-
thing about the matter, referencing Apple as a private player 
who is free to set its own guidelines.
In the spring of 2013, the case spread to Facebook, where 
several of Øvig’s posts were deleted and he was suspended 
from the platform, again citing indecent exposure present on 
some of the photos posted on his Facebook page. When he 
subsequently linked from the Facebook page to a website far 
outside of Facebook, describing and discussing what he per-
ceived as a censorship, his Facebook page was blocked again. 
Facebook would not even allow critical discussion of the case 
outside the reach of their own service. Television network 
TV2 asked Facebook’s Danish representative, Thomas Myrup 
Kristensen, what was wrong with nudity: “In and of itself, 
there is nothing wrong with nudity. Here in the Nordic coun-
tries, we are quite relaxed about nudity. But other cultures see 
things differently. At Facebook we have to protect a set of 
guidelines that covers our whole community of 1.1 billion 
people,” said Thomas Myrup Kristensen, adding: “There are 
rules as to how we define them. I cannot get into exactly how 
we do it. It is a matter of nude nipples not being allowed. 
They are not  — that is what this is about.”2 Author Peter 
Øvig’s problems would return in 2016 when he published a 
book on the Danish squatter BZ-Movement of the early 
1980s. Once again, his Facebook was suspended — this time 
because it contained a link to Øvig’s own website which fea-
tured a photo from a nude protest organized by the 
BZ-movement in from of the Copenhagen Town Hall in 1983. 
This constitutes a detailed regulation that not only affects 
content posted on social media but also content for sale in 
bookstores, as well as content on private web pages entirely 
2 “Facebook til Øvig: Derfor sletter vi dit nøgenfoto” TV2 Nyheder. 
06-13-13.
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outside the realm of Facebook, as long as these pages are 
linked to from the person’s Facebook page. Or in Øvig’s own 
words: “Not being able to decide what to put on your own 
website is simply bizarre.”3
It may seem a peripheral and harmless matter whether or 
not tech giants prevent old photos from the Danish 1970s left 
wing from spreading on the web. And it is almost comical to 
follow how, for example, Facebook’s struggle against nudity 
has migrated into the world of art and cultural history remov-
ing, among other things, classical works of art such as 
Delacroix’s emblematic “La Liberté guidant le Peuple” 
(1830), where goddess of freedom Marianne leads revolution-
ary France in battle, equipped with the French tricolore, a 
bayonetted musket and bare breasts. Another removal was 
Courbet’s famous painting from 1866, “L’Origine du Monde”, 
featuring a close-up of a straddling woman, as well as iconic 
press photos from modern times such as “Terror of War”, Nick 
Ut’s Pulitzer Award-winning photo of naked Vietnamese 
children fleeing from an American napalm attack in 1972. 
Even Hans Holbein’s drawing of Erasmus by Rotterdam’s 
naked hand from around 1532 did not make it through.4 Over 
the past ten years, an extensive and still ongoing confronta-
tion has emerged between Facebook’s removal policy and 
activist groups of breastfeeding mothers who, not entirely 
without reason, consider Facebook’s removal of their happy 
selfie photos of babies sucking their breasts as just another 
element in a major suppression of breastfeeding mothers in 
the public sphere. The fact that Facebook categorizes such 
photos of mother-child idyll with relatively limited nudity as 
“obscene” or “adult” has probably offended these mothers 
just as much—if not more—as those images offended the 
sensible users who felt they needed to complain about them 
3 Kjær, B. “Facebook strammer censur-skruen over for Peter Øvig” 
Politiken. 10-03-16.
4 Jones, J. “Facebook banned Holbein’s hand – but it isn’t even art’s sauci-
est” The Guardian. 08-31-16.
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to begin with.5 In terms of nudity in advertisements, Facebook’s 
policy is even more restrictive, which has made Belgian 
 museums desperate—they can no longer advertise classic 
masterpieces such as “Adam and Eve” by Rubens. Therefore, 
they submitted an official complaint to Mark Zuckerberg in 
July 2018.6
However, the somewhat comical fear of nudity illustrates 
a much bigger and more fundamental problem: the tech 
giants’ increasing removal of user content. To a large extent, 
the tech giants long managed to keep their machinery of 
removal hidden from the public, but as communications 
researcher Tarleton Gillespie points out, content moderation 
is one of the essential services provided by the platforms—it 
might even be part of what defines them.7 Although the com-
panies do not produce content, their reason for being—and 
what separates them from the remaining unfiltered web 
around them—lies in their services of moderation, prioritiza-
tion and content curation. In the eyes of the tech giants, the 
fact that most users do not discover this machinery and per-
ceive the platform as open and uncurated is a sign of the very 
success of the removal: when many users perceive the plat-
forms as open to all ideas, it is because they have never run 
into problems themselves. This is not the case for the many 
users who have actually had their content removed and their 
accounts blocked. With a number of users in the billions, the 
number of removals can of course not be a marginal task; on 
the contrary, it is so extensive that the machinery of removal 
must take place on an industrial level. Due to a lack of trans-
parency, it is difficult to get quality numbers on these remov-
als, but in a 2014 TED Talk, Twitter Vice President Del 
Harvey said that “Given the scale that Twitter is at, a one-in- 
a-million chance happens five hundred times a day. (...) Say 
5 In Chapter 6, Gillespie (2018) maps the course of events in the breast-
feeding controversy.
6 “It’s Rubens vs. Facebook in Fight over Artistic Nudity” (AP) New 
York Times. 07-28-18.
7 Gillespie’s Custodians of the Internet (2018) is the first comprehensive 
and thorough study of “content moderation” on social media.
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99.999 percent of tweets pose no risk to anyone whatsoever. 
There are no threats involved ... After you take out that 
99.999 per cent, the tiny percentage of tweets remaining, 
works out roughly 150,000 per month.”8 Obviously, this num-
ber has increased since. In March 2017, Mark Zuckerberg 
mentioned that Facebook gets “millions” of complaints each 
week (for more exact 2018 numbers, see ch. 12).9 Although 
the percentage of controversial posts may be small, in abso-
lute numbers they are enormous and many users are exposed 
to removals and sanctions which it takes a lot of resources to 
decide on and deploy.
As noted by Gillespie, most removal activity by the tech 
giants takes place on a number of levels, as part of an intricate 
collaboration scheme.10 At the highest level is the company 
top management. Right below is the department responsible 
for ongoing updates of the removal policy, which consists of 
only a few highly placed persons. Below them is the manage-
ment and recruitment of the crowdworkers who do the actual 
implementation of the rules by removing and making sanc-
tions against users who have posted non-standard content. 
They are usually low-paid and loosely employed people, who 
can be hired and fired according to the given workload, far 
away from the lush main offices in Palo Alto, in places like 
Dublin in Ireland, Hyderabad in India or Manila in the 
Philippines. In addition, there is an increasing amount of 
automated artificial intelligence that—unlike the human cen-
sors working with already posted material—flags uploaded 
material before it is posted online so that it can be removed 
immediately, in some cases even without human involvement. 
In this context, the efficiency of AI is exaggerated, however. 
In 2016, it was reported that Facebook’s AI now finds more 
offensive photos than the hired staff does.11 However, the 
8 Quoted from Gillespie (2018) p. 74.
9 Ibid. p. 75.
10 Ibid. p. 116ff.
11 Constine, J. “Facebook Spares Humans by Fighting Offensive Photos 
with AI” TechCrunch. 05-31-16.
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computers merely flag the photos which then still need sub-
sequent human check by a removal worker.
Although the development of such AI is highly prioritized 
in the companies’ R&D departments, Gillespie points to its 
inherently conservative character. AI still suffers from the 
problem that the machine-learning process that the software 
is trained by can only teach the artificial intelligence to recog-
nize images and text that are closely analogous to the applied 
set of training examples. Which essentially are selected by 
people. Moreover, the AI software is not semantically savvy—
it recognizes proxies only for the problematic content, not the 
content itself. For example, large areas of skin surface tones 
are a proxy for nudity and sex. The exact wording of certain 
sexual slang, pejoratives, swearwords or threats are proxies 
for the presence of porn, “hate speech” or threatening behav-
ior. This means that the AI detectors have large amounts of 
“false positives” (e.g. sunsets with color nuances of pale skin) 
as well as “false negatives:” (e.g. porn images mostly featuring 
dressed models). It also implies that they are easy for creative 
users to fool by writing “fokking” instead of “fucking”, “bo@bs” 
instead of “boobs”, etc., or by coloring the pornographic mod-
els in colors far from that of pale skin. Something similar 
applies to political and religious terms, where it is possible to 
just write “mussels” instead of “Muslims”, “migr@nts” instead 
of “migrants”, etc. Of course, the programs can be revised so 
as to crack down on such creative spelling as well, but this 
requires ongoing human input and revision which cannot in 
itself be automatized. Another way is to identify controver-
sial content individually, piece by piece—images can, for 
instance, be identified by a pixel sequence so that they can 
also be recognized as parts of edited or manipulated versions. 
This technology was developed to curb child pornography, 
but it requires that an extensive “library” of such banned 
images is kept, against which elements found online can then 
be automatically checked. Such technology was used in 2016 
to fight terrorism, as part of a collaboration between 
Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, and YouTube. They set up a 
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shared database of already identified terrorist content, so that 
online reuse of this content could be removed automatically.12 
However, said technology is of course only able to recognize 
already identified content and it takes continuous human 
effort to update the database with new content found online. 
It is another variant of the overall fact that the software can 
not recognize e.g. pornographic, terrorist, threatening con-
tent, otherwise instantly recognizable to humans, unless the 
material has been anticipated in the software’s training syl-
labus. Despite the techno-optimism inherent to the industry, 
it does not seem as if AI will be able—any time soon at 
least—to respond to new types of controversial content with-
out human monitoring. For example, AI will not perceive new 
terrorist threats with a different political agenda than already 
known ones.
In addition to these human and mechanical removal pro-
cedures, most tech giants also rely on the contribution from 
users who have the option to complain about content they 
have witnessed on the platform by flagging it.13 The use of this 
option makes up, in a sense, user co-creation of the site as a 
way to patrol its borders, fitting nicely into many of the tech 
giants’ idyllic self-description as self-organized “communi-
ties”. This is not free from problems, however. The users are no 
neutral, impartial police force. It is better to compare it to a 
self-organized militia or “posse” of a particular group or 
urban neighborhood, who might be capable of carrying out 
certain protective tasks, but who may also have its own agen-
das and who is not obliged by the rule of law, let alone know-
ing about the law. Of course, the trend is for the most annoyed 
or quarreling users to be the ones filing the most com-
12 Perez, S. “Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube collaborate to 
remove ‘terrorist content’ from their services” TechCrunch. 12-06-16.
13 In addition to “flaggers”, Gillespie points to yet another group of mod-
erators—community managers, who are leaders of, for example, 
Facebook groups and the so-called “redditors” on Reddit. They may 
help enforce the companies’ policies and add their own, as long as they 
do not contravene those of the company.
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plaints—rather than just leaving the content in question. No 
one is forced to stick around and watch. There is no guarantee 
whatsoever that complainants primarily complain to defend 
the platform policy. In fact, there is no guarantee that com-
plainants even know about the policy. Other motivations for 
complaints range from diffusely sensing something to be 
inappropriate, to perceived offense (whether or not the 
offense is a violation of any given rule), to offense on behalf 
of others (one is not personally offended but believes that the 
content may offend someone else, who complainants feel 
more or less in their right to defend), to moralist pushiness, to 
taking action against views that one is in disagreement with, 
to private revenge against people belonging an opposing 
group. Sometimes groups of users even join forces to carry 
out coordinated flagging of specific persons, groups, or views, 
simply to have them removed from the platform. What is 
more, there is not even any guarantee that the complaint in 
fact relates to the content in question. These circumstances 
are supported by the fact that the complainant remains 
anonymous both to the removal staff and the accused party, 
the latter of which is not informed about who reported and 
over what exact content aspect—users are completely free to 
complain in the sense that they cannot be criticized or 
accused of fake complaints. In most cases, communication to 
the proscribed user seems rudimentary. Often it is not made 
clear exactly what content is deemed problematic or what 
rule was allegedly violated, appeals mechanisms are not men-
tioned, and with most tech giants it is notoriously difficult to 
get in contact with staff members to object to an unfair 
decision.
Some additional details seem to affect this flagging proce-
dure and the subsequent brief checks by the tech giant staff 
members (often outsourced to other companies such as 
TaskUs, which have specialized in content removal): the use 
of “super users” whose complaint pattern enjoys particular 
confidence and whose complaints are almost automatically 
favored. For example, YouTube has a “Trusted Flagger” cat-
egory, in 2016 expanded and renamed as nothing less than 
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“YouTube Heroes”. The program turns flagging into a kind of 
computer game with points and prizes. Conversely, tech 
giants appear to be working with lists of particularly suspect 
users who could somehow be expected to post questionable 
content—possibly based on posts previously complained 
about and removed, or simply based on their suspicious 
behavior on the site or anywhere else on the Internet. 
Subsequently, such problematic users may be subject to spe-
cial monitoring aimed at quick and consistent crackdowns.
Finally, this entire complex internal structure is continu-
ously affected from outside by leaked cases discussed and 
criticized on the site, elsewhere on the web or in traditional 
media—which, in some cases, may put pressure on or jeopar-
dize the reputation of the tech giant in question, who may 
then modify the set of rules or practices, in public or con-
cealed fashion. Given the large amount of complaints and the 
many odd levels of the complaint mechanism, nobody can 
expect consistency in the decisions, and there are many 
reports of people who have had their accounts deleted for 
posts that are nevertheless still up on other user profiles.
User flagging has several advantages to tech giants. In a 
certain sense, it outsources an enormous and unforeseeable 
task to the users who work for free. It may also seem to sup-
port the belief of tech leaders that the removal of content is 
made by a self-regulating “community”—as if the complain-
ants were in mutual agreement and as if they were not com-
plaining about widely differing things and with widely 
differing motives. Sometimes, the tech elite comes off as if by 
definition there are no other problems on their platform than 
the ones flagged by users—such as when Zuckerberg spoke 
at the congressional hearings. These romantic ideas are of 
course contradicted by the simple fact that it is the companies 
who make and enforce the rules and not the users who act as 
reviewers only, some would say snitches.
Different deviations and varieties of this general scenario 
are found. Filtering can be a supplement or an alternative to 
removals so that certain content categories are reserved for 
certain users. For example, some platforms use filtering for 
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certain categories—such as Tumblr with porn—in a setup14 
where users rate their posts themselves based on how porno-
graphic or not they are. That way only users who have previ-
ously accepted it have access to that content category. Certain 
services have “safe search”, an option in which users before-
hand deselect different categories of content from their 
search. However, as noted by Gillespie, not enabling “safe 
search” does not mean that the user gets access to all content 
when doing neutral searches (porn movies do not appear 
when searching “movies”, only “porn movies”), so even with 
“safe search” disabled, moderation takes place. Filtering is of 
course a milder kind of control than the far more widespread 
policy of removal, but if it is not done according to very 
explicit principles, making the user aware of what is going on, 
it naturally increases the risk of filter bubbles.
Even Tumblr’s relatively liberal stance towards porn has 
come under attack. In December 2018, the platform 
announced full prohibition of all pornographic material. The 
new rule prohibits “Adult Content. Don’t upload images, vid-
eos, or GIFs that show real-life human genitals or female- 
presenting nipples  — this includes content that is so 
photorealistic that it could be mistaken for featuring real-life 
humans (nice try, though). Certain types of artistic, educa-
tional, newsworthy, or political content featuring nudity are 
fine. Don’t upload any content, including images, videos, 
GIFs, or illustrations, that depicts sex acts.”15 The argument 
behind seems to be that in order to accommodate the App 
Store policy against child pornography, it was deemed safest 
to remove the much larger category of pornography in gen-
eral, in order to avoid the issue of borderline cases between 
child porn and normal porn. This antiliberal step gave rise to 
outcry from the LGBT community, which had seen Tumblr as 
a forum of self-expression and experiments. Simultaneously, 
14 The categories have changed over time. At one point there were two 
markings beside the neutral standard: NSFW (“Not Safe For Work”) for 
“occasional” nudity and Adult for “substantial” nudity.
15 Tumblr “Community Guidelines” modified 12-17-18. Last visited 
12-20-18: https://www.tumblr.com/policy/en/community
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this step seems to corroborate the suspicion that Apple is 
increasingly setting the limits for online expression  – and 
applying it to other tech companies – because of the central 
role of the App Store as a gateway to Apple devices for the 
other tech giants.
All in all, content removal is a complex process involving 
many levels. Coordination and communication between lay-
ers is a problem in and of itself, aggravated by the existence 
of different versions of the same set of rules. One may ask 
why content removal — not only on Facebook but with most 
tech giants — must be kept so secret. Media researcher Sarah 
Roberts highlights several reasons behind this: the fact that 
removal is concealed so users do not know the detailed 
removal criteria may prevent users from trying to bypass or 
game the rules, and it also hides the elementary fact that the 
entire platform is a result of ongoing active selection based 
on monetary motives.16 One might add that the whole ideol-
ogy of a free self-organizing community is probably best 
maintained if the extent of the removal industry does not see 
the light of day. At the same time, secrecy gives users intoler-
able conditions when the rules approach the status of laws—
since the Renaissance, a core aspect of the idea of rule of law 
has been that laws must be public.
For a long time now, websites have been around docu-
menting this censorship, as it is often directly dubbed—e.g. 
https://onlinecensorship.org. When looking at how hyper- 
detailed and sensitive the services are when it comes to tar-
geting content and ads at individual users, it is curious to see 
how insensitive their community standards have generally 
been. By default, they apply to the whole world, to “our entire 
community”, as the Danish Facebook spokesperson said in 
sugar-coated terms. The standards are not in any way adapted 
16 Roberts, S.T. “Commercial Content Moderation: Digital Laborers’ 
Dirty Work” Scholarship@Western Media Studies Publications 2016. 
Roberts quotes an anonymous content moderator working for one of 
the tech giants: “We have very, very specific itemized internal policies ... 
the internal policies are not made public because then it becomes very 
easy to skirt them to essentially the point of breaking them” p. 5.
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to cultural, geographical let alone jurisdictional differences. 
They largely reflect the worldview of a small elite of wealthy 
men and software engineers at the top of Silicon Valley. In 
most Western countries, these community standards are more 
stringent than local laws on expressions, whereas in other 
cases, especially in the Middle East and Asia, they may be 
more lenient. But the principle that the standards should be 
the same throughout the world gives them a natural tendency 
to be organized by the lowest common denominator. If some-
thing is tabooed or feels offensive in one part in the world, 
then via the community standards that something is expanded 
to all users across the world. Øvig’s harmless images of naked 
hippie breasts did not raise many eyebrows in Denmark 
where his book was initially published. But they became a 
problem because in other, more straitlaced places of the 
world, there are people who claim to be shocked at the sight 
of people’s natural bodies. Something similar goes for the 
critique of religion, which is widely used in some places and 
even regarded as an intellectual endeavor of a certain stan-
dard, while elsewhere in the world it is regarded as blasphemy 
and may even invoke the death penalty. In that arena, the 
tendency is also for the lowest common denominator to pre-
vail. When it comes to “hate speech”, there are very different 
standards—as mentioned, it is not a crime in the US, but in 
many European and other countries it is, and it usually also 
appears among expressions regulated by tech giant 
standards.
Although by default the same standards apply to the 
whole world, in recent years pressure from dictator states 
and authoritarian regimes has made several tech giants 
tighten the criteria to align them with local laws. For 
instance, Facebook gave in to Turkish pressure by forbid-
ding specific critique of Islam on their Turkish Facebook—
including a ban on caricature images of prophet 
Muhammad. That happened in January 2015, only two 
weeks after Zuckerberg proudly, prompted by the Charlie 
Hebdo massacre in Paris, had stated the following: “We 
never let one country or group of people dictate what 
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people can share across the world.”17 In 2010, American 
illustrator Molly Norris announced “Everybody Draw 
Mohammed Day”. It was based on the idea that if the 
Internet drowned in drawings of Muhammad, censorship 
of them would be practically impossible. Pakistan filed 
protests to Facebook and threatened to close down the 
service. Morris’ initiative was not covered by Facebook’s 
rulebook, so Facebook’s improvised reaction was to 
remove Norris’s big Facebook group with hundreds of 
thousands of users in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. 
Even Google agrees to such local concessions: on the 
Russian version of Google Maps, Crimea is now a part of 
the Russian Federation. Thus the tendency is that in cases 
where the principle of one and the same standard for the 
whole world is departed from, the departure is towards 
further local narrowing of what can be said, not liberaliza-
tion.18 There is no general openness or transparency about 
the range and nature of these local compromises made 
with non-democratic regimes. Gillespie points out that 
such modifications—just like personal filter bubbles—are 
invisible because not only is content removed, but there is 
no mentioning of said removal: the problem is “... the 
obscured obscuring of contentious material from the pub-
lic realm for some, not for others.” It creates filter bubbles 
on the national or religious level, so to speak. The “global 
community” may now look completely different in differ-
17 Dewey, C. “Mark Zuckerberg’s Facebook censors images of the 
Prophet Mohamed in Turkey  – two weeks after he declared ‘Je Suis 
Charlie’” Independent. 01-28-15.
18 Facebook is allegedly entering into restrictive agreements with 
Pakistan on completely removing blasphemy (which is subject to the 
death penalty in the country), with Vietnam on removing comments 
critical of the government, and with Thailand on removing criticism of 
the royal family, cf. Gillespie (2018) p.  38. In this respect, Facebook 
seems more adaptable than Google, who pulled out of China due to that 
country’s demand for censorship.
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ent countries and may not be as global as once 
proclaimed.
Looking at the standards of the different tech giants, we 
find something striking. From the Pinterest “Terms of 
Service”: “You grant Pinterest and our users a non-exclusive, 
royalty-free, transferable, sublicensable, worldwide license to 
use, store, display, reproduce, save, modify, create derivative 
works, perform, and distribute your User Content on Pinterest 
solely for the purposes of operating, developing, providing, 
and using Pinterest. Nothing in these Terms restricts other 
legal rights Pinterest may have to User Content, for example 
under other licenses. We reserve the right to remove or 
modify User Content, or change the way it’s used in Pinterest, 
for any reason”.19 As with other tech giants, users give the 
company the right, to a surprising extent, to use their per-
sonal uploaded content in a number of ways, including com-
mercial ones. But the crucial part here are the last three 
words: “for any reason”. The right to remove or modify user 
content is reserved for any reason. Similar unspecified formu-
lations are found in many tech giant policies, which may talk 
about removing content “at any time” or launching lists of 
critical content with the phrase “... including (but not limited 
to).”20 This is analogous to censorship laws which fail to 
specificy exactly which types of statements are in fact crimi-
nalized. In the absence of such specification, the laws may be 
applied to an unlimited amount of undefined infringements; 
potentially to all kinds of statements. The legal protection of 
the user is non-existent if the extent to what can be removed 
remains unknown. In a Danish context, we are somehow back 
19 Pinterest “Terms of service” Most recent visit 06-25-18: https://policy.
pinterest.com/en/terms-of-service.
20 For instance, the conditions of Facebook-owned Instagram: “Also, 
Instagram reserves the right to remove any Content from the Service for 
any reason, without prior notice”. Last visited 12-19-18: https://help.insta-
gram.com/478745558852511, or “Spotify reserves the right to remove or 
disable access to any User Content for any or no reason”. Last visited 
12-19-18: https://www.spotify.com/legal/end-user-agreement/
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at the Danish police-issued censorship of 1773, in which a 
police commissioner had the sovereign right to confiscate 
which books he deemed illegal, without any prior court deci-
sion. It is also characteristic that content removed by the tech 
giants for any reason is removed offhand, without the criteria 
being clear, without knowing whether it was done manually 
or automatically, without the user being informed why, with-
out anything that looks like a court decision in which argu-
ments pro and contra can be put forward based on a sound 
legal basis and finally without any formal or clear appeal 
path. When it comes to Pinterest’s “Terms of Service”, the 
policy on prohibited content fits on one single line: “Do not 
post pornography or spam or act like a jerk in front of others 
on Pinterest.” This may sound funky, idiomatic and straight-
forward, but it exposes a lack of more precise description of 
what types of actions makes one considered “to be a jerk”. 
This gives that particular company a legal license to do as it 
pleases.
The standard procedure for content removal on Facebook 
starts with users view content that they find problematic or 
offensive. They then decide to flag, to submit a complaint, 
which then constitutes the basis for removal. Then it is up to 
Facebook’s safety and security staff—a team as per early 
2018 consisting of 7,500 people, but which after Facebook’s 
crisis in the spring of 2018 was set out to a quick expansion to 
around 30.000, many of which are allegedly based in the 
Philippines— to check the given content and determine 
which complaints should be favored. This essentially means 
that the needs of “offended” users are met—but it also means 
that only problems visible to the users can be addressed.21 At 
the congressional hearings in April 2018, when commenting 
21 However, far from all potentially problematic cases are visible from 
the point of view of the individual user. For example, if an ad is only 
targeted to white buyers, non-white buyers will never know anything 
about, simply this because they do not see the ad. Many issues regarding 
targeted and personalized content may escape notice because users have 
no transparency when it comes to personalization.
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on various problematic issues raised by US politicians, 
Zuckerberg repeatedly said that Facebook would obviously 
take care of these issues if, it should be noted, any users filed 
relevant complaints. This is to say that if no users were com-
plaining, then there could be no real problem and the politi-
cians need not worry. According to this logic, it is the 
complainants (and the advertisers) who set the agenda and 
that they in fact comprise the sole specification or correction 
of the company guidelines. Many have discovered this and 
are able to abuse it to organize social media shitstorms 
against views and people they dislike—who may then be 
removed from the platform by its speedy representatives, see 
below. According to the same logic, structural, general, and 
statistical aspects of the algorithms – invisible from the view-
point of single users – could never appear as real problems 
the company ought to address.
As mentioned earlier, manual removal of content, as a 
response to complaints, is increasingly supported by the 
automated removal of content based on algorithms con-
stantly developed and modified. There has been no public 
access to, neither the algorithms themselves nor the exact 
criteria on which removals are carried out. The criteria are 
revised and modified on a regular basis, and rarely commu-
nicated to the public. At the hearings in April 2018, 
Zuckerberg placed the main responsibility for the recent 
removal of “terrorist” content from Facebook on the algo-
rithms, claiming that 99% of ISIS-related material was now 
removed automatically. He repeatedly cited further devel-
opment and sophistication of AI-based algorithms as the 
solution to many of the issues highlighted by members of 
congress—including the removal of many different types of 
content, both those already covered by the standards and 
content found problematic by different politicians. But the 
public has no insight into or guarantee that all the afore-
mentioned deleted ISIS posts actually contain serious acts 
such as threats, incitement to violence, organization of ter-
rorist cells, etc. Needless to mention, nothing could be far-
ther from the writers of this book to have the remotest 
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sympathy with ISIS, but that is exactly the reason these 
cases are suitable to illustrate the problem. Interpretations 
of for instance the ISIS theology, its understanding of gov-
ernment, politics, strategy, propaganda etc. should not be 
removed, in our opinion, and certainly not automatically 
and without control. The classic line of argument to defend 
the position that such content should also be tolerated goes 
as follows: if not all views—also abominable ones—are 
allowed, the result is a public sphere characterized by dis-
honesty, pretense and hypocrisy, because people are forced 
to hide what they really mean. If certain views are banned, 
they will not just disappear, but instead get organized in the 
underground—for instance on The Dark Web—where they 
may gain a sheen of martyrdom, become radicalized and 
even more difficult to control. The result is fragmentation of 
the public sphere. It makes it harder both for the public, for 
researchers and for secret services to understand, for exam-
ple, what kind of phenomenon ISIS is, if no one has access 
to their distorted views. And if radical views are rejected, 
supporters of such views are more likely to conclude that 
democracy does not include them; therefore, they must take 
anti-democratic action. One could also add that the pres-
ence of grotesque and extreme views in the public sphere 
has a diversity of functions. This does not only make for the 
recruitment of more supporters. It also gives the public the 
opportunity to be aware of, disgusted at and renounce such 
positions—like a vaccine that makes society ready to battle 
against such positions, a readiness which may lose force if 
these ideologies develop in more clandestine fashions.
The censorship procedure not only includes the removal 
of content, be it algorithmically by censorship before the 
fact or manually by censorship after the fact. It also happens 
by categorizing certain types of users as suspicious and then 
subjecting them to special monitoring of their online behav-
ior. Categorization of someone as suspicious can of course 
be the simple fact that on repeated occasions the person has 
had content removed, manually or algorithmically. But it 
can also just be a significant change in one’s metadata—data 
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mapping one’s network connectivity and online behavior. If 
that behavior suddenly involves new groups, not to mention 
groups in contradiction to one another, or if it comes off as 
striking in any other way, then the “standing” with the tech 
giant can be changed from light green to red, which means 
that the user’s behavior is subject to special monitoring in 
order to immediately crack down, if the user posts some-
thing that violates the community standards. Monitoring 
users happens, of course, primarily for advertising and com-
mercial purposes—but it also has a political dimension, so to 
speak, in the way that it categorizes users before the fact, if 
they are thought to possibly violate the community stan-
dards.22 In August 2018, the public was given a small taste 
sample of this when Facebook announced its use of a Trust 
Index to rate users on a scale between 0 and 1. The purpose 
is to identify malicious users to crack down upon. The index 
most likely includes repeated violators of the community 
rules. According to Facebook, this credibility assessment 
also seems to include whether users have reported some-
thing as false which in fact was only a matter of disagree-
ment—apparently the first attempt at possible sanctioning 
against abuse of the flagging feature. Similarly, the index 
also includes which publishers are considered credible by 
users. As always, there is no transparency about how these 
comprehensive credibility assessments are arrived at, 
whether all users are assigned a credibility score—and there 
is also no indication of whether it is even possible for users 
to gain insight into their own index and potentially file an 
appeal in case of error.23
The overall picture is that by using their de facto monop-
oly, the tech giants are actually in the process of turning their 
community standards into the new limits of the public sphere. 
22 We have this description of the categorization of users from an expert 
source who has visited and interviewed the tech giants on several occa-
sions and who has had profiles closed; we are aware of the identity of the 
person who, however, has preferred to remain anonymous.
23 E. Dwoskin. “Facebook is the Trustworthiness of its Users on a Scale 
from Zero to 1” Washington Post. 08-21-18.
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From their origin as editorial principles these guidelines 
slowly transform and become de facto censorship legislation. 
And these new limits are far narrower than the broad limits 
for freedom of speech generally set out in modern liberal 
democracies.
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Due to the recent crises, Facebook is restructuring to restore 
the company’s reputation, which is, according to Zuckerberg, 
a three-year process. On April 24, 2018, Facebook published 
its updated internal guidelines for enforcement of the com-
pany’s community standards.1 It was the first time the public 
gained direct, “official” insight into this comprehensive hid-
den policing inside the company. The only glimpses behind 
the curtain provided before then came from confidential 
documents leaked to Gawker magazine in 2012, to S/Z in 
2016—and in 2017, when The Guardian published “The 
Facebook Files”. They included comprehensive removal 
guidelines featuring a mixture of parameters, decision trees 
and rules of thumb—illustrated by many concrete examples 
of content to be removed, most likely taken from real ousted 
material of the time.2 As a contrast to this, the 2018 document 
is much more sparse, orderly and void of examples, and it is 
tempting to think that this is a combed-down version aimed 
for publication. Still, the document gives unique insight into 
the detailed principles for the company’s content removal—
albeit not the enforcement procedure itself. One can only 
1  Facebook “Community Standards”. Last visit 08-04-18: https://www.
facebook.com/communitystandards/; the quotes in this chapter are 
taken from here. See also Lee, N. “Facebook publishes its community 
standards playbook” Engadget. 04-24-18.
2  Cf. Gillespie (2018) p. 111f.
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guess as to whether this surprising move away from secrecy 
can be attributed to the increasing media storm throughout 
2017, culminating in the Cambridge Analytica revelation of 
March 2018 and the congressional hearings in April of the 
same year. The document contains six chapters: (1) “Violence 
and Criminal Behavior”, (2) “Safety”, (3) “Objectionable 
Content”, (4) “Integrity and Authenticity”, (5) “Respecting 
Intellectual Property” and (6) “Content Related Requests”.
The first chapter features reasonable restrictions regarding 
criminal acts such as threats and incitement to violence. The 
second, “Safety”, is more problematic. Here, for instance, child 
pornography and images of naked children are treated as if 
they were but varieties of the same thing, i.e., no posting of 
photos featuring “nude, sexualized, or sexual activity with 
minors”. This means that images of diaper-changing and pedo-
philia fall into the same category. The stance towards “self- 
injury” is also problematic, because Facebook believes itself 
capable of preventing suicide by banning content which 
“promotes, encourages, coordinates, or provides instructions 
for suicide, self-injury or eating disorders.” For one, this 
excludes serious discussion of the ongoing political issue of 
voluntary euthanasia—and in the same vein, one can ask 
whether it would not also exclude many fashionable diets. 
The sections “Bullying” and “Harassment” and the right to 
privacy are less problematic. There is, however, an issue with 
the following wording: “Our bullying policies do not apply to 
public figures because we want to allow discourse, which 
often includes critical discussion of people who are featured 
in the news or who have a large public audience. Discussion 
of public figures nonetheless must comply with our 
Community Standards, and we will remove content about 
public figures that violates other policies, including “hate 
speech” or credible threats”. This can easily be used as a cop- 
out to shield public figures from criticism many would find 
completely legitimate.
The fourth item is “Spam”, “Misrepresentation”, “False 
News” and “Memorialization”. It is funny how a basic guide-
line within the “Spam” category says: “Do not artificially 
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increase distribution for financial gain.” It is hard not to read 
this as an exact characterization of Facebook’s very own busi-
ness model, but obviously the company cannot have users 
invading the company’s own commercial turf. Indeed, spam is 
by far the largest category of content removed.
“Misrepresentation” refers to Facebook’s policy stating 
that all users must use their own real name. In democratic 
countries, the reasoning behind this policy is understandable; 
the very name “Facebook” is based on the requirement of 
presenting a somewhat authentic picture of the user’s face. 
But it may be acutely dangerous for users in non-democratic 
countries. However, even in democratic countries, certain 
people such as anonymous media sources, whistle blowers or 
others might have very legitimate reasons not to appear with 
their own name and photo. In 2017, a major case put Facebook 
and the LGBT community at loggerheads. Many Drag 
Queens who appeared on the platform under their adopted 
transgender names had their accounts blocked (it would later 
turn out that they had all been flagged by one and the same 
energetic complainant) with reference to the requirement to 
appear under their own real name. The problem is not periph-
eral. In the first months of 2018, Facebook had to close as 
many as 583 million fake accounts, while still estimating that 
3–4% of the remaining billions of users are fake.3 Creating 
and selling fake user accounts has become a large indepen-
dent industry which can be used to influence everything from 
consumer reviews of restaurants, books, travel, etc., to more 
serious and malicious things such as political propaganda 
disguised as personal views originating from real users. When 
you read a good review of a restaurant online, it is potentially 
written by the owner, with a fake user as intermediary. As 
tech writer Jaron Lanier pointed out, there are numerous 
celebrities, businesses, politicians and others whose presence 
on the Internet is boosted by large numbers of fake users who 
3  That is, around 100 million fake users; “Facebook shut 583 million fake 
accounts” Phys Org. 05-15-18. Last visited 06-25-18: https://phys.org/
news/2018-05-facebook-million-fake-accounts.html.
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“follow” or “like” their activities.4 He believes that the large 
amount of fake users represents a fundamental problem for 
tech giants because so much other false communication—
fake ads, “fake news”, political propaganda—is disseminated 
though these non-existent people. These are dead souls that 
can also be traded. As of early 2018, the price of 25,000 fake 
followers on Twitter was around 225 USD.5 In this light, it is 
understandable that Facebook wants to tackle fake users, but 
it is unsettling if this can only be done by an encroaching ban 
on anonymity, especially earnest and necessary use of ano-
nymity. Serious media regularly need to guarantee anonymity 
of sources or writers to even get them to participate, which 
then happens on the condition that the editorial staff know 
the identity of the person.
Regarding the strongly disputed concept of “fake news”, 
the following phrase from the document might seem reassur-
ing: “There is also a fine line between false news and satire or 
opinion.” This could lead one to believe that Facebook does 
not feel called upon to act as judge of true and false. But the 
very next sentence goes: “For these reasons, we don’t remove 
false news from Facebook but instead significantly reduce its 
distribution by showing it lower in the News Feed.” So false 
news is not removed, but still the people in the background 
consider themselves capable of identifying false news, inas-
much as such news stories are downgraded in the news feed 
and thus marginalized. This reveals a shocking level of con-
ceit: Facebook believes that its some 30.000 moderation 
inspectors —probably untrained— should be able to perform 
a truth check on news within 24 hours. It is self-evident that 
news is new, and society’s established institutions—with their 
highly educated specialists in serious journalism, courts and 
academia—often spend a very long time determining and 
documenting what is true and false in the news flow. How 
would a platform with no experience in the production and 
research of news whatsoever be a credible clearinghouse for 
4  Lanier (2018) p. 34.
5  According to New York Times, cit. from Lanier, op.cit.
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truth? Perhaps the company is realizing this as of late. In 
December 2016, when the “fake news” debate raged in the 
wake of the US presidential election,6 Facebook announced a 
collaboration with various fact-checking organizations. They 
were tasked with tagging certain news (primarily about 
American politics) as “disputed”. The idea was, however, 
abandoned in December 2017, when it was found that this 
tagging attracted more attention and traffic to those news 
stories rather than scaring users off.7
Despite the public promotion of Facebook’s new fact- 
checking cooperation, it is still a very closed procedure with 
few details given. The collaborating organizations are fact 
checker companies PolitiFact, FactCheck.org, Snopes and the 
two news outlets ABC News and Associated Press—cf. Mike 
Ananny’s comprehensive 2018 report The partnership press: 
Lessons for platform-publisher collaborations as Facebook 
and news outlets team to fight misinformation.8 Some collabo-
rators work for free, while others receive a symbolic amount 
from Facebook. The report is based mainly on anonymous 
interviews with fact checkers and according to it, the collabo-
rations between Facebook and the five organizations works 
as follows: “Through a proprietary process that mixes algo-
rithmic and human intervention, Facebook identifies candi-
date stories; these stories are then served to the five news and 
fact-checking partners through a partners-only dashboard 
that ranks stories according to popularity. Partners 
6  It has since become clear that Facebook was the biggest source of “fake 
news” during the 2016 presidential election, cf. Guess, A., Nyhan, B. & 
Reifler, J. “Selective Exposure to Misinformation: Evidence from the 
consumption of fake news during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign” 
Dartmouth. 09-01-18. Last visited 07-30-18: https://www.dartmouth.
edu/~nyhan/fake-news-2016.pdf.
7  BBC “Facebook ditches fake news warning flag” BBC News. 12-21-17.
8  Ananny, M. “The partnership press: Lessons for platform-publisher 
collaborations as Facebook and news outlets team to fight misinforma-
tion” Tow Center for Digital Journalism. 04-04-18. Last visited 07-30-18: 
https://www.cjr.org/tow_center_reports/partnership-press-facebook-
news-outlets-team-fight-misinformation.php#citations—the following 
quotes are taken from this.
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 independently choose stories from the dashboard, do their 
usual fact- checking work, and append their fact-checks to the 
stories’ entries in the dashboards. Facebook uses these fact-
checks to adjust whether and how it shows potentially false 
stories to its users.” Thousands of stories are cued up on the 
website, and each organization has the capacity to control a 
handful or two per day.
The procedure for selecting critical news stories seems to 
consist of Facebook users flagging them as fake, in combina-
tion with automated warnings, which are based on previous 
suspicious links. Once again, a lot of responsibility is put on 
users flagging other users—but the details of the selection 
remain protected, as mentioned above. Ananny’s report 
could access neither the central “dashboard” website nor the 
principles behind it, and many of the fact checkers inter-
viewed in the report are dissatisfied with various aspects of 
the opaque procedure dictated by Facebook. Among other 
things, they complain of not being able to flag pictures and 
videos as fake.9 Among the interviewees, for example, there is 
suspicion that Facebook avoids sending them false stories if 
they have high advertising potential. In general, there is skep-
ticism among fact checkers regarding Facebook’s motives and 
behavior around the design of the dashboard website and the 
classification and selection of its content: “We don’t see main-
stream media appearing [in the dashboard]—is it being fil-
tered out?” And: “We aren’t seeing major conspiracy theories 
or conservative media—no InfoWars on the list, that’s a sur-
prise.” (InfoWars is a site dedicated to conspiracy theories, 
which had more than 1.4 million Facebook followers before 
Facebook finally shut down the site in August 2018—see 
Chapter 12).10
In the absence of a transparent process, several fact- 
checkers suspect that Facebook avoids sending certain types 
9  On iconic material in truth-based assertions, see Stjernfelt (2014).
10  InfoWars host Alex Jones had his account on Facebook and other sites 
shut down on 6. August 2018, cf. Vincent, J. “Facebook removes Alex 
Jones pages, citing repeated hate speech violations” The Verge. 08-06-18. 
Apple, Spotify and YouTube also closed InfoWars on the same day.
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of news through the fact-check system in order to avoid their 
labelling. If that is the case, then some false news stories are 
removed or de-ranked while others are not even sent to 
check. The suspicion seems justified, as in July 2018, an 
undercover reporter from Channel4 Dispatches revealed how 
popular activists from the extreme right get special protec-
tion from Facebook. The documentary showed how modera-
tors, for example, let right-wing movement Britain First’s 
pages slip through, simply because they “generate a lot of 
revenue”. The process is called “shielded review”. Typically, a 
page is removed if it has more than five entries violating 
Facebook rules. But with shielded review, particularly popu-
lar pages are elevated to another moderation level, where the 
final removal decision is made by Facebook’s internal staff.11
In Ananny’s report, fact checkers are also quoted as com-
plaining that they have no knowledge of the actual purpose 
of Facebook’s checks or what impact they have. Facebook has 
publicly stated that a negative fact check results in 80% less 
traffic to the news in question. But as a fact checker says, this 
claim itself is not open to fact-checking. Others complain that 
the process has the character of a private agreement between 
private companies and that there is no openness about its 
ideals or accountability to the public. With so little transpar-
ency about Facebook’s fact-check initiatives, it is difficult to 
conclude anything unambiguously, but the whole process 
seems problematic from a free speech standpoint, given the 
lack of clear criteria regarding which stories are sent to check 
and which are not. The efforts do not seem to be working 
well, either. The number of users visiting Facebook pages 
with “fake news” was higher in 2017 than in 2016.12 As part of 
its hectic public relations activity in Spring 2018, Facebook 
announced that it would begin to check photos and videos, 
this time in collaboration with the French media agency 
11  Hern, A. “Facebook protects far-right activists even after rule 
breaches” The Guardian. 07-17-18.
12  According to a Buzzfeed survey: Silverman, C., Lytvynenko, J. & 
Pham, S. “These are 50 of Fake News Hits on Facebook in 2017” 
BuzzFeed. 12-28-17.
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AFP.13 Details about the procedure and results of this initia-
tive remain to be seen. In December 2018, after Facebook 
had used the Definers spin company to smear opponents 
became known, former managing editor of Snopes, a fact- 
checking company, Brooke Binkowski expressed her disap-
pointment with the company’s two-year collaboration with 
Facebook: “They’ve essentially used us for crisis PR.” She 
added: “They’re not taking anything seriously. They are more 
interested in making themselves look good and passing the 
buck […] They clearly don’t care.”14 By February 2019, 
Snopes quit the Facebook factchecking partnership.15
The next clause of the Facebook removal manual concern-
ing intellectual property rights does nothing more than make 
explicit the company’s responsibility disclaimer—much like 
Google and other tech giants. It puts all responsibility on 
users, who are assumed to have made the copyright situation 
clear for all posts they upload (cf. Ch. 14).
The last section of the clause, “Content-Related Requests”, 
covers users’ right to delete accounts—as expected, there is 
no mention of the right to ask Facebook to delete their 
detailed data profiles including their general online behavior, 
data purchased, etc. Also, the section does not address the 
issue of how the tech giant will respond if asked by intelli-
gence agencies and police for access to user data—a touchy 
subject concerning anything from relatively unproblematic 
help with criminal investigations to much more debatable 
help with politically motivated surveillance.
Crucial to freedom of expression, however, is the third 
item: “Objectionable Content”. It features the subcategories 
“Hate Speech”, “Graphic Violence”, “Adult Nudity and Sexual 
13  Ingram, D. “Facebook begins ‘fact-checking’ photos and videos” 
Reuters. 03-29-18.
14  Levin, S. “‘They don’t care’: Facebook factchecking in disarray as jour-
nalists push to cut ties” The Guardian. 12-13-18.
15  Coldewey, D. ”UPDATE: Snopes quits and AP in talks over Facebook’s 
factchecking partnership” TechCrunch. 02-01-19.
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Activity” and “Cruel and Insensitive”.16 Each category is 
described in detail. “We define hate speech as a direct attack 
on people based on what we call protected characteristics—
race, ethnicity, national origin, religious affiliation, sexual 
orientation, sex, gender, gender identity, and serious disability 
or disease. We also provide some protections for immigration 
status. We define attack as violent or dehumanizing speech, 
statements of inferiority, or calls for exclusion or segregation. 
We separate attacks into three tiers of severity, as described 
below.”17 Facebook’s list of “hate speech” examples is charac-
teristic in its attempt at a definition based on a random list of 
groups of people who for some reason should enjoy particu-
lar protection beyond other groups in society. Such a break 
with equality before the law is one of the classic problems of 
“hate speech” regulation, both because different legislators 
choose and select different groups for special protection, but 
also in practice: usually, it is humor or other remarks about 
certain, selected skin colors, ethnicities and religions, that are 
considered as bad taste. But then there are others of whom it 
is considered acceptable to make fun. This changes with the 
spirit of the times and is often a matter of which groups yell 
the loudest—groups that do not have the zeitgeist in their 
favor notoriously do not even expect to find protection in 
“hate speech” paragraphs. Although “race” is a crucial con-
cept on the list, for instance, the Caucasian race is rarely 
16  Facebook’s “Community Standards 12. Hate Speech” p. 18. Last vis-
ited 07-30-18: https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/objec-
tionable_content/hate_speech.
17  Many tech giants have similar formulas that directly cite the range of 
groups that enjoy special protection in US anti-discrimination legisla-
tion. Although the United States has no criminalization of hate speech 
(and may not have it because of the First Amendment), companies thus, 
in a certain sense, generalize and extend the existing law to include hate 
speech. It is worth noting that the characteristics (ethnicity, gender, reli-
gion, etc.) used in this legislation do not distinguish between minority 
and majority groups—unlike what is often assumed, the protection here 
is not aimed at protecting minorities specifically, and as a matter of prin-
ciple majority groups supposedly have right to equal protection accord-
ing to such laws and regulations.
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mentioned as worthy of protection from attacks related to 
skin color, and attacks on Islam is often taken very seriously 
which is seldom the case with Christianity. Also, Facebook’s 
“hate speech” definition does not include a reference to the 
concept of truth, as we find in libel—thus, a true statement 
can be classified as “hate speech” if someone claims to feel 
offended by it.
It is a well-known fact that Facebook and other tech giants 
have had a hard time deciding how to deal with statements 
which merely cite or parody the hateful statements of others. 
This problem is now openly addressed in the following seg-
ment: “Sometimes people share content containing someone 
else’s hate speech for the purpose of raising awareness or 
educating others. Similarly, in some cases, words or terms that 
might otherwise violate our standards are used self- 
referentially or in an empowering way.” Irony and satire are 
not mentioned explicitly but are referenced in the part about 
“fake news”, and one must assume that they are addressed in 
the “self-referential” use of “hate speech”. Such statements 
are, of course, difficult to process quickly or automatically 
because their character cannot be determined based on the 
simple presence or absence of particular terms but require a 
more thorough understanding of the whole context. 
Facebook’s solution goes: “When this is the case, we allow the 
content, but we expect people to clearly indicate their intent, 
which helps us better understand why they shared it. Where 
the intention is unclear, we may remove the content.”18
Quotes or irony are allowed, then, but only if this is made 
completely clear, with quotation marks and explicit or 
implicit underlining. An ironic post about Christians and 
white Danes was exactly what sprung the Facebook trap on 
Danish journalist Abdel Aziz Mahmoud in January 2018.19 As 
18  Facebook’s “Community Standards 12. Hate Speech” p. 18. Last vis-
ited 07-30-18: https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/objec-
tionable_content/hate_speech.
19  See Abdel Mahmoud’s Facebook post in Pedersen, J. ”Kendt DR-vært 
censureret af Facebook: Se opslaget, der fik ham blokeret” BT. 
01-28-18.
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a public figure with many followers, he had posted a com-
ment aimed at highlighting the double standard among many 
players in public Danish debate. However, after several users 
reported the post as offensive, Facebook chose to delete it 
and throw the journalist off the site. Facebook does not seem 
to understand that irony works best in a delicate balance, 
causing its addressee to wonder what exactly the idea may 
be—and not by overexplaining and spelling out. The reason 
for this removal was, of course, that no one can expect sophis-
ticated text interpretation from underpaid staff working 
under pressure on the other side of the globe, just as it has not 
yet been possible to teach artificial intelligence to understand 
irony. But apparently Facebook has concluded that some of 
the most elegant and artistically and politically effective 
instruments—irony, parody and satire—cannot come to full 
fruition. In a Danish context, we need to dig deep in the his-
tory books and go all the way back to the Danish Freedom of 
the Press Act of 1799. Its Article 13 established that irony and 
allegory were penalized the same way as explicit statements. 
At the time, the idea was to protect the Monarchy. In the case 
of Facebook, the reasons are financial, as the company cannot 
afford to deploy the procedures necessary to really differenti-
ate such challenging statements.
Since 1790, crimes of press freedom in Denmark have, at 
least as a general rule, been decided publicly in the courts, 
allowing for thorough arguments pro et contra to be pre-
sented, and for the intention and meaning of a contested 
statement to be clarified. One of the key challenges of the 
new online censorship is that this is not the case. It is per-
formed automatically, without transparency, and thus far 
removed from any real appeal option, unless the affected 
person—as in the case of Abdel Mahmoud Aziz—is fortunate 
enough to be a publicly known figure with the related oppor-
tunities of contacting the traditional press to raise public 
awareness about a problem, pressuring tech giants to respond 
and apologize for the removal.
Another example from Denmark of a public figure clash-
ing with Facebook’s foggy policies was Jens Philip Yazdani, 
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former chairman of the Union of Danish Upper Secondary 
School Students. During the 2018 Soccer World Cup, Yazdani, 
whose background is part Iranian, weighed in on the debate 
on national identity and what it means to be Danish. In a post 
he wrote that he found it easier to support the Iranian 
national team than the Danish one, because of the harsh tone 
of the immigration debate in Danish society. The post was 
shared vividly on Facebook, garnering many likes and a glow-
ing debate in the comments. Against all reason, Facebook 
decided to remove the post—including its many shares and 
comments—after several complaints, because the post had 
allegedly violated Facebook’s guidelines on “hate speech”. 
One may agree or disagree with Yazdani, but it is indeed hard 
to find anything per se offensive in the post whatsoever. With 
the press of a button, Facebook managed to kill a relevant 
contribution to the Danish debate in society. Only journalist 
Mikkel Andersson’s public criticism of Facebook’s decision 
led to a concession from Facebook, who put Yazdani’s post 
back online.20
The “hate speech” clause details three levels and therefore 
requires a larger quotation here:
Do not post:
Tier 1 attacks, which target a person or group of people who share 
one of the above-listed characteristics or immigration status 
(including all subsets except those described as having carried out 
violent crimes or sexual offenses), where attack is defined as
Any violent speech or support in written or visual form
Dehumanizing speech such as reference or comparison to:
Insects
Animals that are culturally perceived as intellectually or  physically 
inferior
Filth, bacteria, disease and feces
Sexual predator
Subhumanity
Violent and sexual criminals
20  Andersson, M. ”Når Facebook dræber samfundsdebatten” Berlingske. 
07-25-18.
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Other criminals (including but not limited to “thieves”, “bank rob-
bers” or saying “all [protected characteristic or quasi-protected 
characteristic] are ‘criminals’”)
Mocking the concept, events or victims of hate crimes even if no 
real person is depicted in an image
Designated dehumanizing comparisons in both written and visual 
form
Tier 2 attacks, which target a person or group of people who share 
any of the above-listed characteristics, where attack is defined as
Statements of inferiority or an image implying a person’s or a 
group’s physical, mental, or moral deficiency
Physical (including but not limited to “deformed”, “undeveloped”, 
“hideous”, “ugly”)
Mental (including but not limited to “retarded”, “cretin”, “low IQ”, 
“stupid”, “idiot”)
Moral (including but not limited to “slutty”, “fraud”, “cheap”, “free 
riders”)
Expressions of contempt or their visual equivalent, including (but 
not limited to)
“I hate”
“I don’t like”
“X are the worst”
Expressions of disgust or their visual equivalent, including (but 
not limited to)
“Gross”
“Vile”
“Disgusting”
Cursing at a person or group of people who share protected 
characteristics
Tier 3 attacks, which are calls to exclude or segregate a person or 
group of people based on the above-listed characteristics. We do 
allow criticism of immigration policies and arguments for restrict-
ing those policies.
Content that describes or negatively targets people with slurs, 
where slurs are defined as words commonly used as insulting 
labels for the above-listed characteristics.
We find these straitlaced∗, American∗ moderators on 
Facebook despicable∗. We hate∗ their retarded∗ attempts to 
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subdue free speech. We think that such idiots∗ ought to be 
kicked out∗ from Facebook and from other tech giants∗.
In this short statement, we have violated Facebook’s “hate 
speech” criteria in Tiers 1, 2 and 3 (marked by ∗). Despite the 
amplified rhetoric, the sentiment is sincere, and we consider 
the statement to express legitimate political criticism. It is 
instructive to compare Facebook’s weak and broad “hate 
speech” criteria with Twitter’s radically different narrow and 
precise definitions, beginning with: “You may not promote 
violence against or directly attack or threaten other people 
on the basis of race…” (and then a version of the usual well- 
known group list is added).21 The only strange thing here is 
that it implies that users are indeed allowed to promote vio-
lence against people who happen not to belong to any of 
those explicitly protected groups. At Twitter, the focus 
remains on “harm”, “harassment”, “threats” and—unlike 
Facebook’s list—it does not operate with a diffuse list of 
fairly harmless linguistic terms, statements and metaphors.
Regarding “Violence and Graphic Content”, Facebook’s 
policy goes as follows:
Do not post:
Imagery of violence committed against real people or animals with 
comments or captions by the poster that contain
Enjoyment of suffering
Enjoyment of humiliation
Erotic response to suffering
Remarks that speak positively of the violence; or
Remarks indicating the poster is sharing footage for sensational 
viewing pleasure
Videos of dying, wounded, or dead people if they contain
Dismemberment unless in a medical setting
Visible internal organs
Charred or burning people
Victims of cannibalism
It is no wonder that the company wants to ban snuff videos 
where people are actually killed in front of rolling cameras, 
21  Quot. from Gillespie (2018) p. 58.
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essentially for profit. But the paragraph seems to completely 
overlook the value of war journalism and other serious 
reports on torture, crime or disasters—such as Nick Ut’s 
already mentioned press photo “Napalm Girl”, featuring a 
naked child running from a US napalm attack, a photo that at 
the time contributed to a radical turn in the public opinion on 
the Vietnam War.22 Or what about Robert Capa’s famous 
photos from the Spanish Civil War? Facebook seems to 
assume that all images featuring, for example, “charred or 
burning people” necessarily have a malignant purpose as 
opposed to an enlightening, medical, journalistic, documen-
tary or critical purpose. In any event, this section of the policy 
has no counterpart in the legislations of most countries.
The section on nudity and sex contains the following inter-
esting concessions:
“Our nudity policies have become more nuanced over 
time. We understand that nudity can be shared for a variety 
of reasons, including as a form of protest, to raise awareness 
about a cause, or for educational or medical reasons. Where 
such intent is clear, we make allowances for the content. For 
example, while we restrict some images of female breasts that 
include the nipple, we allow other images, including those 
depicting acts of protest, women actively engaged in breast- 
feeding, and photos of post-mastectomy scarring. We also 
allow photographs of paintings, sculptures, and other art that 
depicts nude figures.” Facebook seems to be realizing that 
fighting against the Delacroix painting, breast-feeding selfies, 
and so on is going way too far. Still, as recently as 2018, the 
company had to apologize for repeatedly deleting photos of 
one of humanity’s oldest sculptures, the tiny 30,000-year-old 
stone figurine known as “Venus from Willendorf”, an ample- 
22  Ingram, M. “Here’s Why Facebook Removing That Vietnam War 
Photo Is So Important” Fortune. 09-09-2016. Norwegian newspaper 
Aftenposten went to great lengths to attack Facebook’s removal of the 
photo when its Editor-in-Chief published an open letter to Zuckerberg, 
which gained international impact. Critics added that the effect of 
Facebook’s removal of the photo reiterated the Nixon administration’s 
attempts many years ago to label the photo as a fake.
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bodied fertility symbol with highlighted labia.23 And August 
2018 saw the story of the removal from the Anne Frank 
Center page of a Holocaust photo featuring naked concentra-
tion camp prisoners.24 The very long list of things that this 
section disallows is very detailed and would probably still 
include Peter Øvig’s hippie photos from 1970. In a subclause 
such as the following, there are two interesting things to make 
a note of among the list of sexual content which users are not 
allowed to post:
Other sexual activities including (but not limited to)
Erections
Presence of by-products of sexual activity
Stimulating genitals or anus, even if above or under clothing
Use of sex toys, even if above or under clothing
Stimulation of naked human nipples
Squeezing naked female breast except in breastfeeding context
The recurring phrase “but not limited to” (cf. “for any rea-
son”) gives the platform a license to expand the list of prohib-
ited subjects as it sees fit. Thus users, despite the quite explicit 
and detailed descriptions of examples worthy of a porn site, 
are not given any real clarity about where the boundary actu-
ally lies. Another interesting ban is that against “the presence 
of by-products of sexual activity”… the most widely known 
and visible byproduct of sexual activity being—children. 
However, photos of children (unless nude) do not seem to be 
removed from people’s Facebook pages—the sloppy choice 
of words shows that the platform’s detailed community stan-
dards are still a far cry from the clarity one normally expects 
of real legal texts. This is no minor issue, inasmuch as these 
standards are in the process of supplementing or even replac-
ing actual legislation.
23  Breitenbach, D. “Facebook apologizes for censoring prehistoric figu-
rine ‘Venus of Willendorf’” dw.com. 01-03-18.
24  The photo was put back up after a complaint filed by the museum. 
Brandom, R. “Facebook took down a post by the Anne Frank Center for 
showing nude Holocaust victims” The Verge. 08-29-18.
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The last form of forbidden content has been given the 
enigmatic title “Cruel and Insensitive” (which seems to be 
missing a noun, by the way). It is only briefly elaborated: 
“Content that depicts real people and mocks their implied or 
actual serious physical injuries, disease, or disability, non- 
consensual sexual touching, or premature death.” Is this to 
say that making fun of someone’s death is okay, as long they 
died on time? Perhaps this rule against mockery of disabili-
ties was also what allowed Facebook to remove a caricature 
drawing of Donald Trump with a very small penis, believing 
that it was an offense against the poor man. Again, a more 
context-sensitive reader or algorithm would know that this 
was an ironic political reference to the debates during the 
presidential primaries of 2016, where an opponent accused 
Trump of having small hands (obviously referring to the 
popular wisdom that a correlation exists between the size of 
men’s hands and their genitals).
In the spring and summer of 2018, Facebook seems to have 
been hit by almost a panic of activity in the wake of the 
Cambridge Analytica scandal—hardly a week went by with-
out new, ostentatious initiatives from the company, probably 
in an attempt to appear serious and well-behaved enough to 
avoid imminent political regulation. However, many of the 
initiatives come off as improvised and uncoordinated—the 
principles of the removal manual from April were thus 
already being revised in August. During the Alex Jones case 
(see Chapter 12), the application of the “hate speech” policy 
was further tightened, and a few days after the Jones ban, on 
August 9th, Facebook came out with another sermon, this 
time with the title “Hard Questions: Where Do We Draw The 
Line on Free Expression?”, signed by the company’s Vice 
President of Policy Richard Allen. The document takes its 
departure in a defintion of freedom of speech as guaranteed 
by the government. The spread is noted between American 
freedom, acknowledged by the First Amendment, and at the 
other end, dictatorial regimes. However, in the message 
Facebook takes care to remind us that it is not a government, 
but that still the company wants to draw this line in a way “... 
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that gives freedom of expression the maximum extension 
possible.”25 It seems that leaders at Facebook have finally 
begun to look to the political and legal tradition of freedom 
of expression. Now there are references to Article 19 of “The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” 
(ICCPR) as a source of inspiration. The United Nations 
joined this covenant in 1966, but even back then, the 
 agreement was already surrounded by a lot of discussion and 
criticism, partly due to its Article 20 calling for legislation on 
“hate speech”. It was heavily criticized by many Western 
countries for its curtailment of free speech. There is some 
irony to the fact that this convention, which Facebook now 
invokes, was promoted by none other than the former 
Eastern Bloc, led by the Soviet Union.26 One may wonder 
why Facebook does not prefer to seek inspiration in the US 
tradition of free speech legislation and case law, a country 
which has gained important experience practicing freedom of 
speech over a long period of time. In the short term, however, 
what is worth noting is another bit: “we do not, for example, 
allow content that could physically or financially endanger 
people, that intimidates people through hateful language, or 
that aims to profit by tricking people using Facebook.” In 
mere casual remark, Facebook here introduces a new removal 
criterion that was not included in the removal handbook: 
“financial danger”, i.e. content that tries to gain a profit by 
fooling Facebook users.27 Again, the sloppy steps of the 
approach are spectacular: A whole new removal criterion is 
introduced in passing, with no clear definition or examples of 
what would comprise a violation of the new rule. If we did not 
know any better, the many ads through which Facebook gen-
erates its huge profits could easily be characterized as tools to 
gain profit by fooling people into buying something they do 
25  Facebook: “Hard Questions: Where Do We Draw The Line on Free 
Expression?” Facebook Newsroom. 08-09-18.
26  See also Mchangama & Stjernfelt (2016) p. 781ff.
27  Constine, J. ”Facebook now deletes posts that financially endanger/
trick people” TechChrunch. 08-09-18.
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not need. This is yet another piece of improvisation when 
formulating policy—one must hope that American and 
European politicians realize that such measures cause more 
problems than they solve, and that such measures call out for 
regulation rather than make it superfluous.
The bottom line is that Facebook’s belated publication of 
more detailed content removal guidelines is a small step for-
ward—probably triggered by the congressional hearings of 
Zuckerberg a few weeks before their publication. It is 
 commendable that a little more public light is shed on the mix 
of reasonable and strange, common-sense and unconsidered 
pondering that lie beneath this key political document. We 
still do not know much, however, about the safety and secu-
rity staff, at present counting some 30.000 people, and their 
training, qualifications and working conditions, or what 
equips them to perform this task so crucial for the public. 
Many of the content moderation departments of the tech 
giants work mostly for a low pay (3–500 dollars a month) in 
third-world countries like the Philippines and under non- 
disclosure agreements.28 There is indeed some distance 
between the luxurious hipster life of table soccer and free 
organic food and drinks at the Facebook headquarters in 
California and the work lives of stressed subcontractors 
stuffed closely side-by-side in shabby surroundings. One 
might reasonably ask how they should be able to understand 
the motivation behind a user posting a picture, especially 
when that user is in a different country, posting in a different 
language and a different context. Is the staff being trained, 
and if so then how? Image, video and text are often inter-
twined, commenting on each other: Does the company have 
personnel with the appropriate language skills to cover a 
global circle of users posting in hundreds of different lan-
guages? Does Facebook give moderators productivity 
bonuses—how many cases does an employee need to solve 
28  Chen, A. “The Laborers Who Keep Dickpics and Beheadings out of 
Your Facebook Feed” Wired. 10-23-13.
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per hour? And, respectively, how many accounts need to be 
blocked? And how much content is removed per hour?
An average time of five to ten seconds spent on each 
image is often mentioned; in such a short span, aspects like 
context, culture, quotation or irony of course cannot be taken 
into account. But the actual time frame may be even shorter. 
Dave Willner, who worked for Facebook as a moderator from 
2008 to 2013, processed 15,000 images per day; on an eight- 
hour workday, that makes around two seconds per image.29 
Since doubtful cases presumably take a little longer, the aver-
age time for most decisions is even shorter. Is there any effec-
tive, overall assurance that the many employees actually 
follow the guidelines, or are they to some extent left to their 
own rushed decisions and assessments based on taste? In an 
interview with ProPublica, Willner’s description of how the 
removal work began in 2008 points to a great deal of judg-
ment involved: “ ... [Facebook’s] censorship rulebook was still 
just a single page with a list of material to be removed, such 
as images of nudity and Hitler. At the bottom of the page it 
said, ‘Take down anything else that makes you feel uncom-
fortable’.” This is an extremely broad censorship policy, leav-
ing a considerable amount of judgment on the shoulders of 
the individual employee—and very little legal protection for 
the user. Willner continues with a thoughtful remark: “‘There 
is no path that makes people happy. All the rules are mildly 
upsetting.’ The millions of decisions every day means that the 
method, according to Willner, is ‘more utilitarian than we are 
used to in our justice system. It’s fundamentally not rights- 
oriented.’”30 The utilitarian attitude weighs damage against 
utility. So if a number of users’ rights are violated and their 
content is removed, the act can be legitimized by the fact that 
a larger number of other users, in turn, experience a benefit—
for example, if they feel that a violation has been avenged. 
29  Angwin, J. & Grassegger, H. “Facebook’s secret censorship rules pro-
tect white men from hate speech but not black children” Salon (origi-
nally appeared on ProPublica). 06-28-17.
30  Ibid.
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Questions of guilt and rights drift to the background, as what 
matters is the net number of satisfied users. Obviously, such a 
balancing system tends to favor the complainant, since he or 
she is the one heard by the moderators, while the accused 
party is not heard and has no means of defense. Therefore, it 
is inherent to this system that the expressing party, the utterer 
of a statement, has no right—no real freedom of expression.
The community standards of the tech giants are becoming 
the policies guiding a new form of censorship. Removal of 
content by an algorithm before it even becomes visible to 
users takes us all the way back to the pre-censorship which 
was abolished in Denmark in 1770 by J.F. Struensee. On large 
parts of the Internet, this “formal” freedom of speech is not 
respected. The manual removal of content upon complaints 
can be likened to post-censorship and is comparable to the 
police control practiced in Denmark from 1814 until the 
Constitution of Denmark came into effect in 1849—with it 
came a number of laws against material freedom of expres-
sion, such as the sections on blasphemy, pornography and 
“hate speech”. Unlike Danish law going as far back as 1790, 
however, in the legal environment of the tech giants there is 
no judicial review, no public court case, and appeal options 
are poor, unsystematic, or non-existent.
Of course, Facebook’s rule-book is not a proper legal 
document, but still it is bizarre to note that this pseudo-legal 
text, with its vagueness and many hyper-detailed bans, now 
comprises the principles governing the limits of expression of 
millions—if not billions—of people for whom Facebook’s de 
facto monopoly is the only way they may reach the public 
sphere and access their news.
In the April 2018 document, Facebook had also promised 
a new appeal option for users whose content has been 
blocked and their accounts suspended. In a November 2018 
missive to Facebook users, Zuckerberg elaborated on the 
idea. Here, he promised the long-term establishment of an 
independent appeal institution in order to “[...] uphold the 
principle of giving people a voice while also recognizing the 
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reality of keeping people safe.”31 We are still waiting for the 
details on how that attempt of squaring the circle will work—
particularly how the board will be selected and how indepen-
dence of Facebook’s commercial interests will be granted. 
Given the amount of flaggings, one can only imagine how 
many staffers would have to be employed in this private 
“supreme court”. Even if this idea may be a virtual step in the 
right direction, such an appeal organ, of course, will still have 
to function on the basis of the much-disputed detail of the 
Facebook community standards.
In the same pastoral letter, Zuckerberg articulated a new 
theory on the regulation of free speech. No matter where one 
draws the line between legal and illegal, he claimed, special 
user interest will be drawn to legal content which comes close 
to that borderline. No matter whether you are prudish or 
permissive in drawing the line, special fascination will radiate 
from borderline posts. To mitigate this fact, Zuckerberg now 
proposes a new policy: such borderline content, legal but in 
the vicinity of the border, will be suppressed and have its 
Facebook circulation reduced—with more reduction the 
closer to the line it comes: “[...] by reducing sensationalism of 
all forms, we will create a healthier, less polarized discourse 
where more people feel safe participating.”32 The idea echoes 
de-ranking “fake news”, only now spreading to other types of 
content. Introduced in the same letter as the appeal institu-
tion, this idea begs some new unsolved questions: will people 
posting borderline content be informed about the reduced 
distribution of their posts? If not, a new zone of suppression 
without possibility of appeal will be created. Furthermore, as 
soon as this reduction is realized in the community, more 
interest is sure to be generated by posts on the borderline of 
the borderline—a slippery slope if there ever was one.
One might ask why there should even be detailed rules for 
content removal at all. It was not an issue with the communi-
31  Zuckerberg, M. “A Blueprint for Content Governance and 
Enforcement” Facebook Notes. 11-15-18.
32  ibid.
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cation technologies Facebook is helping to replace: the tele-
phone and mail former generations relied on to “connect” 
with their “friends”. The postal services of the free world do 
not refuse to deliver certain letters after examining their con-
tent, and the telephone companies do not interrupt calls 
based on people talking about things the phone companies 
do not like. These providers of communications infrastructure 
were even obliged not to censor users; they were seen as com-
panies that help communicate content, not moderate it.33 It is 
primarily for commercial reasons that companies like 
Facebook introduce restrictions on what their users have to 
say. But a harmful consequence of this is that it has turned 
out to be conducive to the desires for censorship of certain 
political forces.
33  Cf. the distinction in American law between “conduit” and “content”, 
responsibility for transfer and responsibility for content modification, 
respectively.
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On May 15, 2018, Facebook continued its springtime cam-
paign to restore its reputation in the aftermath of the 
Cambridge Analytica scandal. A “Transparency” report was 
published, which included statistics on the extent of content 
removal, organized by category. Let’s look at for instance the 
category “Graphic Violence”: “In Q1 2018, we took action on 
a total of 3.4 million pieces of content, an increase from 1.2 
million pieces of content in Q4 2017. This increase is mostly 
due to improvements in our detection technology, including 
using photo-matching to cover with warnings photos that 
matched ones we previously marked as disturbing. These 
actions were responsible for around 70% of the increase in 
Q1”.1 The numbers may seem high, but they only tell half the 
story. Another graph in the report shows that 71.56% of the 
1.2 million users were tracked by Facebook itself, until user 
complaints started flooding in; in the first quarter of 2018, this 
figure rose to 85.6%. The fact that the number of removals 
tripled means that content removed because of user com-
plaints rose from 341,000 to almost 500,000, in absolute fig-
ures, despite the decrease in percentage. So, the increase can 
be attributed not only to better tracking equipment, but also 
to more complaints favored. These numbers are a testimony 
to content removal on a disproportionately large scale, also 
known as censorship.
1 Facebook “Community Standards Enforcement Preliminary Report.”
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In other categories, the numbers are even higher. The cat-
egory “Pornographic nudity and sexual activity” remains 
constant over the two quarters: 21 million posts censored in 
each quarter. “Terrorist propaganda” increased from 1.1 to 1.9 
million cases, out of which 99.5% were removed before even 
appearing, that is, as acts of pre-censorship. “Hate speech” 
went up from 1.6 to 2.5 million cases over the course of the 
two quarters. Out of these cases, only 23.6% and 38%, respec-
tively, were found by Facebook itself. The majority of these 
were identified by flagging users, so the company goes to 
great lengths to accommodate users’ sense of violation. In 
those Q4 and Q1, respectively, 727 and 936 million cases of 
spam were deleted, while 694 and 583 million false accounts 
were shut down. The total number of posts removed increased 
over the two quarters, rounding a billion, which amounts to 
more than 10 million per day—the vast majority of them 
spam.
Given the speed of the procedure, some questions should 
be asked: How accurate or indicative can these numbers be? 
Is there a reason to believe that all the removals can be attrib-
uted to someone actually noticing the alleged norm-breaking 
content? And if not, do some—or maybe even many—remov-
als happen as a result of accusation alone, that is, without 
going through the actual content? Of the content-based com-
plaint categories, nudity-and-sex is the most frequent one. 
This could explain why in some cases the category seems 
most liable to be used politically by users to have their oppo-
nents silenced. There seems to be systematic use of the com-
plaints option. If a group of people agree to complain against 
someone voicing something, it seems fairly easy to have that 
person thrown off of Facebook. It also seems that the plausi-
bility of the complaint filed is not always given the highest 
attention.
In 2016, the Council of Ex-Muslims of Britain claimed that 
19 different Facebook groups or sites organized by Arabic 
ex- Muslims or freethinkers had either already been shut 
down or underwent attacks via organized abuse of the 
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 flagging system.2 Thus, it seems that Islamist groups (or even 
governments in the Middle East?) use the flagging system, in 
an organized manner, in order to remove democratic Muslim 
or anti-Islamist sites from Facebook. In the conservative 
online magazine American Thinker, it has been claimed that 
such shutdowns often happen in the following way: Massive 
complaints of pornography are filed by many complainants at 
the same time against a given page, which is then shut down.3 
From the look of it, the reason is that sheer number of com-
plaints is taken as an indication of the complaint’s justifica-
tion, and/or that the pressure on the staff is so high that not 
all cases can be properly handled. Among the deleted 
accounts in 2013 were “Ban Islam”, “Islam Against Women”, 
“Islam Free Planet”. The interesting thing is that the majority 
of pages hit in this way do not contain pornography at all, 
since they are in fact politico-religious pages. Experience 
seems to suggest that sex complaints are easily accepted, so 
that large amounts of complaints almost automatically will 
trigger the blocking of the targeted Facebook page, with no 
review of whether there is even sex on the page. Such abuse 
may comprise anything from spontaneous actions to system-
atic flagging of political opponents, and such cases are obvi-
ously invisible to the Facebook stats, where systematic 
weeding out of democratic voices in the Middle East is then 
represented in the stats simply as removed pornography.
No one knows the extent of coordinated abuse of the flag-
ging feature. Gillespie mentions cases like “Operation 
Smackdown”, organized by a group of YouTube users to 
attack pro-Muslim content on the platform by complaining 
against it for featuring acts of terrorism. The attack was 
orchestrated with a long list of videos to target, detailed 
instructions on how to file complaints and a Twitter account 
2 “Facebook: Stop Censoring Arab Ex-Muslims and Freethinkers NOW” 
Council of Ex-Muslims of Britain. 02-20-16.
3 Murphy, P. “Blasphemy Law Comes to Facebook” American Thinker. 
06-27-13.
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featuring the dates on which the videos were to be attacked. 
This operation was active from 2007 to 2011.4 Obviously, sur-
rendering an important part of the removal process to the 
users’ own reporting activity is dangerous, since user groups 
can abuse the feature to foment their own agendas. We have 
not been able to find clear estimates of how widespread this 
low-intensity online culture war is. Notes Tarleton Gillespie: 
“There is evidence that strategic ‘flagging’ has occurred and 
suspicions that it has occurred widely.””5
Thanks to the flagging system, Facebook’s own removal 
reports may thus hide censorship and let the company off the 
hook. Evidence suggests that Facebook’s current set of rules 
and statistics does not contain the whole truth. In many cases, 
the enforcement of the policy is not consistent with equality 
before the law—sometimes criticism of Islam is removed with 
greater enthusiasm than, for example, anti-Semitism or criti-
cism of the state of Israel. In 2016, New York-based Jewish 
website the algemeiner quoted Amos Yadlin, former chief of 
Israel Defense Forces, an Israeli intelligence service, for say-
ing that “The most dangerous nation in the Middle East act-
ing against Israel is the state of Facebook.” Yadlin, who now 
heads the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, 
continued: “It has a lot more power than anybody who’s oper-
ating an armed force. Unlike before, there’s no longer an 
existential military threat facing Israel. Rather, it’s a strategic 
threat.”6 Since then, Facebook and Israel seem to have 
reached an agreement to remove “incitement” from the plat-
form, but the details of the agreement are not known to the 
public.7 However, as mentioned, there is no reason to expect 
that the many removals taking place will remain consistent, 
4 Gillespie (2018) p. 92.
5 Ibid.
6 Sherman, E. “Ex-IDF Intel Chief: ‘State of Facebook’ Greatest Mideast 
Threat to Israel” the algemeiner. 01-31-16; translated into English from 
the Hebrew website nrg.
7 Kaye, D. “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression” UN 
Human Rights Council. 04-06-18. Chapter 20.
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and certainly not over time, as Facebook may be easily 
 influenced by lobbyists, campaigns and pressure from both 
Israeli and Arab sides.
Similarly, Catholic associations in the US have complained 
about their Facebook accounts being shut down. Facebook 
probably did not take a classic and uncomfortable fact from 
the history of religion into account: that many of the large 
religions practice, as a natural and central custom, insults, 
mockery and ridicule of other religions, or worse: they may 
have a strong tradition for calls to violence against the follow-
ers of other religions or against infidels—sometimes such 
practices even take place in the sacred texts of certain 
religions.
There is an increasing number of cases where Facebook in 
fact removes seemingly legitimate political views, such as sup-
port for Russia or support for Trump’s more unusual bills. In 
January 2018, Uffe Gardel, a Danish Eastern Europe journal-
ist, reported on a peculiar experience. He describes it: “I 
participated in a passionate debate on my own Facebook 
page: the topic was the Russia-backed war in Eastern 
Ukraine. We participated around five users, all of us Danes: 
two pro-Russian views and three pro-Ukrainian views. We 
debated in a lively and matter-of-fact way. Suddenly, not a 
word came from one of the pro-Russian participants. He did 
not respond when addressed. Not a word from him, and 
moreover his previous posts were suddenly gone.”8 Gardel 
was surprised that his debate opponent Jesper Larsen sud-
denly withdrew from the debate. When he returned, Larsen 
wrote that Facebook had informed him that his posts had 
been deleted as spam. A new test post from him was deleted 
in a matter of seconds only. However, it was not spam, but a 
short comment featuring a link to Ukrainian television. 
Could it be thinkable that Facebook had begun removing 
pro-Russian posts? Maybe after the ongoing Russian bot 
campaigns interfering in American politics had become 
known?
8 Gardel, U. “Når Facebook censurerer” Journalisten. 01-11-18.
Chapter 12. Facebook and Google as Offices of Censorship
144
Gardel contacted the Danish branch of Facebook, whose 
representative Peter Andreas Münster explained: “The point 
here is that ‘real’ people can easily risk triggering our anti- 
spam systems if they post stuff very frequently and very 
quickly.” No information was provided on whether the 
removal was influenced by user complaints. What also 
remains unclear is whether Jesper Larsen had posted hyper-
actively, and whether Facebook’s explanation is trustworthy, 
given the fact that Facebook is the only source of this infor-
mation. As Gardel adds, this is not the only recent case of 
political content leading to deletion. He quotes Danish writer 
and debater Suzanne Bjerrehuus, who was sanctioned with a 
three-day quarantine from Facebook that same winter. She 
had posted the following comment on a series of gang rapes 
in the Swedish city of Malmö: “Brutal and abhorrent violence 
and then they get away with it. The police are powerless. [...] 
The Swedes ought to break with those politicians who have 
ruined Sweden.” Facebook’s “hate speech” clause was only 
made public a couple of months later—but at the time, 
Bjerrehus received the explanation that her post was in 
breach of the company’s ban on “posts attacking people 
based on race, ethnic background, national origin, religious 
affiliation, sexual orientation, gender or disability.” The many 
separate problems of this clause aside, it is in fact peculiar 
that her opinion should fall within the scope of that clause. 
Gardel rightly states that one needs not agree with Larsen’s 
or Bjerrehuus’ views in order to find the removal of their 
statements extraordinarily problematic. He concludes that 
tech giants such as “[…] Facebook have gained such a strong 
position that regulation is needed. A still increasing propor-
tion of the Danish debate on public matters is now taking 
place on Facebook. Facebook pages become actual media, 
which are then enrolled in the Danish Media Ethical 
Commission. In some cases, established web media use 
Facebook’s debate forums to control user comments; cur-
rently, this is what’s happening with the newspapers of media 
outlet Syddanske Medier. These media organizations end up 
in fact leaving parts of their editing rights in the hands of 
Chapter 12. Facebook and Google as Offices of Censorship
145
Facebook, and this alone should alarm everyone in the pub-
lishing industry.” Concludes Gardel admonishingly: “In any 
case, it must now be clear that we cannot have both a safe 
Internet and a free network. And it’s an old truth that he who 
gives up freedom for security is at risk of losing both.” We 
support this outcry—playing on Benjamin Franklin’s classic 
words—to the fullest.
There is much to suggest that content with different politi-
cal motivations is removed. Stories and documentation 
abound online of strange omissions, excessive removal and 
inconsistencies in Facebook’s censorship.9 However, it should 
come as no surprise that the removal does not have the same 
consistency as a court bound by precedence, given that the 
control is so speedy, comprehensive, reckless and carried out 
by legally untrained employees. At the congressional hearing 
in April 2018, Senator Ted Cruz (R) was critical, as he himself 
had experienced the tendency of Facebook to remove conser-
vative more eagerly than liberal content, more republican 
than democratic. However, just because content critical of 
Islam is sometimes removed and content critical of Christianity 
is not, it does not follow that such a bias is systematic and a 
sign of double standards. Given the vast amount of content 
deletions, one does not exclude the other. Only whistleblow-
ing or deep statistical surveys would be able to uncover 
explicit or implicit double standards. In December 2015, 
Israeli NGO Shurat HaDin10 did a little experiment: They cre-
ated two parallel Facebook pages entitled Stop Israel! and 
Stop the Palestinians! with identical setups, designs and rheto-
ric. Facebook shut down the anti-Palestinian page, but not the 
anti-Israeli one. The organization has since sued Facebook.
9 See e.g. Tobin, A. &Varner, M. & Angwin, J. “Facebook’s Uneven 
Enforcement of Hate Speech Rules Allows Vile Posts to Stay Up”, 
ProPublica. 12-28-17.
10 Melnick, O. “Facebook’s Hate Speech Double Standard” WND. 
01-11-16.
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In 2016, technology site Gizmodo featured an article11 
based on statements from former Facebook employees who 
claimed that employees who edited incoming news content 
for the Facebook “Trending” column routinely removed con-
servative news, e.g. news on Republicans Ron Paul and Mitt 
Romney. The column claims that it algorithmically reflects 
“topics that have recently become popular on Facebook.” But 
several of Facebook’s former news curators, as they were 
called in the organization, also told Gizmodo that they were 
instructed to artificially “inject” stories into the trending news 
feed, even though they were not popular enough to even be 
there—in some cases the stories had no following whatso-
ever. These former curators, who all worked on contract, also 
said that they were told not to include news about Facebook, 
not even in the trending feature. An anonymous former 
employee kept a protocol of news stories that were buried in 
this way. Gizmodo therefore concluded that Trending on 
Facebook works like a plain opinion-based newspaper, 
except it maintains a surface of neutrality. Top management 
at Facebook rejected all these allegations as false.
Nevertheless, the allegations about what was happening 
on Trending Topics seem to have affected Facebook. As early 
as January 2015, the company had announced a campaign 
against the volume of “fake news” that abounded in the col-
umn. In August 2016, shortly after the revelation in Gizmodo, 
Facebook dismissed the 26 editors who had fed the news 
column and replaced them with an automatic algorithm. The 
algorithm would ensure that the news stories featured also 
reflected their actual popularity on the platform. However, 
this step did nothing short of opening the floodgates for viral 
spread of false news. Apparently, the company had overesti-
mated ability or willingness of users to identify and reject 
false news. Just two days after the new algorithm was put to 
use, a false story about a Fox News journalist made it high up 
on the list: “Breaking: Fox News Exposes Traitor Megyn 
11 Nunez, M. “Former Facebook Workers: We Routinely Suppressed 
Conservative News” Gizmodo. 05-09-16.
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Kelly, Kicks Her Out for Backing Hillary.”12 According to a 
Washington Post survey covering a three-week period in 
September 2016, five fake and three highly misleading news 
stories ranked high on the Trending Topics section of four 
different Facebook accounts (of course, there may have been 
even more on other accounts because of the personalization 
of each account). In January 2018, in the aftermath of the 
chronic problems that had turned Facebook into a main sup-
plier of “fake news” during the presidential campaign, the 
company attempted to shift the news feed balance from jour-
nalistic news to local news from “friends”. In June, a further 
step was taken when Facebook announced the complete 
elimination of Trending Topics.13
At the same time, the company met new problems due to 
a policy introduced on May 24, 2018. The policy gives political 
ads a special label and collects such ads in a separate archive 
containing information on their ad budget, number of users 
who have seen them, etc.14 This goes for ads related to candi-
dates and elections, but also political issues such as “abortion, 
arms, immigration and foreign policy”. The intention was, of 
course, to increase transparency around political ads. 
However, newspapers and media associations, led by New 
York Times, protested fiercely over the fact that their articles 
about politics were given the same categorization and label-
ing on Facebook, the “political ad” warning. Media represen-
tatives argued that since the media pays to have such articles 
promoted as a way of selling their own product, Facebook 
must respect the boundary between political ads on the one 
hand and ads for quality journalism about politics on the 
other, instead of trying to erase it. After this, New York Times 
and other leading media stopped paying to place their con-
tent on the platform. At the same time, reports came out 
12 Solon, O. “In firing human editors, Facebook has lost the fight against 
fake news” The Guardian. 08-29-16.
13 Kastrenakes, J. “Facebook will remove the Trending topics section next 
week” The Verge. 06-01-18.
14 Constine, J. “Facebook and Instagram launch US political ad labeling 
and archive” TechChrunch. 05-24-18.
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showing that people had less confidence in news coming from 
social media than from all other media, and that news 
 consumption via Facebook was declining (hardly surprising 
in light of the suppression of “real” news earlier that year).15 
CEO of New York Times Mark Thompson called Facebook’s 
categorization a “threat to democracy”. In an angry debate, he 
accused Campbell Brown, Head of Global News Partnerships 
at Facebook, of supporting the enemies of quality journal-
ism.16 It is rather ironic that real news was turned into political 
ads as the result of an attempt to make political ads explicit 
and the extent of them public — thus hoping to eradicating 
“dark ads” in the form of targeted political ads visible only to 
their receiver. The case also shows Facebook’s ongoing con-
flict with the media. Despite its many attempts at forming 
alliances, by categorizing journalism as ads Facebook unilat-
erally launched a new and secretly developed policy, without 
having consulted their supposed media allies beforehand. In 
July 2018, researchers from New  York University demon-
strated that from May to July, the first two months of the new 
ads archive, Facebook’s largest political advertising client was 
… Donald Trump.17
Only a few days later, another scandal broke: Zuckerberg 
“accepted” Holocaust denial and claimed that it “deserved” 
its place on the platform. This made him the target of a veri-
table shitstorm in both the offline and online media. However, 
he had not used these words. He was interviewed for an hour 
and a half by Kara Swisher of recode on the topic of 
Facebook’s “annus horribilis”,18 an interview unsurprisingly 
circling around news, “fake news”, disinformation, etc. The 
irony is that in the interview, Zuckerberg goes to great 
lengths to defend free speech on his platform: “There are 
15 “Digital News Report 2018”. Last visited 07-30-18: http://www.digi-
talnewsreport.org.
16 Moses, L. “How The New York Times’ Mark Thompson became the 
latest thorn in Facebook’s side” DigiDay. 07-11-18.
17 Frenkel, S. “The Biggest Spender of Political Ads on Facebook? 
President Trump” New York Times. 07-17-18.
18 Swisher, K. “Zuckerberg: The Recode interview” Recode. 07-18-18.
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really two core principles at play here. There’s giving people 
a voice, so that people can express their opinions. Then, 
there’s keeping the community safe, which I think is really 
important. We’re not gonna let people plan violence or attack 
each other or do bad things. Within this, those principles have 
real trade-offs and real tug on each other.” If what is meant 
by “attack” is real, violent attack, there is hardly a single free 
speech supporter out there who will disagree with this—par-
allel to the limits to freedom of expression drawn at “incite-
ment to imminent lawless action”.19 In the following sentence, 
however, Zuckerberg changes course: “In this case, we feel 
like our responsibility is to prevent hoaxes from going viral 
and being widely distributed.” He then goes on to present the 
news that verifiably “fake news” must be downgraded in the 
news feed, but not removed from it. The journalist does not 
comment on Zuckerberg’s mix-up of misinformation and 
planning violence but instead asks him why “fake news” 
should be downgraded and not simply eliminated entirely. To 
this, Zuckerberg again defends freedom of expression: “… 
[A]s abhorrent as some of this content can be, I do think that 
it gets down to this principle of giving people a voice.” This 
prompted the journalist to give an example of a post she felt 
should just plainly be removed: the claim that “Sandy Hook 
never happened” (a tragic school shooting in 2012, which 
later became the subject of an InfoWars conspiracy theory 
claiming that the event never took place but was staged by 
19 The classic American phrase from 1919 famously states that the limit is 
“clear and present danger” (from iconic Supreme Court Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’ turn of phrase in Schenk v the US ). The current phrase 
goes like this: “[...] the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free 
press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of 
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to incit-
ing or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or pro-
duce such action” – a quote from the Brandenburg v Ohio case of 1969. 
In the case Hess v Indiana, the Supreme Court made clear that unless 
statements made “… were intended to produce, and likely to produce, 
imminent disorder, those words could not be punished by the State on 
the ground that they had a ‘tendency to lead to violence.’” Cf. Freedom 
Forum Institute: “Incitement to Imminent Lawless Action”. 05-12-08.
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anti-gun activists). Zuckerberg defended why this conspiracy 
theory was not removed from Facebook — and then went on 
to compare it to the Holocaust: “I’m Jewish, and there’s a set 
of people who deny that the Holocaust happened. I find that 
deeply offensive. But at the end of the day, I don’t believe that 
our platform should take that down because I think there are 
things that different people get wrong. I don’t think that 
they’re intentionally getting it wrong, but I think ..” Then he is 
interrupted by the journalist. He continues: “It’s hard to 
impugn intent and to understand the intent.” He is certainly 
right about that — but he is just as certainly wrong in claim-
ing that Holocaust deniers innocently make a mistake the 
same way he himself could make a mistake publicly. Deflating 
Holocaust deniers’ motives in this way caused a scandal, and 
the day after he had to pull back: “I personally find Holocaust 
denial deeply offensive, and I absolutely didn’t intend to 
defend the intent of people who deny that.”20
In the midst of this media shitstorm, many people thought 
it obvious that conspiracy theories such as the one about 
Sandy Hook should be deleted as a matter of routine. But 
these people were never able to come up with a clear princi-
ple as to where to draw the line between conspiracy theories, 
lies, false statements, satire, irony, quotations, and random 
mistakes, and how such a line should then be monitored. 
Although Zuckerberg went quite far to defend freedom of 
expression, he expressed himself in covert and unclear fash-
ion, confusing violent attacks with false statements and pre-
senting a half-baked theory that people’s sincerity—which is 
not easy to measure—should act as thermometer to assess 
whether statements should be allowed, downgraded, or alto-
gether removed. It is not comforting that a man in his posi-
tion is unable to express himself more clearly, and it calls for 
a reminder of a classic warning: hazy words cover up hazy 
thoughts.
20 Swisher, K. “Mark Zuckerberg clarifies: ‘I personally find Holocaust 
denial deeply offensive, and I absolutely didn’t intend to defend the 
intent of people who deny that.’” recode. 07-18-18.
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The defense of free speech did not last long, however. On 
August 6, 2018, after weeks of heated public discussion, 
Facebook blocked four accounts belonging to Alt-right talk 
show host Alex Jones and his InfoWars podcast shows. Apple 
was the first tech giant to block InfoWars and was quickly 
followed by Facebook, YouTube, Pinterest and even YouPorn, 
all on the same day in what may resemble a coordinated 
action. This is probably the biggest act of online censorship to 
date—Jones had 1.4 million followers on Facebook and 2.5 
million on YouTube. In a public statement, Facebook argued 
that Jones’ pages were removed for “glorifying violence, 
which violates our graphic violence policy, and using dehu-
manizing language to describe people who are transgender, 
Muslims, and immigrants, which violates our hate speech 
policies.”21 The banning process is ugly and devoid of princi-
ples: as usual, no one is given information on exactly which 
statements are deemed unacceptable. Only a few weeks ear-
lier, Zuckerberg had even defended Jones’ presence. Jones 
was punished for accumulating “too many strikes”, but there 
is nothing about how many that is, and which strike was the 
final blow. If Jones really fell under the scope of Facebook’s 
“hate speech” policy, why had it not happened before? For 
years he had presented his huge audience with grotesque 
opinions on the platform.22 The other tech giants made simi-
lar references to “hate speech” rules. Rumor spread fast that 
Apple’s action made the other tech giants follow suit because 
Apple threatened to throw them out of its App Store, which 
has strict regulations. Commentator Brian Feldman wrote: 
“What the InfoWars decisions represent is a capitulation—
not to censors, not to the public, not to the deep state, but to 
the only entity left that has any real power over Facebook 
21 Shaban, H., Timberg, C. and Stanley-Becker, I.: “YouTube, Apple, 
Facebook and Spotify escalate enforcement against Alex Jones” 
Washington Post. 08-06-18.
22 Facebook’s statement on the Alex Jones case: “Enforcing our commu-
nity standards”. 08-06-18.
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and YouTube: Apple.”23 The exception was Twitter. For eight 
days they hesitated, until finally blocking InfoWars. But it was 
only a week long suspension and it was not for “hate speech”, 
but more explicitly for encouraging violence, as Jones had 
urged his followers to have their “battle rifles” ready to fight 
mainstream media.24
Commentators point out that Jones and his supporters will 
see the ban as evidence of their claim of a coordinated politi-
cal attack against them—and that it will only strengthen 
Jones’ position as a right-wing martyr.25 Jones and his follow-
ers will most likely regroup in underground networks, sepa-
rated from the general public. Predictably, Jones was infuriated 
by the removal: “We’ve seen a giant yellow journalism cam-
paign with thousands and thousands of articles for weeks, for 
months misrepresenting what I’ve said and done to set the 
precedent to de-platform me before Big Tech and the 
Democratic Party as well as some Republican establishment 
types move against the First Amendment in this country as 
we know it.”26 Jones is especially known for spreading prov-
able untruths. Most famous were “Pizzagate”, the claim that 
Hillary Clinton ran a pedophile ring out of a Washington piz-
zeria, or Jones’ assertion that the Sandy Hook school shoot-
ing in 2012 never took place. Jones went on to harass parents 
of children killed at the massacre—not to mention spreading 
fake conspiracy theories about teenagers who survived the 
Parkland school shooting in Florida of February 2018. 
Recently, he has tried to convince the public that the 
Democrats wanted to start a civil war on the 4th of July.
23 Feldman, B. “The Only Pressure Facebook Understands Comes from 
its Megaplatform Rivals” New York Magazine. 08-06-18.
24 Kang, C. and Conger, K. “Twitter Suspends Alex Jones and Infowars 
for Seven Days” New York Times. 08-14-18.
25 See e.g. Lapowsky, I.: “Why Big Tech’s Fight Against InfoWars is 
Unwinnable” Wired. 08-06-18.
26 Shaban, H., Timberg, C. and Stanley-Becker, I.: “YouTube, Apple, 
Facebook and Spotify escalate enforcement against Alex Jones” 
Washington Post. 08-06-18.
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There is no doubt that Jones has repeatedly peddled 
abominable lies, false accusations and bizarre conspiracy 
theories. Still, Facebook’s argument for banning Jones is not 
based on his “fake news” but on the murkier concept of “hate 
speech”—presumably in an attempt to avoid taking the seat 
of judge between true and false. As stated by several observ-
ers, nevertheless, “hate speech” is not only a vague, politicized 
and subjective category. It is also full of double standards, 
because it does not equally protect all groups defined by race, 
gender, religion and so on.27 It is an all-purpose category with 
no clear limits, so it can be stretched to accuse points of view 
that are simply not liked. As pointed out by Robby Soave, no 
one will miss InfoWars—the serious issue raised by this event 
is that completely unclear rules and procedures now govern 
the removal of content on the giants’ platforms.28 The Jones 
case seems to be triggered by public pressure, and one thing 
remains particularly unclear: are there also plans to crack 
down on other right-wing extremists with similar views but 
fewer supporters operating on the same platforms out of the 
public eye? There is no shortage of those. Perhaps a less prob-
lematic cure against characters like Jones would be to bring 
the removal criteria closer to existing US legislation. That 
would make it possible to intervene, assisted by proper 
authorities, against clearly illegal acts such as slander, libel, 
threats and harassment. In Jones’ rhetoric alone, there is 
more than enough of these.29
27 Shapiro, B. “What Tech Giants’ Alex Jones Ban Got Wrong” National 
Review. 08-07-18.
The fact that Facebook now express a wish to be inspired by the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) from the 
1960s is puzzling, inasmuch as that law helped many countries introduce 
hate speech laws (see Chapter 11) and the United States was among the 
countries that chose not to comply with ICCPR.
28 Soave, R. “Banning Alex Jones” Reason. 08-07-18.
29 Cf. French, D. “A Better Way to Ban Alex Jones. New York Times. 
08-07-18.
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All in all, the presentation of news through Facebook has 
been characterized by recurring problems with “fake news”, 
mixing up news with ads, political bias and content deletion, 
not to mention improvised reactions to public and political 
pressure. Various remedy initiatives have not produced any 
successful cure, neither of a human nor algorithmic form (see 
Ch. 11 for a discussion of fact checkers).
The secretive, opaque and shifting removal procedures 
obviously make tech giants subject to political pressure from 
international top players who wish to influence the removal 
policy—not to mention journalistic Kremlinology trying to 
interpret what is really going on behind the scenes, based on 
small signs, rumors and stand-alone issues. When Zuckerberg 
met with Angela Merkel in Berlin during the European 
migrant crisis of 2015, she apparently encouraged him to 
crack down harder on “hate speech”, to which he is said to 
have made the following response: “Yeah.” This was inter-
preted by some media as Facebook committing itself to sup-
pressing critical news coverage of migrants in Europe.30
The spring of 2019 was characterized by an increasing 
effort to censor different types of Facebook content, particu-
larly “fake news” and “hate speech”. In March, after repeated 
criticsm from journalists and lawmakers, Facebook announced 
that it was diminishing the reach of anti-vaccine posts.31 Later 
the same month, Facebook announced it would ban white 
nationalist content.32 These developments clearly indicate the 
ad hoc character of the company’s removal policy, without 
clear principles.
A radical change in the overall Facebook vision was 
announced by Mark Zuckerberg March 6th: “As I think about 
the future of the internet, I believe a privacy-focused com-
munications platform will become even more important than 
30 David, J.  E. “Angela Merkel caught on hot mic griping to Facebook 
CEO over anti-immigrant posts” CNBC. 09-27-15.
31 Matsakis, L. “Facebook will crack down on anti-vaccine content” 
Wired. 03-07-19.
32 Stack, L. ”Facebook announces new polity to ban white nationalist 
content” New York Times. 03-27-19.
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today’s open platforms. Privacy gives people the freedom to 
be themselves and connect more naturally, which is why we 
build social networks.”33 Zuckerberg defined privacy in terms 
of six headlines: privacy of interactions in selected communi-
cation types; end-to-end encryption extending from 
WhatsApp over the whole platform; extended possibility for 
posting information for shorter periods of time only; increased 
safety; interoperability in the sense of communication ability 
across Facebook’s different platforms; increased protection 
of data in countries violating human rights. This general dec-
laration of intent, of course, is an attempt to preempt oncom-
ing government regulation. Simultaneously, it is striking that 
the core business model seems all but untouched by the new 
principles—nothing is said about data sharing and ad target-
ing.34 Late March, however, Zuckerberg gave in to looming 
regulation in a surprising op-ed in Washington Post where he 
called for some sort of external regulation. In the face of 
increased political pressure, Zuckerberg now chose the tactics 
of delimiting regulation to four specific areas: harmful con-
tent, election integrity, privacy and data portability. “I’ve 
come to believe that we shouldn’t make so many important 
decisions about speech on our own. So we’re creating an inde-
pendent body so people can appeal our decisions,” he said.35 
The degree of independence of a voluntary Facebook- 
invented body will of course be a matter of contention. 
Zuckerberg, however, also envisions some kind of cross- 
platform authority to standardize removal practices over the 
internet at large. Again, Facebook’s sudden willingness to 
abandon responsibility can be seen as a preemptive move as 
against threatening anti-trust initiatives.
Only a couple of weeks later, Facebook announced a series 
of new measures to ensure “integrity” in its much-debated 
33 Zuckerberg, M. “A Privacy-Focused Vision for Social Networking” 
Facebook. 03-06-19.
34 Lapowsky, I & Thompson, N. “Facebook’s pivot to privacy is missing 
something crucial” Wired. 03-06-19.
35 Zuckerberg, M. ”Mark Zuckerberg: The Internet needs new rules. 
Let’s start in these four areas” Washington Post. 03-30-19.
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news feed—of which the most important device was the so- 
called Click-Gap.36 It will influence the determination of the 
ranking of a given post in the feed. The idea is to limit the 
dissemination of websites which are deemed disproportion-
ally viral on Facebook in comparison with the net as a whole. 
A given news content of that sort will be limited in reach on 
Facebook. The controversial and contested news feed is 
sought domesticated by a conformity measure making it a 
mirror of the average traffic on the internet. This means that 
it provides no security against viral matters which are popular 
also outside of Facebook. During little than one month, 
Facebook announced a handful of new initiatives, most of all 
giving evidence of increasing panic in the head office of 1 
Hacker Way.
Facebook has always had a very comprehensive removal 
policy. By contrast, Google has held the free speech banner 
quite high. For example, in 2010 Google pulled out of China 
after several years of hacking attempts and pressure to enact 
censorship. But Google has also been accused of outright 
censorship. In 2016, Robert Epstein, a professor of psychol-
ogy and Google critic, came up with an overview of at least 
nine different blacklists at work in Google’s content filter-
ing.37 Especially Epstein’s first blacklist is relevant—it 
36 Dreyfuss, E. & Lapowsky, I. “Facebook is changing news feed (again) 
to stop fake news” Wired. 04-10-19.
37 Epstein’s nine blacklists read as follows:
 1. The autocomplete blacklist, which automatically blocks the guesses 
that follow when certain keywords are entered.
 2. The Google Maps blacklist—maps with disputed geographic areas, 
which without explanation are not shown—military zones, wealthy 
people who paid to have their land exempt.
 3. The YouTube blacklist—for instance in Pakistan featuring what the 
government demands to be removed from the platform.
 4. The Google Account blacklist—blocking users who have not com-
plied with the “Terms of Service”, which can typically be terminated 
“at any time” and with no real appeal option.
 5. The Google News blacklist, which has been accused of leaving out 
news critical of Islam (see below).
 6. The Google AdWords blacklist—certain words cannot appear in ads, 
or entire industries whose ads Google does want on the platform.
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 concerns the autocomplete feature, which was introduced in 
2008 and which works by completing entered keywords with 
a variety of suggestions generated by an algorithm. This fea-
ture blocks, for example, obscene words. But Epstein also 
found political effects in the auto-complete feature. For 
example, when writing the word “Lying” during the American 
election campaign in 2016, what followed was “Ted” (Trump’s 
nickname for Ted Cruz, “Lyin’ Ted”), but when writing 
“Crooked”, what was then suggested was not “Hillary” 
(Trump’s nickname for Hillary Clinton, “Crooked Hillary”) 
— and thus Google served as a protection of Clinton but not 
of Cruz. Others, however, have pointed out politically con-
flicting biases—if someone wrote “Feminism is” or “Abortion 
is”, then the suggestions that came up were “cancer” and “sin”, 
respectively.38 After Google was incriminated for caving in to 
censorship in hardliner Islamic countries, the company has 
been accused of favoring a rosy description of Islam, also in 
other countries. It does indeed cause concern that in Denmark, 
in June 2018, when googling “Islam is”, the first four sugges-
tions are “Islam isimleri”,39 “Islam is Peace”, “Islam is ...” and 
“Islam is a peaceful religion”. By comparison, the first four 
auto-suggestions for “democracy is” are “bad”, “dead”, “fail-
ing” and “not good”, respectively.
 7. The Google AdSense blacklist—concerning websites paid by Google 
for their skill at attracting users to ads—in these cases Google is 
accused of withdrawing from the agreements right before payments 
are due.
 8. The search engine blacklist—it sends search results to the bottom 
ranks, potentially ruining companies affected.
 9. The quarantine list—blocking anything from individual users to 
entire sections of the Internet, sometimes taking a very long time to 
be restored.
Se Epstein, R. “The New Censorship” US News. 06-22-16.
38 Solon, O. & Levin, S. “How Google’s search algorithm spreads false 
information with a rightwing bias” The Guardian. 12-16-16.
39 “Islam isimleri” is Turkish for “Islamic names”. The auto-completion 
suggestions are of course personalized and relative to the searcher and 
time.
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A central battlefield within Google is its crucial ranking 
system. It determines which search results end up at the top 
of the results list. As described above, it has been personal-
ized since 2009. But there is also a long and growing list of 
other conditions, pressures and forces that influence rankings. 
It is believed that more than 200 different principles now 
govern rankings, including how old a website is, the length of 
its URL, a special preference for YouTube links, emphasis on 
local websites in a geographical area, and many more; some 
innocent, others causing suspicion.40 It has become a large 
independent industry to try to “trick” Google’s ranking crite-
ria, enabling companies and others to pay to rank high on 
search lists—called Search Engine Optimization, SEO. The 
method makes use of various tricks, such as creating lots of 
artificial links between websites that one would like to see 
promoted, repeating keywords throughout a text, automati-
cally copypasting from—and then adding a few changes to—
already successful sites, which are then given other titles, and 
much more (“spamdexing”). In 2016, SEO was already a $70 
billion industry in and of itself. Google is said to be constantly 
struggling to make its ranking principles more sophisticated 
and coordinated in efforts to eliminate the possibility of capi-
talizing on the system in this way—in which is, of course, an 
infinite arms race with increasingly sophisticated responses 
from SEO companies. But if companies can game Google’s 
ranking algorithms and place interested customers on the top 
of the list, this can be used by political interests in the same 
way as commercial ones. The Guardian has thus mapped out 
how extreme right-wing sites in particular seem to have fig-
ured out how to take advantage of the complicated ranking 
procedures to come up high on the search rankings.41
40 Dean, B. “Google’s 200 Ranking Factors: The Complete List (2018)” 
Backlinko. 05-16-18.
41 Cadwalladr, C. “Google, democracy and the truth about internet 
search” The Guardian. 12-04-16.
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But these principles can also be politically influenced by 
the company itself.42 Already in 2002, critics of Scientology 
were being removed from search results.43 In 2009, searches 
on then-First Lady Michelle Obama resulted in high ranking 
of a photo where she had been morphed with a monkey. At 
first, Google refused to do anything, referring to the compa-
ny’s neutrality policy, but after much criticism in the media, 
the image was removed and replaced with an explanation as 
to why.44 Political battles in recent years seem to have intensi-
fied political censorship. In August 2017, neo-Nazi site Daily 
Stormer was deleted from the web-hosting platform GoDaddy 
because it had mocked one of the victims of the Charlottesville 
riots. The site shifted to Google, which blocked it after only 
three hours. Daily Stormer is undoubtedly a detestable site, 
but once again the removal conflicted with Google’s tradition 
of claiming full neutrality regarding content, including politi-
cal content.
In November 2017, company CEO Eric Schmidt announced 
that Google would downgrade Russian propaganda in its 
ranking system: “‘We’re working on detecting this kind of 
scenario ... and de-ranking those kinds of sites’, Schmidt said, 
in response to a question at an event in Halifax, Canada. ‘It’s 
basically RT and Sputnik. We’re well aware and we’re trying 
to engineer the systems to prevent it.’”45 The Cato Institute, a 
libertarian think tank, immediately took note of this initiative 
and asked whether Google itself was really concerned about 
42 The Black feminist Safiya Noble highlights cases of algorithmically 
driven data failures that are specific to people of color and women and 
argues that marginalized groups are problematically represented in 
erroneous, stereotypical, or even pornographic ways in search engines. 
See Noble (2018).
43 Hansen, E. “Google pulls anti-Scientology links” Cnet. 04-22-02.
44 Google’s explanation was: “Sometimes Google search results from the 
Internet can include disturbing content, even from innocuous queries. 
We assure you that the views expressed by such sites are not in any way 
endorsed by Google”., cf. Ahmed, S. “Google apologizes for results of 
‘Michelle Obama’ image search” CNN. 11-25-09.
45 Hern, A. “Google plans to ‘de-rank’ Russia Today and Sputnik to com-
bat misinformation” The Guardian. 11-21-17.
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Russian influence, or if the company was rather acting on 
overt or maybe hidden political pressure from the US 
Government.46 The Cato Institute referred to a recent con-
gressional hearing where Senator Dianne Feinstein (D), a 
senior member of the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, had blamed Google Vice President Kent Walker 
for not responding to Russian propaganda long ago: “... I think 
we’re in a different day now, we’re at the beginning of what 
could be cyberwar, and you all, as a policy matter, have to 
really take a look at that and what role you play.” As noted by 
The Cato Institute, such a political imposition would not only 
violate the First Amendment guarantee of free speech; it 
would also violate Google’s judicially protected freedom to 
be in charge of managing its service, that is, prioritizing search 
results.47
There are two conflicting problems at play here: govern-
ment intervention in the tech giant’s freedom of expression, 
but also potentially Google’s own opaque, politicized priori-
tization of search results—depending on which of the two 
explanations is the correct one (one of them, of course, needs 
not exclude the other). In the first case, the perspective is that 
we need to settle for getting only search results approved by 
the US government. In the second case, we must settle for 
search results in alignment with Google’s political stance or 
the company’s voluntary or involuntary permissiveness in the 
face of pressure groups. The Cato Institute, focusing on a nar-
row definition of freedom of expression as closely linked to 
the actions of governments, seems to have no issue with the 
latter of the two scenarios just described. However, it seems 
to us that the prioritization of search results should in all 
cases adhere to openly available criteria, so that users are 
informed and aware of any political biases—if not the very 
searches themselves ought to be governed by principles of 
fairness and neutrality.
46 Samples, J. “Censorship Comes to Google” Cato Liberty. 11-21-17.
47 Sterling, G. “Another Court Affirms Google’s First Amendment 
Control Of Search Results” Search Engine Land. 11-17-14.
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Curiously enough, Google has been accused of favoring 
both critique of Islam and defense of Islam in its rankings. 
This might seem contradictory, but only on the surface. Both 
charges can actually be correct at different times, because if 
the platform has been pressured to modify the algorithm to 
de-rank one of the two, then other will be consequently 
favored. A similar accusation is based on a survey from The 
Guardian,48 which showed that a search for “Jews” would 
direct the searcher towards radical anti-Semitic websites, the 
same way as entering “did the Hol” would lead to websites 
denying the Holocaust. The latter is probably because most 
serious studies of the Holocaust do not even question the fact 
that the event took place and so do not contain the letter 
sequence “did the Hol”, making it a non-factor in the search 
ranking. However, in suggested videos on Google-owned 
YouTube, there is a tendency to prefer extreme results based 
on search words (see below), probably because extreme vid-
eos generate more clicks and are therefore better for adver-
tising. If ranking algorithms are indeed set up to prioritize 
extreme views over moderate ones, it is ironic that they 
reflect the conscious targeting strategy of the Russian troll 
factories: not to support particular positions favored in the 
West, but to spread disagreement, controversy and disintegra-
tion in Western societies by supporting extremism across the 
political spectrum.
In March 2018, Google announced a new policy in the 
fight against “fake news”: the creation of a “Disinfo Lab” 
meant to downgrade or remove misinformation among 
search results and rank serious journalism high. The intention 
behind this initiative is commendable, but the effects of it are 
yet to be assessed. We remain skeptical as to whether Google, 
even with its huge economic muscle, could be able to create a 
48 Cadwalladr, C. “Google is not ‘just’ a platform. It frames, shapes and 
distorts how we see the world” The Guardian. 12-11-16. Google seems to 
have reacted to this accusation by simply removing the “suggestions” 
when for instance entering “Jews are”, “Americans are”—but not when 
entering “Danes are”, which still prompts suggestions such as “reserved”, 
“cold”, “unfriendly” but also the happiest people in the world.
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clearinghouse for truth that would surpass the existing net-
works of media, courts and universities. It is also hard to 
imagine such a lab as operating without political bias, if not 
favoring a particular party, then because its values will be 
based on a “Californian” outlook and the implicit platitudes 
of the Zeitgeist.
The idea of fact checking as something that can take place 
quickly and effectively is counteracted by the simple fact that 
there will always be important cases that remain undecided 
and moot—and even more so by the fact that some truths we 
take for granted today will be overthrown by new evidence 
tomorrow. That is, if indeed this new evidence is given the 
opportunity to come forward and is not fact-checked away in 
a flash. Take the process of Danish transitional justice after 
World War II.49 Back then, a number of Nazi authors were 
punished for expressions made during wartime. This took 
place by recently adopted, retroactive legislation: they were 
sentenced for actions that were not criminal at the time of the 
deed. What is worse, when Harald Tandrup—writer and jour-
nalist at Danish Nazi daily newspaper Fædrelandet (The 
Fatherland)—was sentenced to three years in prison, a piece 
of “fake news” acted as crucial evidence. In the beginning of 
World War II, more than 8,000 Polish officers were rounded 
up and executed near Katyn, outside the city of Smolensk, 
Russia. After the massacre was discovered in 1943, Tandrup 
advanced in the Nazi press the scandalous assertion that the 
Soviet Army perpetrated the massacre. Everyone knew that 
Nazis were responsible for the Katyn massacre, so Tandrup’s 
assertion was deemed Nazi propaganda. In 1952, however, an 
American commission of inquiry found that the Soviet Union 
was in fact behind it, and only in 1990 did the country, through 
Mikhail Gorbachev, admit that Soviet troops had indeed 
been responsible for the massacre. It turned out Tandrup had 
been right all along. One is of course free to believe that the 
freedom of expression and rule of law for Nazi suspects pres-
ents no major problem, despite the fact that abominable 
49 Cf. See Mchangama and Stjernfelt (2016) p. 665ff.
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persons and their views are exactly what principles should be 
tested against. In the context of this book, the example goes 
to show that claims—even when put forward by a coherent 
and serious group of people who are entirely sure of its verac-
ity—may later be debunked if new evidence comes to light. 
But there is only room for such knowledge gains if there is no 
commission or algorithm performing “fact checks”, removing 
such evidence from the public sphere long before any thor-
ough investigation can take place.
Compared to Facebook, Google seems more seriously 
concerned with freedom of expression, for example, in its 
year-long infight with Chinese censorship, but that has not 
prevented the company from making deals with a number of 
countries on local modifications of the algorithms aimed at 
removal of specific content. Currently, Google is resuming 
relations with China after the break in 2010, and possible 
censorship consequences of this new development remain 
unclear. Increasing rumors hint at the development of a spe-
cially censored search engine called Dragonfly which will 
automatically remove content based on dictates from the 
Chinese government; these rumors are taken seriously to the 
point that Senators from both US parties have asked Google’s 
top leaders to explain.50 This has also led to more than a thou-
sand Google employees protesting against the management’s 
plans.51 Critics fear that if Google and China agree on such an 
arrangement, it might form a model for censored Google 
searches in a number of other countries, such as Pakistan, 
Iran, Saudi Arabia, etc. Whether Google, like Facebook, has 
already caved in to Pakistani requirements remains disputed. 
In the spring of 2018, Swedish newspaper Expressen began a 
campaign against the tech giant, claiming that as a publishing 
entity, Google was responsible for spreading hatred and that 
it should be subjected to censorship. This prompted the 
50 Yuan, L. & Wakabayashi, D. “Google, seeking a return to China, is said 
to Be Building a Censored Search Engine” New York Times. 08-01-18.
51 Associated Press: “More than 1,000 Google Workers Protest Censored 
China Search” Washington Post. 08-17-18.
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Swedish government to call Google up for a meeting. The 
government was represented by Justice Minister Morgan 
Johansson (Social Democratic Party) and Minister of 
Digitization Peter Eriksson (The Green Party). They 
expressed concerns that on the platform, Google allowed 
“illegal” and “harmful” content which could affect the 
Swedish elections. Note that the two legislators did not 
restrict their concerns to illegal content. Google promised to 
modify the algorithm and hire more staff to ensure that 
threats and hate were removed from search results and 
YouTube videos.52 Other Swedish newspapers such as 
Göteborgs-Posten and Ystads Allehanda warned against the 
Expressen campaign and the government initiative, stating 
that “spring-cleaning” Google could be extremely damaging 
to freedom of expression.53
The bottom line is, however, that we know that Google has 
knowingly used the ranking algorithm in several cases to pri-
oritize or deprioritize political and other content—but we do 
not know anything about how often it happens or of the 
principles behind it. The ranking algorithm and its constant 
development and sophistication remains part of Google’s 
innermost secret DNA. But one wonders if a de facto monop-
oly on a piece of public infrastructure such as Google should 
be based on principles entirely opaque to the public, or if 
algorithms should instead be publicly accessible and subject 
to discussion.
In August 2018, the possible lopsidedness of Google’s 
searches was questioned again, now as part of the Alex Jones 
case. President Trump posted one of his infamous tweets, 
based on an article by Paula Bolyard in PJ Media. She had 
searched for “Trump news” on Google, looked at the first 100 
results and claimed that the 96 of them linked to left-wing 
media — based on a definition that ranked virtually all main-
52 “Censorship by Google” Wikipedia.
53 Boström, H. “Hatet mot Google” GP. 19-03-18; “Rensa nätet försik-
tigt” Ystads Allehanda. 03-12-18. Last visited 08-03-18: http://www.ystad-
sallehanda.se/ledare/rensa-natet-forsiktigt/
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stream media as “left-wing”.54 Three days later, Trump posted 
a stream of tweets: “Google search results for “Trump News” 
shows only the viewing/reporting of Fake News Media. In 
other words, they have it RIGGED, for me & others, so that 
almost all stories & news is BAD. Fake CNN is prominent. 
Republican/Conservative & Fair Media is shut out. Illegal? 
96% of results on “Trump News” are from National Left- 
Wing Media, very dangerous. Google & others are suppress-
ing voices of Conservatives and hiding information and news 
that is good. They are controlling what we can & cannot see. 
This is a very serious situation-will be addressed!”55 The state-
ment was backed by the White House, which announced 
government checks against Google and the other tech giants. 
This naturally caused a heated debate, indicating that such 
control would squarely violate the freedom of expression 
protection of the First Amendment. Also, a very reasonable 
objection was made: if one labels all media who have criti-
cized Trump as left-wing, it is no surprise that one reaches 
conclusions like that of Bolyard. At the same time, an equal 
number of search results for and against a given subject can-
not count as a criterion of fairness: Should a search on “Flat 
Earth” then return an equal number of websites claiming the 
Earth is flat versus round?
Google’s own response to Trump’s criticism showed, nev-
ertheless, how difficult it was for the company to come up 
with a clear defense: “When users type queries into the 
Google Search bar, our goal is to make sure they receive the 
most relevant answers in a matter of seconds. Search is not 
used to set a political agenda and we don’t bias our results 
toward any political ideology. Every year, we issue hundreds 
of improvements to our algorithms to ensure they surface 
high-quality content in response to users’ queries. We con-
54 Bolyard, P. “96 Percent of Google Search Results for ‘Trump’ News 
Are from Liberal Media Outlets” PJ Media. 08-25-18.
55 Cit. fra Wemple, E. ”Google gives Trump a look at reality. Trump 
doesn’t like it” Washington Post. 08-28-18. The President is not himself a 
computer user, so it is believed that his numbers come from Bolyard’s 
article.
Chapter 12. Facebook and Google as Offices of Censorship
166
tinually work to improve Google Search and we never rank 
search results to manipulate political sentiment.”56 What is 
meant by the fluffy words “relevant” and “high quality”, on 
which this argument relies? Google’s weak response shows 
that, in a sense, the company had it coming, exposing itself to 
attacks like Trump’s: when the company operates with an 
opaque, increasingly complicated algorithm, it is no wonder 
that it calls out for conspiracy theories, and with Google’s his-
tory of actual political manipulation with searches, it is hard 
to muster much trust in the company’s defense. Trump’s idea 
of state censorship is terrifying and unconstitutional, but his 
confused tweet contains the correct observations that Google 
defines what we see, and its workings are not transparent.
Interestingly, the accusations of liberal bias among the 
tech giants caused a group of internal critics on Facebook to 
surface, who pointed to a left-wing trend among the company 
staff. Brian Amerige, top Facebook engineer, wrote in an 
internal memo: “We are a political monoculture that’s intol-
erant of different views. We claim to welcome all perspectives, 
but are quick to attack—often in mobs—anyone who pres-
ents a view that appears to be in opposition to left-leaning 
ideology.”57 There is little doubt that Amerige’s observations 
apply also to staff at the other tech giants in famously liberal 
Silicon Valley. Whether this imbalance is reflected in the 
product is of course another question. But the combination of 
the staff’s bias and the lack of transparency in the companies’ 
procedures makes them a natural target for conspiracy theo-
ries such as Trump’s, theories which—for that very same 
reason—the companies have more than a hard time 
repudiating.
In July 2018, three representatives from Google, Facebook 
and Twitter were summoned to testify before the House 
Judiciary Committee about the content moderation proce-
56 Cit. fra Ohlheiser, A. og Horton, A. ”A short investigation into Trump’s 
claims of ‘RIGGED’ Google results against him” Washington Post. 
08-28-18.
57 Cit. fra Conger, K. & Fraenkel, S. “Dozens at Facebook Unite to 
Challenge Its ‘Intolerant’ Liberal Culture” New York Times. 08-28-18.
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dures of the companies. During the hearing, the tech giants 
were repeatedly accused of censoring conservative voices. An 
interesting thing about this hearing was that it became 
increasingly apparent that several legislators present did not 
understand how beneficial certain legislations on technology 
has been to these companies, and whose benefits are only 
recently being seriously questioned. Tech giants have always 
been able to enjoy full freedom from responsibility when it 
comes to the communication of their users. They remain 
under the political and legal radar because of the Safe 
Harbor Act—also known as Section 230—of 1996. The law is 
extremely convenient for tech giants. Firstly, it ensures that 
platforms that provide access to content are not accountable 
for the the expressions and actions of users on the platforms. 
This means that the platform providers do not have to control 
what their users are doing. Secondly, the second part of the 
law includes the decisive detail that if the platforms actually 
do decide to control what their users are expressing or doing, 
they do not lose their protection under Safe Harbor. This 
means that if a platform removes or moderates content, it will 
not suddenly be categorized as a publisher with associated 
responsibilities.58 At the time, the second part of the law was 
considered an encouragement for tech companies to take on 
the difficult task of limiting online pornography or other 
unwanted content without being held responsible if the task 
seemed impossible to solve. But with Section 230, the princi-
ple that control implies liability was dissolved. The law—cap-
tured by the phrase “you have the right, but not 
responsibility”—leaves legislators without political leverage 
because it immunizes the tech companies, regardless of 
whether they restrict and censor user communication or not.
The law gives rise to some confusion because its second 
part is less known. During the hearing, Congressman Matt 
Gaetz (R) questioned whether tech companies can claim to 
be exempt from liability under Section 230 while at the same 
time asserting their freedom of expression with reference to 
58 Gillespie (2018) p. 30.
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the First Amendment, which guarantees publishers the right 
to freely restrict content on their platforms. Gaetz’s reasoning 
was that calling upon the Section 230 protection necessarily 
means giving up the right to be a publisher.59 But this 
 reasoning is a sign that the law was misunderstood, and Gaetz 
is not the only one. Due to the aforementioned detail in the 
second part of the law, it does not prescribe neutrality, which 
is the underlying premise of Gaetz’s criticism.
Supporters of Section 230 have raised serious concerns 
due to increasing criticism of the law among Members of 
Congress combined with its widespread misinterpretation. 
One of the alarmists is Eric Goldman, a leading researcher on 
Section 230. He points out that the First Amendment prohib-
its the government from intervening in freedom of expres-
sion, and that this protection applies to both private companies 
and publishers as well as tech companies. Goldman says: 
“Private entities can engage in censorship. We call that edito-
rial discretion.” He then added: “When the government tells 
publishers what they can and can’t publish, that’s called 
censorship.”60 It is Goldman’s point that by threatening to 
compromise the moderation practices of tech companies, 
congress is likely guilty of committing the very censorship 
they accuse the tech companies of doing. This is, however, a 
drastic warning, as tech companies would very much prefer 
not to be categorized as publishers. In order to highlight this 
dilemma, we point to the comprehensive responsibilities that 
the European Union is beginning to impose on tech compa-
nies — measures which do not leave the freedom of expres-
sion of users any better off. An example of this was a decision 
by the European Court of Human Rights in the case Delfi v 
Estonia in 2015. It was concluded that an Estonian website 
could actually be held responsible for reader comments in a 
debate posted on the forum without that being a violation of 
Article 10 of the European Human Rights Declaration on 
59 Lapowsky, I. “Lawmakers Don’t Grasp the Sacred Tech Law They 
Want to Gut” Wired. 07-17-18.
60 Op. cit.
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Freedom of Expression  — a somewhat excessive publisher 
responsibility.
This mess suggests that it is difficult to modify and adjust 
Section 230 without any clear definition of “tech giants”. Are 
they publishers, distributors, a public sphere, or something 
entirely different? This is one of the major problems with 
tech companies—they do not fit into existing categories. 
Practically all tech giants make their own content policies and 
police their platforms themselves. With 230  in hand, the 
giants have the freedom to arbitrarily decide when, to what 
extent, and why they should take responsibility for their 
users’ content. As previous chapters of this book have shown, 
this freedom to restrict often goes far beyond what is legally 
required. Often, it is just the result of economic strategy. One 
thing is certain: Section 230 is outdated.
Section 230 was adopted as part of the Communications 
Decency Act of 1996. Not only does it pre-date Facebook, 
Twitter and Google, but also platforms such as MySpace, 
Friendster and Napster. The point is that the law is in no way 
designed for social media, which did not exist in 1996.61 It 
does not take into account Google’s ranking algorithm that 
prioritizes or downgrades specific content, YouTube’s filter-
ing technology which, despite claims to the contrary, could 
identify copyrighted material, or Facebook’s personalized 
news feed algorithm and removal handbook. And, most par-
ticularly, it does not take into account the emerging monop-
oly status of tech giants that has developed in the course of 
the 2010s. Tech giants are a hybrid of many existing business 
categories, which makes it extremely difficult to carry out a 
political and legal review of the nature of platforms’ respon-
sibilities. There is quite simply no clear point from which to 
consider them in existing legal terms. In April 2018, a study 
by the Pew Research Center showed that over half of 
Americans support tech companies that take the initiative to 
limit false information in the fight against misinformation, 
61 Gillespie (2018) p. 33-34.
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“even if it limits public freedom to access and transmit 
information.”62 This is not the right way forward.
In the fall of 2018, a new wave of censorship swept through 
the main tech giants. In September, Twitter adopted new 
guidelines under the nauseating motto “Be Sweet When You 
Tweet”63. It prohibits “[...] content that dehumanizes others 
based on their membership in an identifiable group, even 
when the material does not include a direct target” and adds 
a version of the standard list of selected groups to be granted 
special protection: “Dehumanization: Language that treats 
others as less than human. Dehumanization can occur when 
others are denied of human qualities (animalistic dehuman-
ization) or when others are denied of their human nature 
(mechanistic dehumanization). Examples can include com-
paring groups to animals and viruses (animalistic), or reduc-
ing groups to a tool for some other purpose (mechanistic). 
Identifiable group: Any group of people that can be distin-
guished by their shared characteristics such as their race, 
ethnicity, national origin, sexual orientation, gender, gender 
identity, religious affiliation, age, disability, serious disease, 
occupation, political beliefs, location, or social practices.”64 
The description of “dehumanization” is extremely vague and 
wide-ranging and it is obviously it can be used to stifle much 
standard political debate—such as claims that such and such 
political group has been instrumentalized by lobbyists.
In October, a long-held internal Google memo with the 
title “The Good Censor” was leaked.65 The memo is a blend 
62 Mitchell, A., Grieco, E. & Sumida, N. “Americans Favour Protecting 
Information Freedoms Over Government Steps to Restrict False News 
Online” Pew Research Center. 04-19-18.
63 Matsakis, L. “Twitter Releases New Policy on ‘Dehumanizing Speech’” 
Wired. 09-25-18.
64 Twitter: “Creating New Policies Together”09-25-18. Last visited 12-18-
2018: https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/topics/company/2018/
Creating-new-policies-together.html.
65 Bokhari, A. (upload) “The Good Censor  – GOOGLE LEAK”. Last 
visited 12-18-2018: https://www.scribd.com/document/390521673/The-
Good-Censor-GOOGLE-LEAK#from_embed. More details:
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of interviews and contributions from academics, journalists, 
and cultural critics, arguing for narrowing the scope of 
Google’s traditional free speech stance. Here, the introduc-
tion of censorship is portrayed as a balance between free 
speech and the protection of users from “harmful conduct”. 
The memo discusses whether users can be protected the users 
against negative phenomena like bots, trolling, and extrem-
ism while still being a platform for all voices. The memo does 
not yet conclude in terms of a new rulebook, but clearly the 
tendency goes in the direction of less rather than more free-
dom of expression. The general, hard-to-solve tension 
between liberty and security is the same conundrum as 
encountered by all the tech giants in the wake of the Alex 
Jones case in August 2018.
Moderation, content deletion, censorship by the tech 
giants—call it what you will—is undoubtedly here to stay. The 
Internet must be policed for criminal activities such as 
threats, harassment, extortion, incitement to violence, organi-
zation of violence, or forming terrorist cells. However, it does 
not follow that control should spread from such illegal activi-
ties to a wide variety of other types of content. It is also not 
obvious that the control, as is the case today, should remain 
hidden. Finally, there is no reason such control and its prin-
ciples should be the privilege of tech companies themselves. 
The tech giants, often relying on a simplified and romantic 
idea of representing a “community” of common values, must 
realize that their vast populations of users are highly complex 
and represent strong, often opposing currents and values that 
also exist and act offline. The companies should instead real-
ize that such contradictions are real, and not only the result of 
poor communication which will magically disappear through 
mantras such as “connecting people”. Their task is rather to 
make available the many widely different, incompatible posi-
tions and values and provide a forum for serious clashes to 
take place and develop in a clear and unfeigned manner, one 
Statt, N. “Leaked Google Research Shows Company Grappling with 
Censorship and Free Speech” The Verge 10-10-18.
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that is free of violence and free of crime. This means forming 
public spaces rather than “communities”—and bringing the 
policies closer to ordinary, transparent standards of free 
expression.
However, strong trends are unfortunately heading in a 
completely different direction. With the law in hand, this ten-
dency seeks to expand the deletion practice and  responsibilities 
of the tech giants and thus—somewhat unwittingly—hand 
them even more power over the public.
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Seen from the offices of the CEO’s, the current public turmoil 
faced by the tech giants must be rather confusing. On the one 
hand, agitated politicians and intellectuals demand that the 
companies engage still more in the removal of content—of 
“hate speech”, “fake news”, extremism, defamation, Russian 
bots, nipples, pejoratives and a wide range of other things. On 
the other hand, a number of politicians and intellectuals—
among them the authors of this very book—are accusing the 
giants of already removing way too much content, applying 
their narrow but at the same time vaguely worded commu-
nity standards and the murky and uncontrollable enforce-
ment of them. Unfortunately, the former of the two tendencies 
seems to have the upper hand at the moment.
Many of the critical questions made to Zuckerberg during 
the congressional hearings he faced in 2018 revolved around 
more removal of content, and it seems politicians are able to 
use the problems with the tech giants as a pretext to demand 
de facto censorship, otherwise impossible to carry out against 
the constitutions of most countries. Oftentimes the point is 
put forward that tech giants must acknowledge their status as 
actual media outlets—that they have to assume publisher 
responsibility, make targeted edits to their content and 
assume the same legal status as print media. We think that is 
going down the wrong road. Tech giants are not media and 
they produce news or other content only marginally (Google, 
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Amazon) or not at all (Facebook, Twitter). We will return to 
how they should indeed be categorized.
Still, the idea of tech giants as media outlets naturally leads 
decision makers to imagine how, as subjects of political moni-
toring, the giants should take over responsibility for the con-
tent that is uploaded on their platforms. In this matter, 
Europe leads the way. In May of 2016, the European Union 
convinced Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube to 
accept a “code of conduct” on “hate speech”, which required 
that the companies subject themselves to more detailed 
 control and agree to respond to complaints within 24  h.1  
The most ominous example of this tendency is the German 
legislation carrying the nebulous name 
“Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz”—Networks Implemen-
tation Law – nicknamed “The Facebook Law” or “The Heiko 
Maas Law”, after the German Minister of Justice. It was 
adopted during 2017 and entered into full force on January 
1st, 2018. Its purpose is to comb social networks for smear 
campaigns and “fake news” (it does not, however, include 
email services and edited news sites). The law obliges social 
network providers of a certain size—such as Twitter and 
Facebook—to remove all statements from their servers that 
are “clearly illegal” within 24 hours by establishing and staff-
ing a permanent reporting service. In more complex cases, a 
7-day deadline may be allowed so as to hear the user’s side of 
the matter. In not so clear cases, the service can initiate “regu-
lated self- regulation”, to be monitored by the Justice 
Department in the form of reports twice a year, but also this 
regulation is run, staffed and paid for by the service provider 
1 “European Commission and IT Companies announce Code of Conduct 
on illegal online hate speech” European Commission, Justice and 
Consumers. 05-31-16. Certain organizations may here assume status of 
“trusted flaggers” whose complaints over content receive special treat-
ment in a certain channel unaccessible for normal users. The deal not 
only concerns removal of terrorist content, but also the promoting of 
“counter-narratives”, which may be difficult to distinguish from state 
propaganda Cf. Kaye, D. “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the pro-
motion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expres-
sion” UN Human Rights Council, section 21. 04-06-18.
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itself. Objectionable statements not caught by the still more 
advanced algorithms will have to, for instance on Facebook, 
be reported by vigilant users. A person reports a posting he 
does not like, indicates what violation he thinks the given 
content is guilty of and adds a description of the context in 
which it appears. Subsequently, Facebook—or some subcon-
tractor entrusted with the task of control—decides within 24 
hours on the removal of the utterance in question. If the 
company fails to take measures to remove controversial con-
tent, fines of up to 50 million euros can be issued, along with 
€5 million fines levied on individual employees of the social 
media in  question who are deemed guilty. Even during the 
preparation of this law, heavy criticism was voiced: it would 
breach the German constitution’s article on freedom of 
speech, and the short deadline and high fines would put pres-
sure on the networks to remove all content under even the 
tiniest suspicion of containing reprehensible material. 
Another big problem is that this law actually privatizes parts 
of the judicial as well as the executive powers, by leaving tech 
giants to decide what falls within the scope of German law 
and whether or not to penalize users by removing content 
and enforcing short termed, long termed or indefinite exclu-
sion from the networks. Finally, it is extremely problematic 
that all of this takes place in a semi-automated fashion, with-
out any public scrutiny or control, except for generic half-
yearly reports.
One would think these issues might be serious enough. 
However, it gets worse. The German newspaper Frankfurter 
Allgemeine decided to investigate how this new informer 
service works. If and when a user wishes to complain about 
another’s posting, he is taken to a website containing 14 dif-
ferent categories of violations and has to classify the offend-
ing post. According to Frankfurter Allgemeine, the informer 
can choose between the following categories of violations: (1) 
spreading propaganda material from unconstitutional organi-
zations; (2) using features of unconstitutional organizations; 
(3) preparing a serious act of violence against the state; (4) 
instigating the public to commit criminal acts; (5) disrupting 
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the public space by threatening to carry out criminal acts; (6) 
forming terrorist associations; (7) inciting hate and violence 
(“Volksverhetzung”); (8) reproducing violent acts; (9) insult-
ing faiths, religious organizations or ideological associations 
(“Weltanschauungsvereinigungen”) ; (10) disseminating, 
acquiring or possessing child pornography (if disseminated 
via the Internet); (12) rewarding and accepting criminal acts, 
(13) unspecified “violation”—but, as the newspaper states, 
also otherwise not criminalized acts such as (14) “treasonous 
falsifications”.2 However, it is not correct that treasonous lies 
are not punishable. They come under the rarely used Article 
100a of the German Criminal Code.3
In general terms, these infractions concern anything from 
planning and threatening to commit very serious crimes—to 
things normally associated with ordinary debate, such as criti-
cism of religions and ideologies, representations of violence, 
and unspecified violation (“Beleidigung”). These examples 
are indeed included because they appear in the German 
Criminal Code. But in the absence of court cases with experi-
enced and skilled judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys, 
how are we to trust that the newly hired staff at the German 
branch of Facebook are capable of making a distinction 
2 ”Verbreiten von Propagandamitteln verfassungswidriger 
Organisationen, Verwenden von Kennzeichen verfassungswidriger 
Organisationen, Vorbereitung einer schweren staatsgefährdenden 
Gewalttat, Anleitung zur Begehung einer schweren staatsgefährdenden 
Gewalttat, öffentliche Aufforderung zu Straftaten, Störung des öffentli-
chen Friedens durch Androhung von Straftaten, Bildung terroristischer 
Vereinigungen, Volksverhetzung, Gewaltdarstellungen, Beschimpfung 
von Bekenntnissen, Religionsgesellschaften und 
Weltanschauungsvereinigungen, Verbreitung, Erwerb und Besitz von 
Kinderpornographie (sofern über Telemedien verbreitet), Belohnung 
und Billigung von Straftaten, Beleidigungen  – aber auch selbst für 
Juristen eher unbekannte Tatbestände wie die „Landesverräterische 
Fälschung””. Quote from Wieduwilt, H. “Löschgesetz verlangt Facebook-
Nutzern viel ab” Frankfurter Allgemeine. 12-30-17.
3 One of this book’s authors (Stjernfelt) was once misled by Frankfurter 
Allgemeine’s mistake about this matter when he claimed that these 14 
items included content not punishable under German law. That is not 
the case.
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between “dead letter” articles of the law and still applicable 
ones? How are we to trust that relevant precedence is consid-
ered when applying particular articles and weighing contra-
dictions between them? And how are we to trust that the 
people involved understand that the article of the German 
Constitution on freedom of speech historically has kept the 
articles on, for instance, criticism of religion and insults within 
strict limits? Would one not think it more likely that Facebook 
will interpret these articles in the light of their own commu-
nity standards and the associated combination of tighter 
procedures and more vague wordings?
The entry into force of the law was not impaired by the 
fact that Reporters sans Frontières and a growing freedom-of- 
speech movement in Germany have pointed to the resulting 
serious encroachments on basic human rights. At the time of 
writing, the German branches of Facebook, Twitter etc. are 
busy cleaning out content of the aforementioned kind, a job 
carried out by a large influx of new employees. Critics have 
dubbed this law an autocratic mechanism of censorship, 
referring to totalitarian states and their control of the public. 
They point to the fact that the Belarusian dictator Lukashenko 
is inspired by this legislation. And as early as July 2018, 
Russia drafted legislation which basically copy-pasted the 
German law made public months before. German chair of 
Reporteurs sans Frontières Christian Mihr said: “Our worst 
fears have become reality. The German law on Internet” hate 
speech “now serves as a model for non-democratic states 
wishing to restrict debates online.”4 Eight out of ten experts 
summoned to the German Bundestag claimed that enforce-
ment of this law must be the responsibility of the government 
and not of private contractors. They point to a breach of the 
principle of proportionality regarding punishment, given the 
imbalance between the enormous fines and the nature of the 
actual offense. Observers estimate that the implementation 
of the required control systems will cost social media in 
4 “Russian bill is copy-and-paste of Germany’s hate speech law”Reporters-
Without-Borders. 07-19-17.
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Germany around 500 million euros per year. At the time of 
writing, the EU Commission has blocked access to docu-
ments examining whether this law is even compatible with 
EU legislation, the European Human Rights Convention, 
and European laws on information society service.
However, the most unsettling aspect of this rushed legisla-
tion is that responsibility for this new form of censorship is 
left to private actors and their opaque employee and subcon-
tractor setups. Content is now removed from the public space 
without any warning, without any open case process, without 
the right of defense of the person responsible—and with 
 limited recourse to appeal, a recourse to be decided by the 
networks. No court, trial or sentence is involved—something 
which, mirrored in a Danish context, would bomb us back to 
before 1790 when court sentences became standard in mat-
ters of press freedom crimes. We have no reason to believe 
that tech giants solely focused on profit possess the journalis-
tic, scientific or legal expertise to judge whether a reported 
statement is criminal or merely controversial. Or true, for that 
matter: How would a provider of computer services, with 
such skills, be able to decide whether a piece of news is “trea-
sonous falsification”? As pointed out by critics of the German 
law, which threatens to allow for fines of up to 50 million 
euros, the most likely scenario is that the tech giants will 
remove content in cases with even the slightest doubt about 
their nature. For obvious reasons, both the German right and 
left have opposed this legislation—surely both sides envision 
how their political statements can end up among those 
deleted by faceless hordes of content moderators.
An example from December 2017 illustrates the problem: 
a videoclip of a pedestrian breaking into foul and racist lan-
guage while passing a Jewish restaurant in Berlin. It was 
shared vividly on Facebook, only to be quickly removed. 
After a while, the video returned to the platform. Facebook 
gave no information about the motivations behind the 
removal nor the reappearance of the video. But as stated in 
Frankfurter Allgemeine, one may assume it was removed 
because the passer-by was thought to be carrying out an act 
of “incitement to hate and violence”. Yet later it was uploaded 
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again, once it became clear that people shared it in order to 
shame the individual in the video rather than support his 
views, turning sharing it into a kind of shunning by quotation. 
Merely from the primitive tools “share” and “like”, one cannot 
tell whether such clicking actually means that the clicker 
agrees with what is being liked or shared. Without any public 
insight into procedures and decisions, is there any way of 
knowing for sure that such subtle contextual reasoning will 
be applied in each individual case? We have no reason to 
believe that such flash justice performed by the German 
branch of Facebook is capable of distinguishing quotation or 
irony from direct statements.
The law on these networks appears to rely on the entirely 
untenable idea that to identify “clearly” criminal or contro-
versial points of view is an easy and straightforward matter, 
even possible to turn into an object of automatized control. 
The law completely overlooks the fact that in modern societ-
ies, such elementary distinctions are only put into use thanks 
to the ongoing and demanding work done by the judicial 
systems, serious media and scientific research—and that 
there can be no shortcut to handle this justice via automated 
algorithms5 or anonymous, privately employed moderators 
stressed for time and with dubious qualified training.
It is important to emphasize that the new German censor-
ship practiced by social media has come about despite the 
wishes expressed by the tech giants, and that it puts consider-
able economic and administrative burdens on them. It is the 
German government and Bundestag which have resorted to 
this peculiar, panic-like measure. It forces the outsourcing of 
a crucial and important part of the legal enforcement of free-
dom of speech online to private, formally incompetent and 
reluctant players. The legal rights for large parts of the 
German public sphere remains entirely undefined and insuf-
ficient. These days, much of this public sphere is practiced 
online via social media—including the many “traditional” 
media engaging with their audiences via pages on Facebook 
5 Cf. Garapon and Lassègue (2018).
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or Twitter. One might fear that the legislations currently 
being drafted in France, and the tech regulations possibly 
underway in the United States, could be inspired by the 
German government and hand over more power to the tech 
giants rather than less.
At present, we know only the outline of the suggested 
French legislation, which is set to include a newly established 
Internet tribunal with fast-track case processing as well as 
tightened legislation and control of political ads, especially 
around election time. Unlike the German law, case processing 
is here maintained within the judicial system. On the other 
hand, this new tribunal may be given very vast competences. 
Among other things, the scary possibility of simply closing 
down media found guilty of “fake news” is currently being 
discussed.
In March 2019, a white supremacist assassin from Australia 
attacked two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, simul-
taneously livestreaming his crime on Facebook. That incident 
provoked a new wave of strong demands for regulation of 
so-called “harmful content”, an umbrella term for “fake news”, 
“hate speech” and graphic violence. Inspired by the German 
legislation, Australia passed a new law in the beginning of 
April. The law threatens social media with heavy fines and 
jail sentences for their top executives if they do not manage 
to remove rapidly “abhorrent violent material” from their 
platforms. Such material comprises videos that show terrorist 
attacks, murder, rape or kidnapping; fines are up to 10% of 
annual profit, and employees can face up to three years in 
prison.6 Similar legislation is underway in New Zealand. In 
the UK, an even more comprehensive law is drafted in a 
whitepaper, targeting harmful content including child exploi-
tation, “fake news”, terrorist activity and extreme violence. 
British officials claim that UK will be the “safest place in the 
world to be online”.7 The legislation will be policed by an inde-
6 Cave, D. “Australia Passes Law to Punish Social Media Companies for 
Violent Posts” New York Times. 04-03-19.
7 Romm, T. “U.K. unveils sweeping plans to penalize Facebook and 
Google for harmful online content” Washington Post. 04-07-19.
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pendent regulating body with the power to impose fines 
against tech companies and hold individual executives per-
sonally liable. Increasingly, tech giants are categorized after 
the lines of traditional media with publishing responsibities. 
What began as internal regulation in individual companies is 
quickly developing in the direction of traditional centralized 
state censorship. The strange thing is that these tendencies 
are rarely discussed in the context of fundamental political 
liberties in existing constitutions. Why should special 
 legislations be developed for the internet when well-func-
tioning, clearly defined free speech legislation exists in most 
Western countries, e.g. the First Amendment in the US?
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As we have seen, censorship is a real and serious problem 
when it comes to the tech giants. However, when they use the 
word “censorship” themselves, they often have something 
completely different in mind. That other something is copy-
right. Not surprisingly, the tech giants oppose copyright pro-
tections, since they wish to attract users by offering free 
access to a world of alluring content. Thus, by praising copy-
right infringements as though they were a matter of practic-
ing free speech, they end up abusing the honorable name and 
reputation of free speech itself.
In the early years of the Internet, the push for the free 
exchange of information and software boasted the motto 
“Information wants to be free”. But the word “free” may mean 
both “without restraint” and “without cost”, and on tech plat-
forms, free information tends to be interpreted as the right to 
access films, music and text without cost. Oftentimes, it is in 
the very name of free speech that popular content is uploaded 
and made available. The call for free access to a world of 
information may come off as a blessing for knowledge. It has 
never been as easy to get ahold of so much knowledge and 
treasured material as it is today—without even having to pay 
for it. But the dogma of no cost has enabled the tech giants to 
neutralize the economic value of knowledge and art. First, the 
traditional paid media have grown desperately dependent on 
the platforms of these giants. Second, the intellectual prop-
erty of musicians, writers and other content makers has been 
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robbed from them. The latter consequence has already 
claimed its first victims: the digital losers. The success of the 
motto “move fast and break things” has drained the income 
sources of many artists.1 It is the consequence of the tech 
giants’ powerful position to dictate the rules of how to access 
and share content. For many years, Silicon Valley has waged 
war on copyright legislations, propagandizing the issue by 
framing these laws as a kind of censorship machine which 
aims to put an end to freedom of expression. However, this is 
Orwellian doublespeak—as a form of rhetoric, it plays on fear 
sentiments in an attempt to stir up resistance against political 
intervention. This line of thought puts writers who want an 
income for their work up there with totalitarian regimes 
curbing free speech. The truth of the matter is that these laws 
serve to protect the incomes of content makers and their 
opportunity to create new and valuable material.
Large chunks of the traffic toward traditional media sites 
run through Google. Pieces of writing are easily and quickly 
accessed via social media, especially Facebook’s news feed. 
As mentioned earlier, a Reuters mapping of news consump-
tion in 2017 showed that a little over half the Danish popula-
tion go to social media weekly for their news. The Internet 
has changed our behavioral patterns as news consumers. 
Newspapers and magazines have tried to rethink their busi-
ness strategies to adapt to the changes brought on by the 
advent of the Internet. The Internet was, after all, this infor-
mation superhighway that would open the door to a huge 
readership hitherto out of reach, back when traditional mar-
keting strategies were applied. Wanting to fit in and adjust, 
many articles were published online for free, while the media 
were waiting for new and better online business model to 
emerge. Charging for these articles would mean letting a 
revolutionary opportunity slip by. Their hope was to reach a 
larger readership and then generate more traffic on their own 
websites—and thus more advertising income. That was just 
1 The first major elaboration of this problem is found in Taplin’s Move 
Fast and Break Things (2017).
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not what happened. As an unforeseen consequence of this 
strategy, many newspapers and magazines burst into pieces. 
They had to abandon large parts of the editorial line and 
accept the role of simple piles of decomposed and decontex-
tualized articles. In the traditional print versions of newspa-
pers, the editorial layout of articles represented a strong 
strategy: readers interested in the cultural section only of, for 
instance, Washington Post, would also have to pay for inter-
national politics, sports, local news, cartoons, op-eds and the 
rest of the obligatory package that came with the newspaper. 
This was the classic “omnibus” newspaper, catering to all 
kinds of readers, which practically sold itself with its optimal 
“mix” of many kinds of news and features. But online, many 
articles were now accessible individually, à la carte and, let us 
not forget, for free. Users no longer needed to pay subscrip-
tion fees or even buy an entire copy. Thus, readers became 
used to jumping from page to page and from one link to the 
next. The result was that online news outlets and magazines 
ceased to exist in the form of coherent anthologies of articles 
offered by the classic general-interest daily newspaper. Now 
each individual article was to be self-sustaining, measurable 
by its numbers of clicks.2 Articles may no longer be sheltered 
by the more or less coherent editorial line of an entire news-
paper. In came new and powerful gatekeepers such as 
Facebook, Amazon and Google, who opened the gates to a 
full supply of news articles, books and videos, gathered in 
bundles. Out of the many fragmented parts, they made a use-
ful and somewhat coherent product. Obviously, this is a 
hugely successful business model for the tech giants: Google 
and Facebook never pay for the articles they offer to their 
users, and they can offer a much larger selection than tradi-
tional media outlets, and even customized to the individual 
user.
Most of the media organizations that were not seduced by 
the Internet mantra of free information were punished by the 
2 Foer (2017) pp. 86–87.
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algorithms run by Facebook and Google.3 Newspapers and 
magazines charging a subscription for access to their product 
tend to drown in the enormous supply of information con-
trolled by the algorithms. The articles do not generate the 
decisive likes, comments and shares that are rewarded with 
promotion and exposure. In other words, articles hidden 
behind paywalls tend to lose the online popularity contest. In 
2006, Jonathan Rosenberg, then Senior Vice President of 
Products at Google, said that his company should “pressure 
premium content providers to change their model to free.”4 
This is a clever business strategy, since the value of the giants 
depend upon offering a free shortcut to an enormous supply 
of valuable information and entertainment.
The problem today is that journalism and newspapers 
have become unhealthily if not pathologically dependent on 
Google and Facebook, which have made them financially 
vulnerable. The news media have entered into anti- 
competitive agreements, which initially seemed essential to 
their survival. Unfortunately, however, these agreements 
have made the giants even more powerful. The media outlets 
have accepted that Facebook sells accompanying ads, tradi-
tionally the media’s own main source of revenue, and Google 
has been allowed to publish the articles quickly and directly 
on their own platform rather than allowing traffic to go 
through the media’s web sites. The agreements are particu-
larly sensitive because of the well-known capriciousness of 
the giants: they quickly change direction if it benefits their 
bottom lines or reputations. The problem is that such changes 
may have major consequences for the media, who now 
depend upon the traffic flowing from the platforms.5 For 
example, in January 2018, Zuckerberg changed the news feed 
algorithm radically, so that content from “friends” and family 
took priority over news content, and more local news was 
3 Foer (2017) p. 90.
4 Cleland, S. “Grand Theft Auto-mated! Online Ad-Economics Fuel 
Piracy &amp: SOPA Opposition” Forbes. 11-30-11.
5 Foer (2017) p. 132.
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given higher priority.6 The purpose of this radical change was 
to create more “meaningful interactions” and avoid inappro-
priate content such as misinformation and hateful comments. 
As a result, the disempowered media naturally saw a sharp 
drop in traffic and in revenues derived from it.
In 2014, Mathias Döpfner, CEO of the large German 
media group Axel Springer, wrote an open letter to Google 
CEO Eric Smidt expressing his concern that Google’s domi-
nant position as a search engine has lead to companies small 
and large living in constant “fear of Google”. Frequent 
changes to the search algorithm unpredictably affect all busi-
nesses that have become dependent on the heavy traffic flow-
ing through the platform. Döpfner wrote: “Our business 
relationship is that of the Goliath of Google to the David of 
Axel Springer. When Google changed an algorithm, one of 
our subsidiaries lost 70 percent of its traffic within a few 
days.” With bitter irony that is possibly lost on Google, 
Döpfner added: “The fact that this subsidiary is a competitor 
of Google’s is certainly a coincidence.”7 Reaching $14 billion, 
Google’s annual profits are about twenty times bigger than 
Axel Springer’s. Financially, they do not compare; even as a 
giant in Germany, Springer is a dwarf as compared to Google. 
One could say that Google does not need Springer, while 
Springer—and with them all other larger and smaller media 
companies—most definitely need Google.
Besides causing financial vulnerability, the giants even 
dictate the actual work patterns of journalism. Journalism is 
increasingly subject to Google’s and Facebook’s algorithms. If 
a story is important, it must be shared at exactly the right 
time, have exactly the right headline and the right status 
update to go with it. And still it is not certain that the article 
will get attention. The point is that stories important in them-
selves do not gain popularity unless they are also curated to 
fit into the model of each tech giant. Pandering to the 
6 “Facebooks News Feed Algorithm History” Wallaroo Media. 06-04-18.
7 Döpfner, M. “Why we fear Google” Frankfurter Allgemeine. 04-17-14.
Chapter 14. The First Digital Losers
188
 algorithms may affect the quality of the news. In his book 
World Without a Mind (2017), Franklin Foer writes about his 
time at American political magazine New Republic. The 
magazine’s growing dependence on tech giants gradually 
undermined the integrity of its journalism. In the pursuit of 
clicks—of survival—even major news providers began to 
embrace sensationalism, publish more or less dubious stories 
and give attention to propagandists and conspiracy theorists, 
including Donald Trump.8
Journalists are continuously and instantly measured by 
how many clicks their stories generate, sometimes openly, via 
a single screen in the editorial office. An infinite cycle of feed-
back is established: priority is given to stories that spread 
online, all other material is downgraded even if it is supposed 
to be important according to classical journalistic news crite-
ria. Easily digestible content has become a whole new genre 
that appeals to people who are bored at work or on the train. 
It includes various top-ten lists, videos, and short, quick 
reads.9 The subject may be serious, but it is published in a fast 
and entertaining way so that it may generate reactions on 
Facebook and thus be shared. Another side effect is that 
many media outlets get caught in the clickbait trap, preferring 
to high click rates over solid news. Headlines such as “you’ll 
never guess …” have become commonplace online. These 
mischievous teaser headlines activate in the reader an almost 
primal hunger for the information suggested, which is quickly 
and easily accessed with a click or two. Contrary to tradi-
tional print media, the headline no longer contains the gist of 
the article but may be enigmatic and inspire curiosity, act as 
bait, and keep the user busy clicking, sometimes generating a 
whole series of clicks, which increases both the time spent by 
the user and the number of possible companion ads. The clas-
sic journalistic criterion that the headline should condense 
the most important information in the article is abandoned in 
favor of riddle-like headlines. The result is that the reader 
8 Foer (2017) pp. 6–7.
9 Ibid. pp. 139–140.
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loses the freedom to determine the relevance of the article 
based on the headline. In the United States, Upworthy, 
Buzzfeed and Vox gained incredible success by developing 
insights, through the analysis of data, into how audience- 
winning content is created. Since then, most of the media 
community has followed suit—even highly respected media 
outlets like Time and Washington Post.
In general, tech giants have created a novel news system 
that aims to offer products pandering to the tastes of users. 
This may ultimately lead to a homogenization of the news 
industry through a leveling of opinion and taste. The founder 
of Vox Media and The Verge, Joshua Topolsky, bemoans this 
tendency: “Everything looks the same, reads the same, and 
seems to be competing for the same eyeballs.”10 Most media 
outlets write about the same scandals and cling to the hot 
topics of the day. Foer gives a spot-on example in his book. 
Many people may remember the rather inconsequential story 
of Cecil the lion. The story became very influential online, 
with its picture of a smiling hunter posing proudly in front of 
his prey, which he had shot with his bow and arrow in Africa. 
It had social media in a frenzy. The American dentist and 
hobby hunter became the object of hatred on Twitter under 
the hashtag #WalterPalmer, and the story generated more 
than 3.2 million other pieces of content from both private 
users and from major media outlets. Everyone tried to steer 
traffic in their direction. It was almost comical to witness the 
many clumsy attempts to find new angles on the weak and 
hackneyed story. Most media outlets made an honest attempt. 
The news outlet Vox wrote: “Eating Chicken is morally worse 
than killing Cecil the lion” and BuzzFeed: “A Psychic Says 
She Spoke With Cecil The Lion After His Death.” Even a 
more traditional magazine like The Atlantic wrote “From 
Cecil the Lion to Climate Change: A Perfect Storm of 
Outrage”.11 The list goes on, and international media also fol-
lowed suit. The unhealthy dependence of journalism on the 
10 Topolsky, J. “Hello again” Joshua Topolsky blog. 07-11-15.
11 Foer (2017) p. 148.
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tech giants causes them to be in constant danger of losing 
control. If the ethos of journalism is to be protected, no-cost 
content and data fetishism is not the right way to go.
Not only journalism suffers under the giant idea that the 
word “free” in “Information wants to be free” should be 
understood as “free of charge”. It is even worse for other con-
tent creators such as authors and musicians. Back in 2004–05, 
Google discreetly launched its digitization project. The goal 
was to create the largest collection of knowledge ever seen on 
the Internet, by scanning millions of library books and index-
ing them in one massive digital archive; Google Books. It was 
part of their mission to “organize world information”. A 
Google spokesperson said: “Google was founded on the prin-
ciple of making information more accessible to more people. 
From the beginning, we’ve envisioned a future where stu-
dents, researchers, and book lovers could all discover and 
access the world’s books online. We believe that this agree-
ment represents a giant step toward realizing that vision.”12 
Many international universities participated in the project, 
which has indeed provided useful access to a vast amount of 
literature from before 1900. The digitalization project sounds 
so magnificently philanthropic that we almost miss the fact 
that this philanthropy turns into piracy when moving into the 
literature of twentieth century.13
In Google’s opinion, copyright rules should not hold any-
one back. Google’s chief lawyer once described the compa-
ny’s attitude as follows: “Google’s leadership does not care 
terribly much about precedence or law.”14 This statement 
alluded to the traditional protection of intellectual property. 
This reckless attitude has the power to destroy the publishing 
industry, and it will obviously be disastrous to writers 
12 Pilkington, E. “Google’s book project faces growing opposition” The 
Guardian. 08-19-09.
13 Most countries’ copyright legislations operate with an expiration date, 
for example 70 years after the death of the author. Thus, the copyright 
restrictions of most texts from before 1900 have expired and they are 
now free to be used by anyone.
14 Foer (2017) p. 54.
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 dependent on that industry. Put bluntly, with its digitization 
project Google was planning an intellectual coup of historical 
dimensions. By 2015, 25 million15 of the estimated 130 million 
existing books (2010 numbers) were scanned,16 but the ambi-
tious goal to finish scanning all of them by 2020 disappears on 
the horizon due to copyright conflicts that have significantly 
reduced the scanning pace.
The interesting thing is that Google’s path to success was 
created by copying material without asking or paying for 
permission to do so. The pattern consists of a “Don’t ask per-
mission” strategy and, subsequently, confidence that users 
will love the results as soon as they see them. Ergo, Google 
will do whatever it wants. Better to ask for forgiveness than 
permission. Just think of Gmail, with which Google offered 
free email and storage. Would users have accepted the terms 
as easily if Google at the same time had asked them permis-
sion to scan all emails in order to sell the content for custom- 
made ads? Or what about Google Street View, taking photos 
of everyone’s front yards and matching them with people’s 
addresses? If Google had asked permission to do this, the 
streets would most likely be dotted with pixelated houses due 
to the many rejections they would receive.
The “Don’t ask permission” strategy is also why virtually 
any song in the world is available for free on the video- 
sharing website YouTube. The platform is the largest music 
streaming service in the world with a market share of 52%, 
even though YouTube only pays 13% of the total music 
streaming royalty costs paid by the music industry.17 
Co-founder of YouTube Chad Hurley wrote the following 
email regarding one of the company’s early copyright dis-
putes: “So, a way to avoid the copyright bastards might be to 
remove the ‘No copyrighted or obscene material’ line and let 
15 Heyman, S. “Google Books: A Complex and Controversial Experiment” 
New York Times. 10-28-15.
16 Jackson, J. “Google: 129 Million Different Books Have Been Published” 
PC World. 08-06-10.
17 Taplin (2017) p. 99.
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the users moderate the videos themselves. Legally, this will 
probably be better for us, as we’ll make the case we can 
review all videos and tell them if they’re concerned they have 
the tools to do it themselves.”18 He seems well aware that he 
is building his business on illegal material. YouTube has a 
consistently lax attitude towards pirated material. It has been 
able to get away with this for years. Due to the United States’ 
Safe Harbor provision and the EU’s Electronic Commerce 
Directive (2000), the giants can move under the radar when 
it comes to copyright politics because legislation places the 
legal responsibility for the material with the users who share 
it and not with the companies that provide the platforms. This 
legislation was originally adopted with the reasonable aim of 
finding a balance between the rights of copyright-holders and 
the interests in transmitting content of the internet compa-
nies. The exemption of the companies from legal responsibil-
ity was counterbalanced by their duty to shut down accounts 
that contained unauthorized copyrighted material. However, 
the companies did not regard these two aspects of the law 
with equal seriousness. They do not police their platforms for 
illegal uploads, and they rarely remove accounts that violate 
copyright laws unless repeated complaints have been made. 
Therefore, without much difficulty, YouTube has been able to 
employ a strategy in which they simply close their eyes to 
illegal content uploaded by users, removing it only if reported 
by the copyright holders. Legislation in this area is outdated 
and as a consequence, the content owners are left alone with 
the responsibility of finding out if a website in some corner of 
the Internet is violating their copyright. Today, YouTube has 
made agreements with most copyright owners, but what it is 
paying is almost symbolic when looking at the profit the com-
pany gains from the use of the material, see figures above.
One is easily seduced by the arguments that information 
should be free and cultural products should be shared. 
Professor of Law and copyright expert Lawrence Lessig 
exposes the tech giant philosophy when he describes how the 
18 Taplin (2017) p. 100.
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Internet is disrupting a long era in which greedy publishers, 
film studios, and record companies have “robbed the people 
of culture”, reducing them to mere consumers, passive sofa-
ridden recipients of movies, television and music. From this 
point of view, the Internet was supposed to be a showdown 
against the professionalization of creativity. And through this 
showdown, the creativity of millions of ordinary people 
would be released online, and all information and other con-
tent should become free, understood as “free of charge”. This 
is a new interpretation of the old idea that “good artists copy, 
while great artists steal”. Lessig thinks it is an established fact 
that every artist borrows, references and creates original 
works only on the basis on the work of others.19 Lessig wants 
to dilute copyright rules, which, in his opinion, are based on a 
quaint, romantic, illusory idea of  originality. He is seconded 
by Google and most of Silicon Valley because he strikes an 
important chord with tech giants: creativity is based on 
collaboration.20
It may sound alluring and beautiful, and it is tempting to 
be seduced by the idea when tech giant representatives talk 
about cooperation as opposed to the illusion of the romantic 
genius. But strangely enough, this point is put forward by the 
very same VIPs who honor Ayn Rand-like worship of the 
lonesome, heroic entrepreneur who creates a tech giant all by 
himself. When it comes to writers, thinkers and artists, col-
laboration is considered wonderful, as long as it does not 
demand remuneration. On the other hand, when it comes to 
programming, tech development, and funding, the solitary 
genius is worshipped, and the tech giants zealously defend 
the copyright on their own patents, algorithms and programs. 
All of a sudden, copyright legislation is a thing! In addition, it 
is important to keep in mind—even though it may seem 
counter-intuitive—that professionalism actually makes writ-
ing more democratic. It becomes more diverse because con-
tent producers are actually paid for their work by the very 
19 Lessig, L. “Laws that choke creativity” TEDtalk 2007.
20 Foer (2017) p. 160.
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companies Lessig attacks—unlike those he defends. Writing 
and artistic expression may become a way of life and a profes-
sion for a larger part of the population and thus not just a 
hobby reserved for the privileged class.21
Silicon Valley has long waged war against professional 
writers. It is a deliberate tactic to weaken the copyright laws 
that allow authors, musicians and artists to live off their pro-
fession. Consider Google—copyright protection is one of the 
company’s biggest concerns because the company links to 
millions of copyrighted newspaper articles, books, magazines, 
etc. In 2012, the US House of Representatives discussed the 
Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA). The intention behind the law 
was to curb copyright infringement by limiting access to 
pages that helped the exchange of pirated content. The law 
specifically targeted search engines like Google, which links 
to pirate pages. In response, Google put a picture on its 
homepage with the Google icon blocked by a black box that 
read “Tell Congress: Please don’t censor the web!” with an 
accompanying link to a list of email addresses for all mem-
bers of congress. In the 24 hours the icon and link were up on 
the search portal, this display of force was seen by 1.8 billion 
users. An overwhelming number of people responded to it 
and two days later, the proposal was withdrawn.22 Misusing 
the “censorship” concept to attack legitimate rights holders 
proved effective.
Google deploys tremendous lobbying to moderate copy-
right legislation. In 2017, Wall Street Journal reported: “Over 
the past decade, Google has helped finance hundreds of 
research papers to defend against regulatory challenges of it 
market dominance, paying $5,000 to $400,000 for the work.”23 
Academic experts can play a key role in supporting the poli-
cies promoted by specific stakeholders. During the Obama 
21 Foer (2017) p. 166.
22 Taplin, J. “Why is Google spending record sums on lobbying 
Washington?” The Guardian. 07-30-17.
23 Mullins, B. & Nicas, J. “Paying Professors: Inside Google’s Academic 
Influence Campaign” The Wall Street Journal. 07-14-17.
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administration, Google appears to have encouraged the firing 
of US Register of Copyrights Maria Pallente, who supported 
an update of the copyright legislation and thus opposed 
Google’s efforts to weaken copyright protection for musi-
cians, writers and artists. Google’s lobbying was so massive 
that the Obama administration was sometimes referred to as 
“the Google administration”.24 The odd part is that when it 
comes to Google’s own intellectual property, the double stan-
dard shines as clear as the sun: “Our patents, trademarks, 
trade secrets, copyrights and all of other intellectual property 
rights are important assets for us ... any significant impair-
ment to our intellectual property rights could harm our busi-
ness or our ability to compete.”25 World information is to be 
organized and made available to all for free, but of course 
there is one exception: Google itself. Google and Facebook’s 
algorithms are among the best kept secrets in the world and 
have never been subject to successful hacker attacks.
It is untenable to claim that information should not only 
be free but also free of charge. Journalism and art are part of 
what challenges the powers that be every day, developing 
new experiences and knowledge, pushing boundaries. But 
today, content makers have seen a significant shrinkage in 
their opportunities to create new art and content and make a 
living on it. Their revenues have simply been channeled into 
the swelling money bins of the tech giants. Google tries to 
frame copyright legislation as a censorship machine that will 
suffocate freedom of speech, but that is simply wrong. On the 
contrary, the purpose of copyright legislation is to protect the 
rights of artists and other content creators on the Internet—
and their continued opportunity to investigate the world and 
express themselves.
Since 2016, the EU Commission has been working on a 
new and disputed copyright legislation. At the core is an 
24 Pridham, D. “How Google Tries to Buy Government” Forbes. 
07-19-17.
25 Lanchester, J. “Googled: The End of the World as We Know It by Ken 
Auletta” The Guardian. 02-21-10.
Chapter 14. The First Digital Losers
196
attempt to modify the lucrative business model of the tech 
giants, which sneaks advertising sales into user-uploaded con-
tent like music, movies and books, not to mention allowing 
free access to original journalism content—in a certain sense 
providing it all without charge.
The proposal is controversial and its critics specifically 
focus on Article 11 and Article 13. The former grants news 
outlets copyright over the sharing of their content online and 
it is aimed at websites such as Google and Facebook, which 
use links to journalistic content as part of their business mod-
els. The proposal would require such websites to pay an 
amount for each link they post. Something critics claim is an 
effective “tax” on links. The latter article concerns websites 
such as YouTube and Instagram, which under the Safe 
Harbor provision have not been liable for the copyrighted 
material uploaded by their users. The users themselves are 
responsible. According to Article 13, the platforms would be 
responsible for the copyright infringement of the users unless 
they proactively prevent offending uploads. It is a call for 
content recognition systems or upload filters like Google’s 
Content ID-system, which according Article 13 should be 
used to block copyrighted content such as images and videos 
that violate the rights of copyright holders.
However, the visions for copyright legislation has entered 
troubled waters. In July 2018, parliamentarians would cast 
their votes on the new and updated EU copyright directive—
very similar to the one first proposed by the European 
Commission. But in the meantime, the directive was mas-
sively criticized. Particularly, Article 13 was dubbed nothing 
short of a censorship machine. Such rhetoric raised suspicions 
that the EU intended to undermine a free and open Internet. 
Seventy high-profile internet professionals, start-ups and tech 
companies got together to form a critical coalition and 
drafted an open letter asking European Parliament President 
Antonio Tajani to vote down the proposal. Among the activ-
ists opposing the proposal were Wikipedia founder Jimmy 
Wales, founder of the Internet Tim Berners-Lee, and net 
neutrality expert Tim Wu. In the letter, they said that “Article 
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13 takes an unprecedented step towards the transformation 
of the Internet from an open platform for sharing and inno-
vation, into a tool for the automated surveillance and control 
of its users.”26 But this conclusion is too radical. The proposal 
from Parliament includes no general surveillance of uploads. 
Rather, it focuses on the right of authors and artists to have 
their works monitored.
There is real need for legislation that breaks with the 
unreasonable free rein given to the tech giants and the subse-
quent distortion of the market for art and journalism. There 
is no doubt that this is no easy task, and therefore it is impor-
tant to listen to critical voices. In the open letter, the critical 
coalition sought more clarity and consistency in the propos-
al’s attempt to define which tech platforms would have to 
comply with the provision and which could be exempted. 
First, they accused the law of hitting small- and medium-sized 
tech companies economically harder than the big ones, as the 
required automatic filtering technology would be both expen-
sive and burdensome for the smaller players on the market. 
Second, the law would affect ordinary users who not only 
upload music and video, but also text, images and computer 
coding used in open collaboration on, for example, Wikipedia. 
Third, according to the coalition, the law would restrict free-
dom of expression and information because it would, in prac-
tice, have a much broader effect than what was intended, 
restricting how users share information.27 These are all rea-
sonable critical points and they must be taken into account in 
the ongoing work to modify the directive.
The mandate for the copyright directive in the European 
Parliament was voted down in July 2018—with 318 voters 
against and 278 in favour of the mandate. The European law-
makers did not vote against the proposal, but they wanted to 
have the opportunity to discuss more amendments and 
26 Cerf, V., Berners-Lee, T. m.fl. Open letter “Article 13 of the EU 
Copyright Directive Threatens the Internet”. Electronic Frontier 
Foundation.
27 Ibid.
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details in plenary. When the proposal comes up for a final 
vote in early 2019, it is unlikely to lose.
The controversial proposal is not without its backers. In 
2018, thirty thousand artists from all over Europe signed a 
statement of support for the EU proposal. French electronic 
music pioneer Jean-Michel Jarre, who was in charge of col-
lecting signatures, said: “The biggest crime against freedom of 
expression would be to remove the artists’ income—and thus 
their ability to create new art.”28
28  Lassen, A. “På med sølvpapirshatten - copyright-monstrene kommer!” 
Jyllands-Posten. 06-20-18.
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In 2010, in an attempt to explore how technology promotes 
peace, Facebook launched a new feature ‘Peace on Facebook’: 
“Facebook is proud to play a part in promoting peace by 
building technology that helps people better understand each 
other. By enabling people from diverse backgrounds to easily 
connect and share their ideas, we can decrease world conflict 
in the short and long term.”1 Facebook keeps track of for 
instance how many “friendships” the company has helped 
create between people representing arch enemies such as 
Israel/Palestine, Pakistan/India and Ukraine/Russia under the 
headline “A World of Friends”. All of them great stories. But 
Facebook speaks less loudly when it comes to the role of the 
company in the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya minority in 
Myanmar. In 2014, Facebook moved into the country and 
within three years, the amount of users went from two to 
thirty million,2 and since then Buddhist extremists have used 
the platform to spread misinformation, encouraging violent 
upheaval. In 2017, propaganda, threats and coordination via 
Facebook became a contributing factor in this extensive eth-
1 Huffington Post “‘Peace On Facebook’ Tracks How Tech Promotes 
Peace” Huffington Post. 03-18-10.
2 Ananny, op. cit.
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nic cleansing.3 The fact that the conflict seems to have started 
with an Islamist massacre of Hindu villages in Rakhine state 
in August 2017,4 does not exempt Facebook for parts of the 
blame for the following escalating violence. In August 2018, 
after the UN had pointed to Myanmar military leaders as 
responsible for genocide, Facebook finally chose to remove 
20 accounts of individuals and organizations from Myanmar’s 
top political management, among them General Min Aung 
Hlaing and the military television network Myawady—their 
Facebook pages were followed by as many as 12 million out 
of a total population of 53 million and had been used to 
encourage genocide. It was the first time Facebook banned 
political leaders from using the platform. The UN report criti-
cized the role of Facebook as a useful instrument of the 
armed forces who incited the population to fight the Rohingya 
people. Facebook admitted that they had reacted too 
slowly.5
No one is claiming that Facebook is an evil company, plan-
ning to drive the world off a cliff. A more likely explanation 
of the tragic events can be found in the automated algorithm 
system and the business model of the giant. Despite the beau-
tiful ideals, Facebook and the other giants are first and fore-
most ad brokers whose purpose it is to make money off of 
user attention. They have created a communication system 
where certain emotionally driven utterances are exposed 
while others are simply killed in the noise. It is a successful 
business strategy, but the side effect is disturbance of the pub-
lic sphere. A contributing issue is that the spread of the busi-
ness to new areas with new languages seems not to be 
associated with a corresponding linguistic training of the 
safety and security staff, skills which could more effectively 
3 Taub, A. & Fisher, M. “Where Countries Are Tinderboxes and Facebook 
Is a Match” New York Times. 04-21-18.
4 Amnesty International “Myanmar: New evidence reveals Rohingya 
armed group massacred scores in Rakhine State” Amnesty International. 
05-22-18.
5 Bostrup, J. ”Facebook blokerer Myanmars militære topledelse” 
Politiken. 08-28-18.
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remove threats and coordinated campaigns of violence, 
rather than spending time on nipples and “hate speech” of a 
diffuse character.
Tech giants have created a public sphere with unlimited 
access to contributing to this sphere, at least in principle. 
Many people can communicate information and attitudes so 
that they become part of the common knowledge of societies. 
That was the ideal—verbalized in slogans like “a more open 
and connected world”. But given the fact that the giants have 
almost reached monopoly power over user information flow, 
they have in their hands a very powerful tool to control and 
take advantage of precisely what becomes shared knowledge 
and what does not. It is a power that should be used with 
great care. The one who controls public space and the infor-
mation in it can do good but also cause major harm. With 
information, or lack thereof, the character of the public 
sphere can even change. It makes it possible the amplification 
and dissemination of information phenomena such as infor-
mation cascades and pluralistic ignorance.6 The former arises 
from too much information. The user doubts the adequacy of 
his own information and turns to the other (presumably rea-
sonable) users whom they trust and conclude that what the 
others do or feel must be the right thing to do or feel. The 
latter arises from too little information. It becomes legitimate 
for everyone to remain in the unknown as long as one 
observes that everyone else remains there as well. On these 
bases, it is possible to turn public opinion, create false agree-
ment and make groups of consumers buy certain products—
but also share political, social or religious views. Both 
individually and collectively, people can reproduce the mis-
takes of others and just jump on a train whose destination no 
one knows.
The public sphere of tech giants has become each individ-
ual user’s very own customized public space. First and fore-
most, that space is characterized by conformism. The 
algorithms feed the users with content they like to read and 
6 Hendricks and Hansen (2011) p. 17.
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share with others. But what is not to like about giving us what 
we like? The problem is that the algorithms serve the user 
text and video that confirm existing positions—or even 
 existing attitudes in more extreme form, see below. At the 
same time, the algorithm calculation suppresses the opinions 
and positions that might challenge users. That is, content that 
could be instrumental in moving attitudes and providing 
insight into the views of other people and perhaps under-
standing them – in short, the classic role of the public domain 
as a meeting place in democracies, “the marketplace of ideas”. 
But filter bubbles may develop, which tend to reinforce con-
firmation bias—believing in things that confirm already exist-
ing attitudes more so than things that go against them. After 
all, it is an easy thing to consume information which corre-
sponds with one’s own ideas and world view. However, it may 
be frustrating and difficult to consume information that chal-
lenges a person to think in new ways and question one’s basic 
assumptions. In spite of Facebook’s ideal to help connect 
people around the globe, the algorithms of the filter bubble 
are just not set to present the user to the diversity of ideas or 
people and new cultures.
Conformism has a tendency to flip over and turn into phe-
nomena like polarization and radicalization. As professor of 
Law Cass Sunstein from Harvard University says: “When 
people find themselves in groups of like-minded types, they 
are especially likely to move to extremes.”7 Like-minded 
people can easily agree too much, because if not exposed to 
competing views and opinions, the views are more likely to 
becomes extreme—be they political, social, religious or cul-
tural. On these terms, a discussion can streamline the atti-
tudes of the entire group and that of the individual user into 
a more radical version than their initial point of view. In this 
polarization process, the algorithm does the user the dubious 
favor of making a thick preselection of the voices the indi-
vidual users will likely listen to, the sources they will bother 
7 Sunstein (2009) p. 2.
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reading and the people they feel like talking to. This form of 
information selection can become an actual echo chamber, 
where only persons already in agreement are let in. An echo 
chamber is a hospitable environment for various forms of 
bubble formation. Bubbles of opinion, politics or religion eas-
ily arise when a given matter is overheated and when sub-
stance or value are absent. Opinion bubbles can grow and 
trigger Twitter storms or hate campaigns on Facebook. The 
international media storm which hit the Copenhagen Zoo in 
2014 is a good example. A lot of people had very strong opin-
ions about Marius, a giraffe that had been put down, and “the 
Danish tormentors of animals”. The media storm arose as a 
momentary storm of emotions, not considering the point that 
the zookeepers had to put Marius down in order to keep up 
the gene pool in the Copenhagen Zoo, since the genes of this 
particular giraffe were already well represented in European 
zoos. Of course, such effects do not violate freedom of expres-
sion in the sense of the right to express their point of view—
but they are highly problematic when looking at the broader 
concept of freedom of information, especially since the bub-
bles are not noticed from the inside: you may not realize that 
alternative views are left out, and you also do not notice the 
filtering process itself.
With the algorithm behind YouTube’s autoplay feature, the 
video service even has a tendency to speed up radicalization. 
By feeding users with gradually more extreme content, 
Google-owned YouTube increases the possibility that the 
user remains glued to the screen. Sociologist Zeynep Tufekci 
experimented with YouTube during the 2016 US presidential 
elections. She found out that no matter what content she was 
looking for, the recommended videos were always a bit more 
extreme and titillating than the previous ones. Jogging 
became ultra marathon, vegetarianism became veganism, and 
even more interestingly: Trump videos were followed by rants 
and svadas from supporters of white supremacy, Holocaust 
denial, and other content from the extreme right. On the 
other hand, videos of Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders 
would prompt extreme leftist conspiracy theories, such as 
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accusations that 9/11 was orchestrated by the US Government. 
Tufekci illustrated this by an analogy of fat and sugar, making 
YouTube a happy junk food restaurant: “In effect, YouTube 
has created a restaurant that serves us increasingly sugary, 
fatty foods, loading up our plates as soon as we are finished 
with the last meal. Over time, our tastes adjust, and we seek 
even more sugary, fatty foods, which the restaurant dutifully 
provides. When confronted about this by health department 
and concerned citizens, the restaurant managers reply that 
they are merely serving us what we want.”8
In addition to reshaping the framework of the public 
domain, tech giants also influence the way users interact. 
Users are rewarded for the expressions that engage the most. 
This happens because it gives them a dopamine hit every 
time they get likes, comments, shares, retweets, etc. You can 
say that tech giants train the user to cultivate a behavior that 
seeks confirmation. When, at the same time, the algorithms 
favor elementary activity-mobilizing emotions (anger, fear, 
awe and fascination), the consequence may be that the users 
get an intoxicating shot of energy from attacking the oppo-
nent, be it the other group, the other political party, or the 
other religion. The giants exploit the right of the users to 
express themselves by luring or downright manipulating the 
user to express negative feelings in anticipation of more 
social gain. A tempting hypothesis is that “conflicts and divi-
sive material about everything from political views to reli-
gious beliefs to social inequalities have greater social 
transmission than consensus.”9 Conflict can be thought to—
perhaps unintentionally—have become one of the main 
ingredients of the algorithmic laws of tech giants, cf. the 
Girard-Thiel hypothesis above.
The problem with the public sphere of the giants is that 
there is a dismal backside to their version of it. Conformism, 
radicalization and polarization are by no means new phe-
8 Tufecki, Z. “YouTube, the Great Radicalizer”. New York Times. 
03-10-18.
9 Hendricks, V. (2016) p. 153.
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nomena, and divisive material has always gained attention. 
But this cocktail, plus the speed and global scope enabled by 
these technologies, inadvertently risk amplifying disruptive 
and in some cases downright dangerous tendencies in  societies 
in different parts of the globe. Western countries are seeing 
increased political correctness, which has turned into a digital 
culture war between an aggressive identity political discourse 
on the one hand and extreme right-wing groups on the other; 
in developing countries there are disturbing examples of 
threats, incitement to violence and coordination between 
activists which turn into lynching in the streets; they are 
polarization processes with one thing in common – they all 
originate from Facebook.
In Western countries, the disturbance of public space is 
manifested in an online cultural war, where extreme right- 
wing movements battle against the front-line fighters of 
aggressive identity politics—and both parties are radicalized 
and made more simple-minded in the process. One of the first 
big clashes between the two sides was the controversy known 
as “Gamergate” in 2014, where attention was drawn to sexism 
and misogyny in the American gaming industry.10 Feminist 
video game critic Anita Sarkeesian became the object of 
extensive hate campaign when she uploaded videos on 
YouTube where she introduced viewers to basic ideas within 
feminist media critique. She had a critical view on how video 
games depicted women. We are used to think that societies 
with free speech can discuss criticism of a classic work of art 
for being sexist without necessarily doubting its aesthetic or 
other value, and one can easily disagree with the quality of it 
without moving on threats of rape and death. But Sarkeesian 
would have to endure several years of not just harsh attacks, 
but also outright personal threats for this intolerable “crime”. 
She was met with comments like “I’ll rape you and put your 
head on a stick”, vandalism of her Wikipedia page with porno-
graphic images, threats, and a campaign to flag her social 
media accounts for spam, fraud and even for terrorism. These 
10 Nagle (2017) p. 19–24.
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were serious attempts to ruin her career and reputation—
including criminal acts such as harassment, slander and 
threats.
Meanwhile, fairly unknown video game developer Zoe 
Quinn released the game “Depression Quest”, which was an 
ideological project to take video games in a more feminist 
direction. This would turn out to be the straw that broke the 
camel’s back within the gamer community. Also Quinn was 
subjected to death and rape threats; she was hacked, her per-
sonal information was published and she was the victim of 
revenge porn. In the wake of this, attacks were directed at 
other feminist gamers and video game critics who dared 
entering the war zone. Journalists defended these feminists 
through articles on how the game culture had become a toxic 
community for misogynist men. The reaction from anony-
mous voices in the online world was even more vandalism 
and trolling. Everyone blamed each other for lying and hav-
ing malicious intentions. #Gamergate was born and lines of 
battle were drawn. The controversy will be remembered as a 
turbulent culture war feeding on not only strong passions but 
also harassment and personal threats, which are criminalized 
in the legislations of most countries.
Writer and journalist Angela Nagle has examined this digi-
tal culture war, where two parties fight over anything from 
feminism to sexuality, gender identity, racism, freedom of 
speech and political correctness. According to her analysis, 
the conflict can be traced back to a discussion about the dis-
course on Facebook. The Alt-right, which in the United States 
is the umbrella term for the new extreme right of the 2010s, 
has developed by using old left-wing strategies like transgres-
sion, provocation, satire, and abysmal irony. Their behavior is 
a reaction to what they see as a politically correct finger con-
stantly wagging on the social media. Former Breitbart editor 
and Alt-rights leader figure Milo Yiannopoulos has expressed 
it in this way: “The Alt-right for me is primarily a cultural 
reaction to the nannying and language policing and authori-
tarianism of the progressive left—the stranglehold that it has 
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on culture. It is primarily—like Trump is and like I am—a 
reaction against the progressive left doing today what the 
religious right was doing in the 1990s—which is trying to 
police what can be thought and said, how opinions can be 
expressed.”11 In other words, some feel left out of the ranks. 
No one has to agree to the bizarre political ideas of the Alt- 
right in order to understand why they may be annoyed with 
the choking political correctness of their opponents. The limit 
of tolerance goes exactly where it glimpses intolerance.
The fraction of the left-wing concerned with identity poli-
tics is increasingly an anti-free speech, anti-free thinking and 
anti-intellectual online movement obsessed with policing 
speech. It is an emotional culture that aims to witness and 
expose the sufferings of oneself and others. Initially, the 
movement roamed on niche platform Tumblr, where floating 
genders and identities were broadly embraced. Over time, 
however, the movement has gained hold of the mainstream 
and now dominates parts of social media discourse. For 
example, in 2014, users could choose between 50 different 
genders on their Facebook profile.12 It has even spread into 
“the real world” with Hillary Clinton assuming catchphrases 
from identity politics, for instance ‘check your privileges’ and 
‘intersectionality’, as part of her presidential campaign. 
Particularly in American universities we have witnessed the 
emergence of a range of now well-established political 
demands and concepts going against free speech; safe spaces 
as in safe zones where women or African-Americans or other 
identities can meet screened off from groups and statements 
whom they prefer to avoid; trigger warnings which are clear 
expression of caution which the teacher is responsible for giv-
ing if a work of literature contains words or paragraphs with 
potentially offensive content, for instance violence, rape, dis-
11 Nagle (2017) p. 65.
12 Associated Press in Menlo Park, California “Facebook expands gender 
options: transgender activists hail ‘big advance’” The Guardian. 
02-14-14.
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crimination, or particular offensive words; no platform which 
is a slogan used to prevent certain invited speakers from mak-
ing their voices heard—by way of social media storms, harass-
ment and pressure on university management; cultural 
appropriation which refers to majority persons who borrow 
or “steal” elements from another culture, and who are there-
fore accused of not respecting that other culture. A curious 
example of the latter was the public shaming that hit 
Caucasian pop star Justin Bieber when he got dreadlocks. 
These activities take place not only online but on campuses 
as well, in the classrooms and auditoriums—but the suppres-
sion of freedom of expression in these physical spaces is 
closely tied to social media storms organized online aimed at 
gathering loud masses who can interrupt and harass unwanted 
speakers or put pressure on weak university management to 
cave in to demands of censorship.
Rather than embracing diversity or hybrid identities, iden-
tity politics has developed an extreme worship of group affili-
ations. The battle is fought through words, and the goal is to 
achieve silence rather than agreement or disagreement. 
Nagle unfolds it this way: “They tried to move the culture in 
the opposite direction by restricting speech on the right but 
expanding the Overton window on the left when it came to 
issues of race and gender, making increasingly anti-male, anti- 
white, anti-straight, anti-cis rhetoric normal on the cultural 
left. The liberal online culture typified by Tumblr was equally 
successful in pushing fringe ideas into the mainstream. It was 
ultra-sensitive in contrast to the shooting irreverence of chan 
culture, but equally subcultural and radical.”13
Policing the web from the perspective of identity politics 
has as a consequence that Facebook and Twitter hesitate to 
accommodate right-wing warriors from the Alt-right. Instead, 
the extreme right has absconded to anonymous niche plat-
forms such as 4chan and 8chan, where they can freely practice 
their cynicism, nihilism, misogyny and fight for men’s rights, 
white identity and the right to rebellion. The Alt-right has not 
13 Nagle (2017) p. 68.
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lost its power in this process, quite the contrary. It has grown 
larger in isolation because its devotees know how easily 
digestible humor and content, when combined with explosive 
comments and debate threads can leverage broad and active 
communities. With Trump’s election victory, they even felt 
represented in the White House by people like Steve Bannon. 
There are several examples reminiscent of Gamergate, where 
right-wing extremists hit back hard; where inhumane rhetoric 
turns into actual threats and violence. In 2015, a US student 
wrote on 4chan that the users of the site should stay home 
from school the following day, when that self-same student 
ended up committing a school shooting in Oregon.14 The clash 
between the Alt-right and the cultural left has turned into a 
bitter and overheated cultural war with no peace dialog in 
sight. Each of these groups find themselves in each their own 
extreme bubble of opinion, where some matters overheat so 
much that they trigger media shitstorms, threats, shaming and 
slander campaigns.
Gamergate also helped make it clear that there is a big 
difference between the inaccurate concept of “hate speech” 
concerning pejoratives directed at certain groups—and actual 
persecution and harassment of individuals where groups sin-
gle out an individual victim (cf. Girard’s scapegoat), using 
techniques such as shifting accounts, coordinated networks 
on other platforms, systematic abuse of the flagging option, 
doxxing (revealing people’s private addresses and other pri-
vate data as a way of encouraging persecution and violence 
against them), sending private and compromising informa-
tion to friends and colleagues, hacking and taking over the 
person’s Internet accounts and swatting (calling the victim’s 
address to the police based on invented reports)15—a list that 
includes criminal acts such as stalking, threats and harass-
ment. Here, the tech giants ought to play a more active role 
in the criminal persecution of such acts, by helping identify 
the individuals responsible for the coordinated pursuits.
14 Nagle (2017) p. 26.
15 Cf. Gillespie (2018), p. 56f.
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The consequence of Gamergate was that a number of tech 
giants made their removal procedures even stricter. During 
the online war, particularly Twitter had gained reputation as 
a place where hateful voices would gather and at an internal 
meeting in February 2015, CEO Dick Costolo came to a 
tough conclusion: “We suck at dealing with abuse and trolls 
on the platform and we’ve sucked at it for years. It’s no secret 
and the rest of the world talks about it every day. ... We’re 
going to start kicking these people off right and left and mak-
ing sure that when they issue their ridiculous attacks, nobody 
hears them.”16 Hardly a cure without side effects for free 
speech on the platform.
In Gamergate, Facebook did not live up to its ideal of con-
tributing to human understanding between people—quite 
the contrary. The digital culture war is a consequence of the 
polarization tendencies brought on by the automatic algo-
rithm system of the technology giants. It reinforces a univer-
sal tendency towards tribalism. Groups dividing the world 
into “us” and “them” occur naturally, also outside of the 
Internet, but they are easily reinforced if Internet users are 
always floating in a stream of information which confirms 
already existing attitudes only. It is difficult to say why the 
public opinion on Twitter and Facebook has fluctuated so 
heavily towards identity politics. It is also difficult to tell 
whether Facebook has unintentionally picked sides in the 
conflict by prioritizing the “tone of debate” over freedom of 
expression in their community standards and in their 
responses to users flagging questionable content. But prefer-
ring peace and quiet over agreement and disagreement in the 
public sphere has its serious consequences. In her many years 
as president of the American Civil Liberties Union, Professor 
of Law Nadine Strossen has argued that free speech is the 
only cure against hateful utterances, and that prohibition and 
restrictions will only make thing worse. For years, when argu-
16 This statement was leaked to The Verge, here quoted from Gillespie 
(2018) p. 24.
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ing time and again with censorship-happy right wingers, she 
had to plead against censorship, but in more recent years she 
has had to argue also against her old comrades-in-arms on 
the left, who are leaning ever more towards censoring opin-
ions they do not like, cf. Strossen’s book Hate: Why We Should 
Resist It with Free Speech, Not Censorship (2018).
However, such Western problems with extremization pale 
in comparison with the growing amount of urgent cases seen 
in developing countries. Facebook’s fast expansion in places 
like Indonesia, India, Mexico, Myanmar and Sri Lanka has 
resulted in some of the most frightening examples of serious, 
Internet-based social unrest. In those places, many people’s 
access to the Internet goes through Facebook, oftentimes 
they may even consider Facebook as the very Internet itself. 
Emotional feelings run free on the platform because the insti-
tutions in some of those countries are weak and credible 
sources are few and far between. This means that content 
shared between friends, family and people of trust may easily 
become “common knowledge”. When this is combined with 
people not relying on police and courts, panic originating 
from misinformation and calls for violence on Facebook may 
lead to violent riots and lynchings, because users take justice 
in their own hands. That recently happened in Sri Lanka. 
Facebook’s inborn preference for negative feelings helped 
escalate the conflict between Buddhists and Muslims, because 
mutual hatred and threats frequently and freely dominated 
the flow of news on Facebook, which is now the Sri Lankans’ 
primary source of news and information. The Muslims form a 
10% minority on the island, speak predominantly Tamil, and 
many of them are immigrants.
In April 2018, New York Times ran the story. At the center 
of the storm was 28-year-old Muslim restaurant employee 
Farsith, who became the innocent victim of a seriously vio-
lent chain of event caused by a rumor gone viral on 
Facebook. According to rumors, the police had confiscated 
23.000 sterilization pills from a Muslim pharmacist in the 
town of Ampara. For a while rumors had circulated of a 
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Muslim plot to sterilize and wipe out the Sinhalese majority 
in Sri Lanka. One day, when a Sinhalese restaurant guest 
yelled out that he had found a lump of something white in 
his food, everything went wrong. The customer furiously 
gathered a crowd around Farsith and accused him of having 
put sterilization medicine in the food. Farsith was unaware of 
the viral rumor and hesitantly commented, in his inadequate 
Sinhalese, something along the lines of: “Yes, we put?” 
Farsith thought they were yelling about the small lump of 
flour he could see in the dish. The crowd took his muttering 
as a confession of his crime, beat him up, terrorized the res-
taurant and burned down the local mosque. The story did not 
end there, because while the assault unfolded, Farsith’s “con-
fession” was recorded on a mobile phone, uploaded and 
quickly gained viral life. The 18 seconds video was uploaded 
to a popular Buddhist Facebook group as “proof” of the 
Muslim plot. With hasty shares, likes and comments, the 
video went viral and generated comments like “Kill all 
Muslims, don’t even spare infants”. Unintentionally, 
Facebook’s algorithm system transformed Farsith into a 
nationwide villain. This tragic affair ruined his business, put 
his family in debt and nearly cost him his life.17
How could things turn out as badly as in the case of 
Farsith? Presumably because conflicts have higher social 
transmission than consensus—the algorithmic law. Because 
users move around inside an echo chamber which amplifies 
and radicalizes already existing positions—polarization. And 
because, as a group, we can easily end up following a norm (in 
this case extreme hate towards Muslims), which each of the 
members of the group might not individually dislike, but 
which they nevertheless end up persecuting because they 
mistakenly believe, that the everyone else in the group do the 
same—pluralistic ignorance. Because even if we personally 
believe otherwise, the mere fact that many others seem to 
believe the opposite (judging by the countless likes, shares 
17 Taub, A. & Fisher, M. “Where Countries Are Tinderboxes and 
Facebook Is a Match” New York Times. 04-21-18.
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and comments a particular video has generated) makes us 
suppress what we actually used to believe—information cas-
cades. There is a particular mean irony to the fact that these 
effects seem enhanced by the new policy introduced by 
Facebook during the winter of 2017–18, as a response to the 
whole debate on “fake news” online. A new calibration of the 
news feed was introduced: communication between “friends” 
was now prioritized, while news stories driven by the media 
were deranked—allegedly in order to emphasize the ideal of 
“connecting people” and build local communities rather than 
serve as the source of news of shifting quality. In Sri Lanka, 
however, the effect of this was that local rumors of evil 
Muslims circulated intensively within circles of “friends” who 
intended to surpass each other’s news feed turning it into a 
self-reinforcing loop—while serious news that might have 
given an external and perhaps more objective perspective on 
the events now became deprioritized in their news feeds. It 
shows how Facebook’s sentimental understanding of contacts 
as “friends” does not necessarily bring global friendliness 
with it, but can easily gloss over malicious, even conspiratorial 
groups of people. Given cases such as these, one might well 
dream that Facebook’s increasing monitoring departments 
would focus their forces on serious and criminal cases, such as 
the spectrum ranging from personal injuries to harassment, 
threats, persecution of individuals, to terrorist plots or coordi-
nated violence—rather than increasingly policing their plat-
form with the large and vague catalog of taboos applied to 
everything from nudity and sex to diffuse “hate speech” and 
unspecified violations, to euthanasia and violent images, and 
to quotes, satire, irony and a wide range of other non-criminal 
content which is subject to wagging index fingers, moralism, 
removal and sanctions.
Maybe Facebook is slowly taking its first steps in this 
direction. In July 2018, WhatsApp launched an experiment 
featuring a limit on the number of “chats” a user could par-
ticipate in on the messaging service—after discovering how 
groups in India had knowingly spread misinformation on the 
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service by political agents acting in 10–20 interwoven chat- 
groups. At the same time, Facebook announced the removal 
of content from the site if it is deemed on the brink of turning 
into violence: “There are certain forms of misinformation 
that have contributed to physical harm, and we are making a 
policy change which will enable us to take that type of con-
tent down,” a Facebook spokesperson said.18 It is certainly a 
step forward if—contrary to unspecified “hate speech”—the 
focus is on content that actually calls for imminent violence. 
Then we may slowly approach the American judicial system’s 
standard interpretation of the limits to freedom of expression 
as “incitement to imminent lawless action”. This might have 
been discovered much earlier, if lawyers, intellectual histori-
ans, or sociologists had been asked, instead of believing that 
the tech environment itself holds the answer to everything. 
But how to identify such content remains problematic in the 
new initiative: “To help figure out when misinformation has 
tipped from “just plain wrong” to “wrong and possibly con-
tributive to violence”, Facebook will partner with local civil 
society groups that might better understand the specific cul-
tural context.”19 Facebook’s naive belief in the good of local, 
cultural “communities” may become a danger. There is no 
information on which groups in India, Sri Lanka and Myanmar 
Facebook wishes to confide in, but local communities may 
often be part of the problem rather than the solution. Many 
such local groups might have widely different opinions and 
have their own agendas; far from all of them are necessarily 
democratic, and some of them may even be active parts of the 
conflict. Doubtlessly, publishing the names of such collabora-
tion groups could put them in danger—but not doing so will 
contribute to even more to the opaqueness of Facebook’s 
removal policy and will promote local rumor formation, plot 
speculation and conflict. Obviously, on-site notifiers need to 
be locally connected, but it seems important to construct a 
18 Quot. from E. Dreyfuss “Facebook’s Fight Againt Fake News Keeps 
Raising Questions” Wired. 07-20-18.
19 Ibid.
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procedure for selecting such helpers, to make sure they have 
some level of skill, neutrality and some knowledge of univer-
sal rights, e.g. from local media or human rights organizations. 
Or else, basing removal policy on the preferences of local 
cultural groups may turn out to be yet another mistake in 
Facebook’s “annus horribilis” which seem to go from singular 
to plural.
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In light of the many problems caused by the tech giants’ 
somewhat opaque transformation of the public sphere, it is 
quite necessary to ask the question of how they can be 
brought to show greater accountability when it comes to the 
public sphere. It is not just a matter of pushing a few but-
tons—there are elementary structural defects to the very 
setup. There are two ways to change this: the coercive or the 
voluntary. The first is often discussed in terms of the increas-
ingly monopolistic behavior of the giants. We have already 
touched upon their dominant role in the market. The present 
situation is a far cry from the anarchist—or free-market liber-
alist—Internet of the 1990s, with its diversity of users and 
small companies all competing with each other. The dot-com 
bubble burst around the turn of the millennium and wiped 
out many of the small firms, helping to usher in the next 
phase, the 2000s. Here, a few companies gradually gained 
control of the market, only to become the world’s richest dur-
ing the 2010s. Scrooge McDuck’s amazing career from shoe-
shine boy to the richest duck in the world has long been 
replaced by the story of Mark the Nerd who founded 
Facebook in his college dorm room in 2004, and long before 
turning 30 became one of the world’s most wealthy and pow-
erful people. Facebook and Google are approaching a duo-
poly in the online advertising market based on non-paying 
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users, with Microsoft and Apple bordering on duopoly in the 
field of software, and finally Amazon with its near-monopoly 
on Internet trade. The latter is less central to freedom of 
expression, but still includes a relevant dimension, as the size 
and market dominance of Amazon has made the company’s 
bookstore capable of putting unprecedented pressure on its 
suppliers—the publishing companies. The story of Jeff Bezos 
is well known, how he saw the enormous possibilities of 
Internet trading and decided to start from one corner: books. 
It was an industry of durable, easily transportable goods with 
a distribution network then dominated by small local players. 
It turned out to be the perfect place to launch a disruption of 
trade patterns through e-commerce. Amazon grew explo-
sively and managed in but a few years to establish itself as a 
key player in the sales and distribution of books in many 
countries. Among the secrets to the company’s success was 
placing its headquarters in Seattle, in sparsely populated and 
remote Washington State, which meant that mail order buy-
ers outside of the state could avoid taxes, allowing Amazon to 
undercut the prices of local bookstores. In the longer run, 
Amazon’s strength allowed the company to put pressure on 
the pricing policies of publishing companies.
This became clear in the case of Amazon’s dispute with 
large French publishing group Hachette, which also owns a 
number of American publishing houses. In April 2014, the 
contract between the two was set for renewal negotiations 
when Amazon came up with a new demand: Hachette was to 
reduce the price of most of its e-books to 9.99 USD. Hachette 
refused—and, as a counterstrike, Amazon made it more dif-
ficult to purchase Hachette’s books through its website.1 The 
books could no longer be pre-ordered on Amazon, and if a 
buyer managed to order a Hachette book, the delivery time 
1 This does not, however, make Hachette a persecuted company, free of 
any guilt. In 2012, the US Department of Justice filed an antitrust case 
against Hachette and Apple, accusing the two companies of having 
made clandestine deals to keep e-book prices artificially high. Hachette 
concluded a settlement while Apple took the case which it ended up 
losing.
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was extended to several weeks. Hachette is a major player 
with revenue of around 10 billion USD, making it one of the 
five largest publishing groups in the US—but still a dwarf as 
compared to Amazon’s turnover in the trillions. Amazon’s 
blackmail tactics gave rise to a protest by 900 authors, led by 
Malcolm Gladwell and Philip Roth who claimed that Amazon 
deliberately hurt both Hachette and the authors’ own oppor-
tunity for income and freedom of expression. At a price of 
9.99 USD, Amazon not only deflated the price of books, but 
indirectly manifested the company’s perception of the value 
of books—the cost of producing a book is based exclusively 
on print, inventory and shipping and not on the intellectual 
capital, creativity and years of work going into it. The authors 
called for Amazon to be reported to the US Department of 
Justice in order to file an antitrust suit.
Clearly Amazon could only get away with its pressure 
policy because the company has a quasi-monopoly in the 
field of online book sales. As things had evolved, Hachette 
was in no position to simply turn away and look for another 
distributor. In June, Amazon wrote to a handful of selected 
Hachette authors and offered them 100% payments for the 
duration of the lawsuit—arguing publicly that publishers like 
Hachette should simply cease to exist entirely now that peo-
ple could go ahead and publish their books online. The out-
come of the conflict was a compromise: Hachette retained the 
right to price its own products, but a number of strong incen-
tives to put promotional offers up on Amazon were imposed 
on them. Over the duration of the suit, Hachette’s revenue 
fell by 18.5% against the previous year—illustrating the 
power of a company like Amazon, which controls more than 
half of US book sales. The case against Hachette is not the 
only one in which Amazon has used special methods towards 
its suppliers, and one might fear that Amazon, with its 
extraordinary economic muscle, is slowly gaining control over 
which books can be published and at what price—a situation 
with obvious problems for freedom of speech. Today, Amazon 
itself is already the largest publisher of books in the US, pri-
marily of popular fiction, and is currently in the process of 
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establishing itself in neighboring industries, as a producer of 
television shows, etc. Is it a good thing that the same 
 monopoly company not only sells and distributes content, but 
produces it as well? Publishers today already have no alterna-
tives to Amazon—could the next step be authors who have 
no real alternative channels of publishing and distribution?
The role and position of Amazon are easily to under-
stand—it is the world’s largest retailer. But how should com-
panies like Google and Facebook be categorized? On some 
occasions Facebook calls itself a neutral “platform for all 
ideas”, on others a “community” based on certain values. 
Others have called it a “means of communication” or a 
“social network”, and still others have used the words “media” 
or a “social media”, while others claim it is a piece of infra-
structure—a “public utility”. This battle for categorization is 
by no means a simple matter of semantics—it is crucial to 
how we can imagine a solution to the problems of tech giants 
discussed in this book. As stated by Senior Editor of New 
York Magazine, Max Read, there is real difficulty in describ-
ing what kind of social, cultural and economic phenomenon 
Facebook really is: “Over the past year I’ve heard Facebook 
compared to a dozen entities and felt like I’ve caught 
glimpses of it acting like a dozen more. I’ve heard govern-
ment metaphors (a state, the E.U., the Catholic Church, Star 
Trek’s United Federation of Planets) and business ones (a 
railroad company, a mall); physical metaphors (a town square, 
an interstate highway, an electrical grid) and economic ones 
(a Special Economic Zone, Gosplan). For every direct com-
parison, there was an equally elaborate one: a faceless Elder 
God. A conquering alien fleet. There are real consequences to 
our inability to understand what Facebook is.”2 Zuckerberg’s 
May 2017 “listening tour” to all US states was reminiscent of 
a visit from the Pope, and led to speculation as to whether he 
was preparing to run for President.
Nevertheless, a categorization must take into consider-
ation the company’s monopoly-like status. In the spring of 
2 Read, op.cit.
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2018, at the hearings in the US Congress and the European 
Parliament, Zuckerberg waved off critical questions about 
Facebook’s alleged monopoly status. He claimed that the 
average American communicates through eight different 
apps—but at the same time, he was unable to name a single 
competitor who offered services to the user similar to those 
of Facebook. Zuckerberg’s argument is misleading—it is a bit 
like if the owner of all the roads in a country were asked if he 
had a monopoly and the owner replied: Everyone is moving 
in at least eight ways—they crawl, walk, run, ride a bike, fly, 
drive a car, ride the bus and ride the train. Needless to say, 
Zuckerberg’s contention aligns badly with his own explicitly 
stated ambitions on the company’s behalf: to form a global 
community.
A growing number of observers find that market domi-
nance of the tech giants must be fought through antitrust 
legislation. In a US context, antitrust legislation dates back to 
the decades around 1900, when many trusts had sprung up 
within a number of industries. Many companies from the 
same industry branches had joined forces, been bought up or 
entered into agreements, especially on price regulation. 
Theodore Roosevelt (US President 1901–09) stands out as 
the strongest anti-trust fighter. As early as 1890, the Sherman 
Antitrust Act was adopted, and in 1898 Roosevelt’s predeces-
sor William McKinley founded the U.S. Industrial Commission 
on Trusts, which then summoned Andrew Carnegie, John D. 
Rockefeller, and Charles M.  Schwab to a hearing. In 1902, 
Roosevelt challenged railroad company Northern Securities, 
led by business tycoons such as J.P. Morgan and James J. Hill. 
The case went all the way to the Supreme Court, which in 
1904 ordered Northern Securities split up into smaller com-
panies. More than forty trusts were dissolved during the 
Roosevelt era. The trust-busting campaign peaked under 
Roosevelt’s successor William H. Taft, who broke more than 
ninety monopolies in his Presidential term in the years 
around 1910. In the presidential election of 1912, trustbusting 
was the central theme, and Taft, who at the time had now 
developed a plan for state leadership of commerce and pro-
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duction, lost the election to Woodrow Wilson who ran on an 
anti-trust agenda informed by anti-trust lawyer Louis 
Brandeis as his advisor.3
One of the most famous cases was the one filed against 
Standard Oil, the dominant oil company of the times, owned 
by four families and headed by John D. Rockefeller. As early 
as 1890, it controlled 88% of the oil trade. In 1906, an antitrust 
suit was brought against Standard Oil, and it was sentenced 
to split up into 34 locally-rooted companies, among them 
later giants Mobil, Chevron and Exxon. The US Supreme 
Court approved the split-up in 1911. From 1916, Louis 
Brandeis sat on the Supreme Court, and along with Oliver 
Wendell Holmes he became famous for a radical interpreta-
tion of the First Amendment: that freedom of expression 
should be curbed by the State only in cases where a concrete 
situation presented a “clear and present danger”. But Brandeis 
was also a fierce advocate of antitrust legislation, deriving 
from James Madison’s view that power concentrations in a 
market were not only an economic but also a democratic and 
political issue: citizens should be able to control the political 
power of large privately-owned operators.
Brandeis’ activist anti-monopoly position on the Supreme 
Court was later filled by Thurman Arnold, who led F.D. 
Roosevelt’s anti-monopoly campaign around World War 
II.  Arnold, however, increasingly endorsed efficiency-based 
arguments, i.e., that competition ensured a level of efficiency 
lost in monopoly formation. With his focus on efficiency and 
price formation, Arnold weakened public interest in the 
political role of monopolies. The legacy of Brandeis, however, 
was definitively broken in the 1970s and 1980s, by economists 
of the Chicago school, led by Richard Posner and influential 
Yale economist Robert Bork. In his landmark book The 
Antitrust Paradox from 1978, Bork argued that often consum-
ers actually benefit from company mergers, as they can lead 
to better and cheaper goods, making antitrust legislation 
appear economically irrational in many cases. Therefore, 
3 Wu (2018) p. 76.
Chapter 16. Trust Busting the Tech Giants?
223
Bork’s argument was that antitrust decisions should only 
consider the matter economically, that is, from the point of 
view of the consumer and of price formation—and not from 
the point of view of ensuring competition, preventing power 
concentration, securing democratic control, etc. This attitude 
gradually became dominant in the US Supreme Court and 
would turn out to play an important part in the deregulation 
of the economy from the 1980s and on.
In the wake of the emergence of tech giants, today a new 
movement of “neo-Brandeisians” is growing—a movement 
which argues for the resumption of antitrust legislation with 
a broader legal base.4 Advocates are also called “hipster anti-
trusters” and include people like Lina Kahn, Tad Lipsky, Tim 
Wu, and Barry Lynn.5 This position is gaining support in parts 
of the Democratic Party, for instance by Senator and attorney 
Elizabeth Warren, who is calling for action against monopo-
lies: “In many ways, tech monopolies are similar to the oil and 
sugar and railroad trusts of the 19th century. And antitrust 
enforcers have the tools to stop tech companies from engag-
ing in practices that choke off competition, but only if they 
use them. But there’s one key difference between the 19th- 
century trusts and today’s tech companies, and that’s data. 
Companies today gather more data on everything from 
where we work to where we shop, to our political views, to 
what we eat for breakfast. There’s this belief, when it comes 
to tech companies, that when people don’t pay up front, 
there’s no antitrust concern. But that’s a myth. Data is power. 
And data allows companies to push tailored advertisements 
to both shape and drive our preferences, and ultimately to 
benefit the corporation’s bottom line. That’s why it’s critically 
important that antitrust enforcers focus on the ways data can 
be used to undermine competition.”6
4 Cf. Khan (2018).
5 The nickname was invented by one of their opponents, Konstantin 
Medvedovsky 2018, “Hipster Antitrust—a Brief Fling or Something 
More?” Competition Policy International. 04-17-18.
6 Quoted from Zornick, G. “Elizabeth Warren’s ‘Big Fight’ Against 
Monopolies” The Nation. 02-15-18.
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However, there are also many Republicans who see the 
danger—not least because of signs of indirect support of the 
tech giants for the Democrats. An example is Republican 
political campaign strategist Eric Wilson, who speaks on 
behalf of monopoly regulation of the companies due to his 
own experience with Facebook’s acceptance of political ads 
based on “fake news”: “Regulation should include limits on 
the information Facebook may gather on its users and subse-
quently sell to advertisers, greater oversight and transparency 
related to its compliance with federal election laws and more 
cooperation with researchers about the adverse effects of its 
various platforms on individuals and communities. More 
broadly, the government should begin looking into breaking 
Facebook into smaller entities to allow for greater competi-
tion and more consumer-friendly practices in the online 
advertising, publishing and communications spaces.”7
A strong political voice realizing the manifold problems 
with the tech giants is Senator Mark R. Warner (D) whose 
white paper “Potential Policy Proposals for Regulation of 
Social Media and Technology Firms” appeared in July 2018. 
Here, Warner advocates a number of policies for regulating 
the excesses of tech giants. He sets out with emphasizing the 
monopoly problem: :“[...] the rise of a few dominant plat-
forms poses key problems for long-term competition and 
innovation across multiple markets, including digital advertis-
ing markets (which support much of the internet economy), 
future markets driven by machine-learning and artificial 
intelligence, and communications technology markets.”8 
Warner’s detailed list of proposals include a GDPR-like law 
in order to protect the privacy of users; making tech algo-
rithms more transparent and accessible to government audit; 
demanding data portability between platforms; making tech 
firms liable for defamation referring to existing state tort 
laws; requiring that automatized activity like bots is explicitly 
7 Wilson (2018).
8 Warner, M.  R. “Potential Policy Proposals for Regulation of Social 
Media and Technology Firms” Whitepaper, Axios. 07-30-18.
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labeled as such; the development of educational and public 
policies to build media literacy among users.
It is hardly surprising that dominant Silicon Valley figures 
like Peter Thiel—Facebook’s first major investor and still an 
executive board member—run counter to such views by 
stating that monopolies actually deserve their position in 
the market. By this line of argument, a monopoly is the logi-
cal result of their victory in the competitive game, a compe-
tition which is then rendered unnecessary. Thiel is a radical 
libertarian and by definition he considers states—even 
democracies—as the enemy: “I no longer believe that free-
dom and democracy are compatible.”9 Monopolies are, how-
ever, the very thing that allows him to create a free world 
protected against taxation and state intervention. By con-
trast, Thiel speaks directly against competition between sup-
pliers of the same type of product, as it will only eat away 
profits.10 His line of thought makes it clear that devotion to 
the free market is no longer the same as devotion to free 
competition.
A leading figure of the neo-Brandesian movement is 
Barry Lynn from the Open Market program at the think tank 
New America. After supporting antitrust legislation against 
the tech giants, he was fired in August 2017, shortly after the 
EU fined Google. According to the New York Times, the rea-
son behind the firing was that Google was among the spon-
sors of New America, and Google CEO Eric Schmidt seems 
to have personally demanded Lynn’s departure. President 
and CEO of New America Anne-Marie Slaughter shut down 
the entire Open Market program and emailed Lynn that the 
decision was “in no way based on the content of your work” 
but at the same time accused Lynn of “imperiling the institu-
tion as a whole”.11 The wealth of the tech giants enables them 
to support a very large number of think tanks, NGOs and civil 
9 Thiel, P. “The Education of a Libertarian” Cato Unbound. 04-13-18.
10 Thiel (2014) p. 35ff.
11 Vogel, K.P. “Google Critic Ousted from Think Tank Funded by the 
Tech Giant” New York Times. 08-30-17.
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society organizations of many different political  orientations—
not to mention both major political parties, of course. They 
carry out this support based on the assurance that it will 
make them influential regardless of the outcome of the next 
elections. In this light, it is no encouragement to free speech 
that giant power may be used to get rid of critics representing 
nominally independent think tanks, which are co-sponsored 
by giants. One might ask: could a classic high-quality medium 
with a long tradition of serious investigative journalism, such 
as Washington Post, now really show critical interest in the 
monopoly behaviors of tech giants? Since 2013, The Post has 
been owned by Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos. An uncanny paral-
lel is Facebook’s removal of ads by Elizabeth Warren calling 
for Facebook break-up in March 2019. Warren said, in an ad, 
“Three companies have vast power over our economy and 
our democracy. Facebook, Amazon, and Google. We all use 
them. But in their rise to power, they’ve bulldozed competi-
tion, used our private information for profit, and tilted the 
playing field in their favor.”12 After public outrage, a Facebook 
spokesperson explained that they removed Warren’s ads 
because they violated their policies of corporate logos. They 
later restored the ads.
But there are important parallels between the strong anti-
trust legislation in the US during large parts of the 20th cen-
tury and the increasing problems with the tech giants. They 
have not yet been seriously subject to antitrust scrutiny, pos-
sibly due to the misunderstanding that because users get the 
service for free, there is nothing to get at—echoing Bork’s 
perspective on the perspective of consumer prices. However, 
this ignores that in the tech giant setup, the consumer is not 
the user; rather, the paying advertisers are. The prices they 
negotiate when dealing with tech giants are hardly exposed to 
free competition, judging by the way things are now.
We have already described how the railway monopoly was 
trust-busted—a related case concerns freight transport by 
12 Lima, C. “Facebook backtracks after removing Warren ads calling for 
Facebook breakup” Politico. 03-11-19.
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rail. It is obvious that a railway owner who also owns 
 production companies could be inclined to give priority to 
transport of its own products in the freight wagons. Antitrust 
legislation prohibited this by adopting a principle of neutral-
ity, so that goods must be shipped in the order they arrive, 
treating all customers equally and charging the same prices 
for the same services. This is often called a ban against “verti-
cal integration”—that is, against allowing companies to inte-
grate the production of goods with higher-level distribution 
and processing of said goods. The ban serves to block the 
option of giving priority to one’s own products over the com-
petitor’s. The first major monopoly case in the Internet age, 
against Microsoft in the 1990s, in fact had exactly that charac-
teristic. The argument was that the company combined its 
Windows operating system with its own browser, Internet 
Explorer, so customers were not free to use the browser soft-
ware they wanted. It was considered so-called illegal “tie-in” 
in which the buyer of a product was forced to also buy 
another product, thus excluding other browser developers 
such as then- popular Netscape, from access to consumers. 
Microsoft claimed that the browser was not an independent 
product but an independent “feature” inside the operating 
system. In 1999, the Department of Justice won the case, 
obliging Microsoft to split up into two companies. In 2002, 
however, appeals by Microsoft led to a settlement which held 
that making all “tie-ins” illegal would hamper technological 
advances. On the other hand, the settlement obliged Microsoft 
to share with competitors key components of its software 
code, and set up a committee to make sure it happened. In the 
US, this was the last major antitrust case, and during the 
presidency of George W. Bush, not a single trust was broken. 
Thus, the actual gilded age of tech giants occurs in a legal 
vacuum where the US government seems to have forgotten 
its century- long antitrust legacy.
The EU, however, continues along the antitrust lines which 
Europe originally learned from the US. Of a similar nature as 
the Microsoft case is the EU Commission’s recent case 
against Google. It made the accusation that, when users 
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searched for a given product, Google prioritized its own price 
comparison feature for shopping over that of competing ser-
vices. In August 2017, the EU, led by Commissioner Margrethe 
Vestager, fined Google 2.7 billion USD for competition 
abuse. A January 2017 survey by Wall Street Journal showed 
that 91% of searches on Google resulted in ads for one of 
Google’s own products at the top of the rankings.13 Currently, 
the EU Commission has ongoing cases against both Google 
and Apple. On several occasions, Vestager has aired classic 
antitrust views—simply proposing a split-up of Google into 
several independent companies. On July 18, 2018, the EU 
issued its biggest fine ever, 5 billion USD. Once again, it was 
Google that received the fine. The reason for this one relates 
closely to the Microsoft case from around the turn of the mil-
lennium. Since 2011, Google has made use of its operating 
system Android depend on the use of Google’s own native 
apps. This so-called “bundling” takes away the user’s freedom 
to choose between other apps, according to Commissioner 
Vestager. The verdict gave Google 90 days to change its ways, 
on pain of daily penalties of up to 5% of its company reve-
nue—to no one’s surprise, the company appealed the 
decision.14
These issues are also deeply tied to the entire debate on 
net neutrality. The term refers to the idea that the Internet 
should generally be structured so that all content is treated 
according to the same principles, and that no content is given 
priority over other content when network providers process 
that content. Net neutrality aims to ensure that different 
users, content, websites, platforms, applications, equipment or 
methods of communication are treated equally and are not, 
13 When entering the search “phone”, up came a Google Pixel, the search 
“laptop” resulted in a Chromebook, “watches” an Android Smartwatch 
etc., cf. Nicas, J. “Google Uses Its Search Engine to Hawk Its Products” 
Wall Street Journal. 01-19-18.
14 Anneberg, M, Nielsen, R.  D. & Albrectsen, N. ”Vestager straffer 
Google med milliardbøde” TV2 Udland. 07-18-18.
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for example, subject to different payment or priorities during 
the process. This is the Internet’s heir to the concept of “com-
mon carrier”, which dates back to the legal basis of the 
 transport of goods and phone conversations (Communications 
Act of 1934). A number of European countries have legally-
based net neutrality, but in the US the concept is disputed. In 
2015, the United States Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) decided to allow different processing speeds, but at the 
same time it reclassified the web as telecommunications. This 
reclassification put the Internet within the scope of the prin-
ciple of neutrality for common carriers. Under President 
Trump, however, the FCC has reclassified the web back to 
public infrastructure. Thus, in June 2018 the principle of net 
neutrality was lifted. Some observers argue that continued 
growth in bandwidth have, until now, made the subject less 
relevant in practice. Legally and politically, the issue is highly 
controversial, and a more detailed analysis falls outside the 
scope of the present work—not least because net neutrality 
refers to internet service providers rather than our focus here: 
the tech giants.
As a precedent of net neutrality, the status of telephone 
companies calls to mind another classic antitrust case from 
the US, which is even more similar to the tech giants than 
Northern Securities railways were. It concerned telephone 
company AT&T. During the 1880s, this company emerged 
from Bell Telephone Company, named after Alexander 
Graham Bell, inventor of the telephone. In the early years of 
the telephone, competing telephone companies each main-
tained their own cable network in such a way that a given 
street in US could have many telephone poles and wires from 
several competing companies—an example of what is often 
called “destructive competition”. In such cases, a market can 
become unstable, and even in the ideal case of symmetrical 
competition between equal competitors of equal sizes, costs 
will occur that are absent in the case of monopolies (e.g. costs 
related to coordination and negotiations between 
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companies).15 Just like the network-driven Internet providers, 
customers back then had an obvious interest in being able to 
get in touch with as many other phone owners as possible—
this early version of the network effect naturally concen-
trated customers in a few large companies. As early as 1907, 
AT&T had a 50% market share, a share quickly approaching 
a de facto monopoly. Initially, the government followed the 
same procedure as against Standard Oil and advocated for a 
split-up, but in 1913 a compromise was reached. In this deal, 
known as The Kingsbury Commitment, AT&T’s natural 
monopoly was acknowledged. In return for the Government’s 
promise not to split up the company, AT&T agreed to the fol-
lowing: give up its control of the telegraph company Western 
Union; stop acquiring additional companies without the per-
mission of the authorities; commit to serve all customers, 
even remote ones; allow other non-competing telephone 
companies to connect with AT&T’s attractive long-distance 
telephony. At the time, the company had been criticized for 
being able to eradicate competitors by denying them the right 
to connect to AT&T’s long-distance service. During the 1920s 
and 1930s, the authorities allowed for AT&T to acquire 
smaller telephone companies but simultaneously, the com-
pany was subject to government price controls.
Another antitrust case, in 1949, led to a new compromise 
in 1956. It made the company agree to run the national tele-
phone network only and thus not move into neighboring 
industries. The company’s development department, the 
famous Bell Labs, was required to share its patents freely. The 
roots of Bell Labs went all the way back to Bell’s very own 
laboratory, having been owned by AT&T and Western 
15 Interestingly enough, following his detailed review of the theory of 
natural monopolies and the American telecommunications industry, 
Sharkey (2008) (orig. 1982, p. 213) concludes that it is difficult to deter-
mine whether this industry is a natural monopoly, even though it has 
many of the features predicted by abstract theory of economics 
(decreasing marginal costs, many “sunk” establishment costs, lower 
prices of a monopoly than a duopoly, etc.).
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Electric since the 1920s. It became one of the most important 
research labs of the 20th century, employing several Nobel 
Prize-winning researchers. Many important breakthroughs 
and inventions can be traced back to Bell Labs: radio astron-
omy, the transistor, some of the first American computers, the 
photocell, the communication satellite, the solar panel, the 
laser, several of the early computer languages, the quantum 
Hall effect, the digital mobile phone, etc. Its impact goes all 
the way up to today; it is now owned by Nokia. There is an 
irony to the fact that Bell Lab’s freely available patents 
became central to the early development of the personal 
computer. As Jonathan Taplin writes, today’s enormous tech 
monopolies rest on technologies which the giants themselves 
were free to access because of government antitrust action. 
The appearance of the first mobile phones in the 1960s was 
what finally led to a split-up of the Bell System in 1982. The 
newly arrived mobile phones did not depend on the cable 
network, and AT&T used its monopoly to try to prevent 
those phones from connecting to the company’s network by 
increasing the price for access. As a result, calls were made in 
1982 for the separation of local telephone networks—the so- 
called “Baby Bells”—and Bell Labs was finally sold off in 
1996.
The AT&T example is prototypical for the discussion of 
“natural monopolies”.16 The idea is that certain products or 
services are naturally inclined towards monopoly. These are 
products where the initial costs of establishing a company’s 
services are high, but where the marginal costs of recruiting 
new customers are low. This makes the marginal income 
increase with the number of customers. That is why earnings 
can explode once the company is established. Hence, new 
customers can be attracted at a lower price than that of new 
companies, who first have to pay the establishment costs (e.g. 
cable networks). The result is often that first movers turn into 
natural monopolies. At the same time, these companies are 
16 And which is chosen by Sharkey as an example to analyze.
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able to provide their services at a lower price than would two 
competing companies (if there were two competing phone 
companies, all consumers would need two telephones to get 
the same service that one could provide, which would be 
more expensive for the consumer).17 A product with the 
 characteristics of a network may be considered a natural 
monopoly candidate thanks to the network effect: all custom-
ers want to belong to that company which offers the highest 
possible number of other customers. This effect is evident, 
since the very service offered is a connection between cus-
tomers, and the inclusion of an additional customer is only a 
marginal expense once the network is established. Many 
natural monopolies have the traits of infrastructure like water 
suppliers, power providers, sewerage, road networks, railways 
and telephone networks.
The US Government—since 1890—developed a long anti-
trust tradition. Therefore, the 1913 compromise with AT&T 
may seem surprising—probably the decision makers realized 
that telephony was a natural monopoly. It would be counter-
productive and artificial to insist on maintaining many com-
peting telephone companies, each operating its own cable 
network (it is no coincidence that what split up AT&T 100 
years after its founding was phones with no need for cables). 
In return for this acknowledgment of the AT&T monopoly as 
public infrastructure, the government regulated its acquisi-
tion of new companies, introduced price controls, prohibited 
the company from moving into neighboring industries and 
ultimately demanded the company make its research and 
patents public.
It is possible to view Google and Facebook as natural 
monopolies, except they no longer just operate in American 
territory, but worldwide. Thus, any possible regulation efforts 
in the foreseeable future must take place on a nation-state 
basis. These two companies have a market share similar to 
that of Standard Oil when it was charged as a monopoly in 
the 1890s (and even higher than Standard Oil’s market share 
17 See Sharkey (2008) chs. 1 and 9.
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at the time of the verdict). Also, they are similar to AT&T in 
a number of ways: they deal in communications infrastruc-
ture; they base their strength on the network effect; they 
shield themselves behind the ongoing acquisition of competi-
tors; they continuously expand their field of activity by buy-
ing and absorbing companies from neighboring industries.
Thus, certain options for regulating the monopolies of tech 
companies appear on the horizon. Barry Lynn categorizes 
tech giants as public utility infrastructure and points to two 
kinds of solutions: either splitting up monopolies or regulat-
ing them.18
The former solution is thus splitting up the companies. 
Due to their character of natural monopoly, this could not 
follow the Standard Oil model of splitting into smaller com-
panies of the same kind, only divided according to geographi-
cal location. It would make no sense to split up Google into 
local, competing search engines Giggle, Gaggle and Guggle. 
Pretty much the same goes for Facebook. Yet, they could be 
split up by being forced to sell off some of the many compa-
nies they have acquired and integrated as additional services 
(a pattern which could be accused of “vertical integration”), 
while still retaining their core service as a natural monopoly.
Another even more reasonable approach (and one which 
does not exclude the first) would be the recognition of a natu-
ral monopoly on information searches and on “connecting 
people”, or however Facebook will end up being defined. As 
in the case of AT&T,19 such a recognition would then come at 
a price, for instance some of the following: public price con-
trol (on ads prices); net neutrality and non-discrimination of 
customers and users; publication, public discussion and audit 
of algorithms; balancing off community standards at least so 
they are not stricter than local legislation; public control of 
18 Brandom, R. “The Anti-monopoly Case Against Google” The Verge. 
09-05-17.
19 As noted by Gillespie (2018) p.  44f, it is striking how it was agreed 
upon to give the tech companies comprehensive legal protection under 
the “Safe Harbor Act” without balancing things by giving them 
obligations.
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and clear appeal options regarding the removal of criminal 
content and ditto users; a transparent procedure around 
copyright enforcement; transparency requirements for the 
publication of political ads; sharing of profits with external 
content providers who attract online traffic for the ad busi-
ness; free access—as in the case of Bell Labs—to the results 
and patents of the companies’ wildly expanding research 
departments. Companies like Google and Facebook do not 
produce and edit the content posted by their users—but there 
is one service that they actually edit and control, namely ads. 
Their origin, funding, content and targeting could be subject 
to greater control.
Obviously, as mentioned above, there are states with sig-
nificantly stricter legislation on free speech than the Facebook 
and Google standards, and several of these states regularly 
push, restrict, harass or shut down these services (e.g. Turkey, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and several other Muslim states). 
Others even completely disconnect the services from operat-
ing and create alternative, highly-controlled copycat services 
(as in China). It is not within the scope of this book to go into 
detail about the many different struggles and compromises 
that tech giants have faced when dealing with non-democratic 
states. In such countries, key freedom of speech issues are 
“classical” government and/or religious restrictions on free 
speech. In those cases, problems are only partly caused by 
tech giants. On the contrary, they have had a tendency to sup-
port freedom of speech when confronted with strict local 
political-religious gag laws and regulations. Here, Orwell is 
more relevant than Huxley. Especially in the early days, the 
web and tech companies actually made a whole new level of 
free speech possible for many groups in such countries, evi-
denced by Google top leaders rejoicing the Arab Spring. 
However, in order to also fit in to authoritarian markets, tech 
giants over time have tended to increasingly bow to pressure 
to remove content that such countries request or push to 
have removed—even if they were not originally covered by 
the company’s own standards. These disputes have been 
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around for many years and will hardly be affected by the 
introduction of western regulation of the services. It will pri-
marily be a matter concerning the United States and the EU, 
secondarily other countries with Western models of society 
emphasizing liberty. At present, neo-Brandeisians supporting 
antitrust legislation are hardly strong enough for action in the 
United States even though many politicians after the 
 congressional hearings in April 2018 are gradually beginning 
to speak about regulation. Furthermore, a decisive player like 
the European Union is now weaker than when the Google 
cases were launched, due to the Euro and Brexit crises.
Some may argue that given the decline in American anti-
trust policies, the US may have a hard case trying to split up 
tech giants, facing now a Supreme Court with a possible 
republican free-market bent. But still it can be argued that 
even lost antitrust cases have proven helpful because compa-
nies, during the legal process, strive to accommodate their 
activity in order to try to alleviate consequences in case of 
losing. Facebook co-founder and critic Chris Hughes cites the 
antitrust case lost against IBM in the 1980’s which neverthe-
less forced the company to increased openness as well as to 
separate hardware and software sales.20
It comes as no surprise that the tech giants are not 
excited about growing rumblings of monopoly control. In 
July 2018, in a long interview with the website recode, 
Zuckerberg set up a foreign policy nightmare scenario as a 
warning against monopoly control: “... do we want American 
companies to be exporting across the world? We grew up 
here, I think we share a lot of values that I think people hold 
very dear here, and I think it’s generally very good that 
we’re doing this, both for security reasons and from a values 
perspective. Because I think that the alternative, frankly, is 
going to be the Chinese companies. If we adopt a stance 
which is that, ‘Okay, we’re gonna, as a country, decide that 
we wanna clip the wings of these companies and make it so 
20 Hughes, C. ”It’s Time to Break Up Facebook” New York Times. 
05-09-19.
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that it’s harder for them to operate in different places, where 
they have to be smaller’, then there are plenty of other com-
panies out that are willing and able to take the place of the 
work that we’re doing.”21 Zuckerberg’s argument is that 
monopoly control would especially harm the opportunities 
of US companies to operate outside the United States. It is 
a rather odd remark, given the natural fact that outside the 
US is outside the realm of American legislation. So it is hard 
not to see this as straw man argument, which plays on the 
well-known American fear of Chinese competition—and it 
clearly fails to address the key arguments for monopoly 
control in the United States.
Anti-monopoly legislation, however, is a heavy weapon 
and should be used carefully. Voices against any government 
interference into the economy are quick to label neo- 
Brandeisians like Lynn as communists, supporters of planned 
economy, sentimental and populist protectors of small and 
unprofitable businesses, driven by envy of companies who 
have done well and grown big, and as anti-democratic pater-
nalists who think they know better than the consumers, and 
so on. But anti-Brandeisians also put forward serious argu-
ments that should be taken into account. In fact, this is a col-
lision of two varieties of a free-market ideology. One sees 
competition as a procedure which ought to be ensured when 
monopolies, to a greater or lesser extent, neutralize or block 
competition in a given field. Such blockage implies the risk of 
these competition “winners” taking advantage of their 
strength to prevent new competition from gaining ground, to 
push prices up and ultimately freeze in their own inefficiency 
when they are no longer exposed to competition. As the mar-
ket itself is unable to fight monopolies and ensure competi-
tion, the state must step in. The other emphasizes the results 
of competition—once a company has won a monopoly or 
duopoly in an industry, it is proof of the superiority of its busi-
ness model and the high quality of the product, and thus there 
21 Swisher, K. “Recommended listening: Kara Swisher interviews Mark 
Zuckerberg” Recode. 07-20-18.
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is no need to ensure further competition. It would only take 
the form of harmful government interference and abuse of 
the market, giving artificial support to inferior products. In 
this view, monopolies must be protected against the greed 
and ignorance of the government.
Supporters of the latter position—that of anti-antitrust—
will argue that if the growth of a company is restricted in 
order to expose the company to competition, then immedi-
ately the companies start competing against each other in an 
alternative battle for political influence in order to use it 
against the competitors. It will cause smaller companies to 
seek political support against the larger ones—and perhaps 
consequently lead to even greater concentration, only now 
one that enjoys political protection. This will lead to increased 
lobbyism activity, where the benefit of getting along well with 
a small group of government officials can be greater than that 
of improving the business model. This argument can also be 
expanded to address the very real problem that introducing 
regulation of, for example, Facebook and Google may secure 
these companies, insofar as due to lobbyism they are better 
than smaller firms at influencing regulation to serve their 
own purposes, just as they are likely to have more resources 
on their hands to implement demanding regulatory proce-
dures. A further argument goes like this: if monopoly control 
is also introduced for reasons other than economic ones—for 
instance to promote certain political, social or democratic 
goals—then the point could be made that special cases would 
support those same objectives by making exceptions from 
the regulation. Such exceptions would then be subject to 
 further lobbyism and in turn lead to more and worse 
concentration.22
In light of the current high level of concentration, the point 
that regulation will lead to worse market concentration does 
not seem strong. Only on rare occasions did previous anti-
22 These arguments are summarized by Manne, G. “The Illiberal Vision of 
neo-Brandeisian Antitrust” Truth on the Market. 04-16-18.
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trust interventions lead to higher concentrations. The lobby-
ism argument, on the other hand, is stronger. It is undoubtedly 
true that regulation in all its forms will give companies an 
even stronger incentive to try to influence the political pro-
cess. Taplin cites a gloomy statistic of how many top execu-
tives have switched back and forth between Google and the 
White House.23 Some of them are likely to maintain a connec-
tion with or loyalty to their former employer. Anti-antitrust 
figures such as Law Professor Geoffrey Manne speaks as if 
antitrust legislation could be used indiscriminately to 
 implement all sorts of support policies with widely different 
goals. This should indeed be avoided; thus monopoly suits 
should only be opened in case of very clear indications of 
destructive economic, public or political effects of the monop-
oly. We think that is indeed the case when looking at the tech 
giants, their actual management of free speech, their strong 
influence on democratic elections and processes, their lack of 
data protection, their acquisition of competitors, etc. The 
incentive for more lobbyism in case of antitrust intervention 
is undoubtedly an important factor to keep in mind—which 
may only be counteracted by increased transparency on and 
regulation of campaign support, nepotism, and corruption. In 
May 2019, the antitrust case received renewed impetus with 
an important op-ed from Facebook co-founder Chris Hughes 
in the New York Times. Here, Hughes recommended a break-
up of Facebook, most easily accomplished by the forced sale 
of acquisitions like Messenger, Instagram and WhatsApp. 
Hughes refers to his old friend, attacking his unprecedented 
control of freedom of expression: ”The most problematic 
aspect of Facebook’s power is Mark’s unilateral control over 
speech. There is no precedent for his ability to monitor, orga-
nize and even censor the conversations of two billion 
people.”24
23 Taplin (2017) p. 129f.
24 Hughes, C. ”It’s Time to Break Up Facebook” New York Times. 
05-09-19.
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It is not within the framework of this book to get into 
details on how regulation can and should be drafted. But to 
us there is no doubt that the still more strong voices advocat-
ing reconsideration of antitrust trials against tech giants have 
a strong case going for them.
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We cannot, however, rely on government-imposed regulation 
to solve all the problems of the Internet. Regulation can and 
should set a better framework than what is currently the case, 
but by nature all regulation is general and framework-setting 
only, and nobody can expect it to solve all problems in detail. 
Malignant forces of many different kinds will continue to 
bypass, exploit and challenge even the best regulation. 
Therefore, actors within the public sphere and civil society 
must contribute to the preservation of freedom of expression 
on the Internet. The simplistic view of a dichotomy between 
state and private often seems to assume that society consists 
only of a number of companies and private individuals on the 
one hand, and on the other, a state. From that plain dichot-
omy, it follows that policy must then be determined by an 
ongoing arm-wrestle between the two. Such a polarized setup 
might give a rough picture of authoritarian societies. But 
painting the two in this oppositional way completely ignores 
the key role of civil society and the public sphere in modern 
democracies—in between the government sphere and the 
private sphere, so to speak. In this context, traditional media 
ought to adopt a leading role. It is well known that such 
media outlets are under pressure by tech giants, primarily 
because the crucial advertising income is migrating towards 
the tech giants and their attention economy. Print newspapers 
are shrinking, and people go online to find news. In this story 
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of decay, many have been a bit too willing to see an 
 overlapping shift, where new technology and new players 
replace old and outdated ones, just like cars replaced horse-
drawn carriages and the drive-thru replaced roadside inns. 
This widely- held idea overlooks one fundamental fact: to a 
very large extent, the news content that people look for and 
find on the tech giants’ platforms is still largely produced by 
the old pre- Internet media outlets, newspapers, TV-networks, 
publishing companies, film production companies, etc. Tech 
giants have indeed become great marketers of news and con-
tent, but they themselves do not produce the content they 
deliver. This is one of the reasons that the categorization of 
the giants as media is wrong. Newspapers, media outlets and 
publishers embody free debate and Enlightenment principles 
in civil society—supplemented by public-private players such 
as universities and other research institutions, think tanks and 
philanthropic foundations. Here it is crucial that such media 
and institutions hold on to the elementary principles of free 
speech and do not resort to introducing community stan-
dards. Moreover, they must keep promoting freedom, which 
includes also points of view considered unpopular, provoca-
tive or grotesque by the ideas of the moment and the main-
stream. One man’s “hate speech” is another man’s truth may 
not apply to every single case but should still count as a guid-
ing motto.
In the 2017 Spielberg film The Post, famous 1970s-80s 
editor-in-chief at The Washington Post, Ben Bradlee, is 
quoted for saying: “The only way to assert the right to publish 
is to publish.” This ethos must be followed by strong actors in 
civil society. Lengthy tribute speeches in praise of freedom of 
expression, often heard from the tech giants, can be gripping 
but also entirely useless, if the companies are not willing to 
act on their principles. One of the inventors of virtual reality, 
Jaron Lanier, recently published a sharply written pamphlet 
encouraging people to simply delete their social media 
accounts. He advises people to read three independent news 
sites each day instead of their social media news feed—mak-
ing them more well-informed faster. Tech giants are harmful 
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for truth, for politics, and they favor people who act like 
 assholes, to paraphrase Lanier’s blunt characterization. 
However, he rejects the claim that the highly addictive tech 
giants are the tobacco industry of our day—there are also 
good sides to them, after all. He prefers to compare them to 
lead paint: it was phased out little by little—but it did not 
make people believe that they should stop painting their 
houses entirely. So, his radical proposal is not to shut down 
social media, but to push them to evolve in a direction away 
from their addictive, public-distorting traits. It seems doubt-
ful, however, that Lanier will be able to provoke a mass 
movement to actually abandon the tech giants. But the threat 
in itself, and the rising debate in civil society, might perhaps 
result in a pressure to gradually guide the companies in a bet-
ter direction. Lanier suggests an alternative business model 
where users pay for social media to be at their service rather 
than primarily serving the advertisers1—supplemented by the 
rights of users to own the data they create. That would make 
the companies’ use of these data subject to payment, but pay-
ment in the opposite direction, to the users. Such a solution 
would no doubt be more bureaucratic, and relevant support-
ing algorithms could be written. As to whether people would 
really wish to pay for such services, Lanier points to the fact 
that they have indeed long since become used to free content 
but still have proved willing to pay for HBO and Netflix sub-
scriptions to access quality television. So why should discern-
ing consumers not also be willing to pay for a similar 
subscription to access high quality social media? Lanier vows 
a fateful oath: he will not restore his accounts with the tech 
giants until he is allowed to pay for them.
In general, it is important that the public sphere and civil 
society continuously develop new tools to face new chal-
lenges. In early 2018, a number of civil liberty organizations—
some old, some new—got together to discuss a mutual 
interest: online freedom of expression.2 Over two meetings in 
1 Lanier (2018) p. 104ff.
2 The organizations are primarily American: American Civil Liberties 
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January and May carrying the title “Content Moderation and 
Removal to Scale”, they articulated a possible set of principles 
for freedom on the major Internet platforms, given the name 
Santa Clara Principles (named after the first meeting, which 
took place at Santa Clara University, California). The objec-
tive was to achieve “... reasonable transparency and account-
ability on the Internet platforms.”3 The manifest lists three 
basic principles to achieve this objective, respectively 1) num-
ber of posts removed; 2) notice about removal; 3) possibility 
to appeal for any content removals.
About removal of content the general recommendation is: 
“Publish the numbers of posts removed and accounts perma-
nently or temporarily suspended due to violations of their 
content guidelines.” It must include the number of complaints 
about posts, number of posts and accounts deleted—orga-
nized by certain criteria: by the rules they are claimed to have 
violated; formats (text, image, video, etc.); by the type of com-
plainant (governments, employees, users, automated); by the 
geographical location of the parties involved (both complain-
ing and accused party).
Regarding notification of the affected user about removal, 
the general recommendation is: “The companies have to sub-
mit a notice to all users whose content has been removed or 
whose account has been suspended, giving the reason for the 
removal or suspension.” Generally, the companies must pro-
vide clear guidelines with examples of both permissible and 
Union Foundation of Northern California, the California branch of 
ACLU from 1920; Center for Democracy and Technology, founded in 
1994 to defend free speech online; Electronic Frontier Foundation, a 
digital rights organization founded in 1990 by John Perry Barlow, the 
man behind the Cyberspace manifesto; New America’s Open Technology 
Institute from 2009 (the technology branch of think tank New America, 
headed by Kevin Bankston)—plus a handful of individual researchers: 
Irina Raicu (Santa Clara University), Nicolas Suzor (Queensland 
University of Technology), Sarah T. Roberts (UCLA), and Sarah Myers 
West (USC)
3 The principles can be found here “The Santa Clara Principles on 
Transparency and Accountability in Content Moderation” Last visited 
08-04-18: https://cdt.org/files/2018/05/Santa_Clara_Principles.pdf
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critical content. Any removal notice must contain: URL, 
 content quote or other clear reference to identify the posting; 
what exact rule the content has allegedly violated; how the 
content was flagged and removed (however, individual com-
plainants may maintain anonymity); a guideline of how to 
appeal the decision.
Regarding appeal, the recommendation is: “The compa-
nies have to provide reasonable opportunity to lodge an 
appeal for any removal of content or suspension of 
accounts.” A proper appeal must include: a review carried 
out by a person or group of persons who were not involved 
in the first decision; an opportunity to present further argu-
ments and have them included in the investigation; 
announcement of the results of the review in an under-
standable language.
The Santa Clara Principles address the tech giants directly, 
requiring them to adjust their removal procedures according 
to the recommendations. There is no doubt that these princi-
ples would represent a very big step forward for user freedom 
of expression on the tech giant platforms. They would intro-
duce clarity, openness and a rule-governed procedure, which 
is not the case at present.
However, there are a number of important questions that 
these principles do not address. It appears that the Santa 
Clara organizations are hoping that tech giants will volun-
tarily adhere to their principles—government involvement in 
the matter is not mentioned. The problems include, for 
example, the nature and scope of the platforms’ policies: 
Should tech giants be able to freely decide their own censor-
ship policies? Should external control of their removal poli-
cies become a condition for accepting their monopolies? Are 
there limits to what may be prohibited? What is the relation-
ship between the policies of the tech giants and the free 
speech legislations in different countries? Should govern-
ments have influence over the policies, why, and how (or why 
not)? Also, the principles do not state (although they may 
imply it) that all removal of content should be subject to 
explicit rules (based on the old doctrine nulla poena sine 
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lege—no punishment without law). They also do not empha-
size any conditions for changing the rules—tech giants are 
famous for continuously changing their rules, often without 
clearly announcing the changes or giving any clear deadline 
for their enforcement. And finally, the principles do not 
specify whether the rules are to be enforced or even con-
trolled by a third party, which would make it difficult for tech 
giants to keep acting as legislative, judicial, and executive 
branch alike.
In June 2018, we had the opportunity to speak to one of 
the persons behind the Santa Clara document, Nate Cardozo 
from the Electronic Frontier Foundation in San Francisco. 
EFF was founded in 1990 by John Perry Barlow, among oth-
ers, to protect people and new technological tools active on 
the emerging Internet from various legal threats, to monitor 
and criticize government interventions in the field and to 
organize political action in support of personal freedoms 
online. Cardozo says that, until now, the EFF has focused on 
the problem of government demanding tech companies to 
hand over data. But two recent developments have now put 
censorship by tech giants on the agenda: the election of 
Trump and the advance of the Alt-right movement online: 
“The purpose of SC manifesto is twofold—to try to make 
companies comply, but also, once companies accept those 
principles, we’ll have data about removal—before that we 
can’t even have an intelligent conversation.”
 – Do you imagine the SC principles accepted voluntarily by 
the tech giants, or by political enforcement?
“We have no unified view on that yet. EFF comes from a 
more libertarian tradition so we would never embrace politi-
cal enforcement, but there should be a political pressure for 
transparency. We’re not a fan of government regulation 
because the risk of error is extraordinarily high—if Congress 
would write a law now with the present power relations there 
and the present President, chances are we would not like it at 
all.”
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 – But there are mounting regulation pressures in both the US 
and in the EU?
“One point where there’s appetite on Capitol Hill is for 
data protection like in the EU—which we at EFF would be in 
favor of. One area of the EU GDPR which makes us nervous, 
however, is the “right to erasure” [the idea that people have a 
right to have removed claims made about them online, claims 
they do not like, even old statements made by themselves]. 
Another problem is that tech giants have way more means of 
affecting legislations and adapting to them—Google has 
thousands of lawyers on staff, a startup has none. The other 
possibility is that government passes something toothless 
which would just make matters worse because then political 
pressure would cease. Another area where we would wel-
come government intervention would be more initiative from 
FTC (Federal Trade Commission) on enforcing already exist-
ing rules for FIPs (Fair Information Practices) which are 20 
years old, but essentially unenforced as of yet.”
 – The whole complex of the criteria of removal are not 
addressed in the Santa Clara Principles?
“No, that’s correct. You’re right, they are quite fuzzy—
vague, intentionally so, because that gives a large room of 
manoeuvre for the companies. We talked about it but con-
cluded: let’s not let the perfect be the enemy of the good, let 
us first see how far we can get with transparency and then 
increase demands later.”
 – There is tension between the broad freedom of expression 
granted by the First Amendment and the far more narrow 
removal criteria of the tech giants?
“We are indeed hesitant to accept any criteria narrower 
than the First Amendment. On the other hand, platforms also 
have their free speech rights. If you have a dog photo site, you 
have your rights to delete cat photos. If you have a vegetarian 
site, you will delete photos of pork etc.—of course you have 
rights to such things—the issue is how to balance these 
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 liberties. Infrastructure companies are easy to tackle—they 
should not censor at all! When CloudFare and Google cut off 
the white supremacist site The Daily Stormer which is not 
illegal under US law, we took a strong line against that.4 With 
things like Facebook it is different, but we’re moderating our 
stance a bit—we don’t say they should keep everything up all 
of the time, but they should keep up a hell of a lot more than 
they do today.”
 – Where do you stand on the suggestions for control of 
monopoly?
“We have an ongoing project in EFF to find out what we 
mean about that. One thing we have decided on is to back the 
idea of ‘interoperability’—that is, the possibility to move 
across the big tech companies online. You should be able to 
leave e.g. Facebook and take all your data with you to 
another operator, and it should be possible to send messages 
across different companies. Right now, monopolies are 
enforced by means of NOT being interoperable, even Google 
turned off the possibility of interoperative chats 4 years ago, 
they went out of the way to turn off interoperability. Facebook 
has all of these privacy settings—only one of them have a 
default setting which protects your privacy, and that is about 
your address book. And that is in order to not letting users 
taking their address book with them when they leave for 
another company.”
 – What about the AT&T example? Meeting government 
demands as a price in order to get accept of monopoly?
“It makes me extremely uncomfortable to imagine what 
the current government might require as a price for accepting 
monopoly, for instance government access to personal data—
I think we rather need to come up with new solutions rather 
than look at the AT&T example.”
4 Cf. Vega, N. “Internet rights group slams Google and GoDaddy’s ‘dan-
gerous’ decision to ban a neo-Nazi site” nordic.businessinsider.com. 
08-18-17.
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 – How is the EFF itself funded?
“EFF lives from donations from individuals, we’re only 
supported less than 6% from companies and 0% from the 
government. We had a big kick in support after the Edward 
Snowden affair in 2013 and another kick when Trump got 
elected ...”
 – Another type of censorship comes from external pressure 
on the companies, e.g. flagging storms by protest groups 
attempting to have opponents suspended from the platforms ...
“Companies repeatedly tell us that numbers of flaggers 
complaining about a particular post play no role—that is 
obviously bullshit. They have “trusted flaggers” whose com-
plaints are easily followed—that sort of inequality is intrans-
parent. And postings by known people have much better 
chances for being preserved than postings by an unknown. 
Another issue is: Which elements of civil society do compa-
nies chose to engage with or ignore also has a huge influence. 
After Charlottesville, the tech giants have been much more 
willing to engage with anti-hate speech organizations like 
Southern Poverty Law Center (who tend to err on the side of 
fighting white supremacy) and Anti-Defamation League (a 
Jewish organization particularly focusing on antisemitism) 
than with free-speech organizations like us.”
 – Globally, a huge issue for Free Speech is the compromises 
being made between the tech giants and totalitarian states?
“If tech giants are not forced to comply with legislations in 
countries where they have no boots on the ground, our stance 
is they should NOT at all comply with the demand of those 
countries. We protested when Twitter opened an office in 
UAE [the United Arab Emirates] because now they are no 
longer able to ignore demands from UAE, because now they 
have employees there who may be pressured or threatened. 
We have the policy that when content is illegal in some juris-
diction but not others—e.g. insulting Erdogan in Turkey—
and the companies are forced to comply with that, they 
should continue to make that content available in the rest of 
the world.”
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As an organization, EFF illustrates very well some of the 
dilemmas involved when trying to bring transparency and 
appropriate conditions to the technological Wild West of tech 
giant censorship. EFF is a strong voice in civil society hoping 
to help create pressure that makes the companies listen. Still, 
the organization refrains from supporting government inter-
vention. The ongoing crisis after the Cambridge Analytica 
scandal also make this an opportune time for the public to 
put pressure on tech giants, because the companies might be 
nudged to see the advantage of taking a proactive stance—
before regulation they might dislike is imposed on them.
It is crucial that civil society organizations and NGO’s, 
such as the ones behind the Santa Clara manifesto, continu-
ously articulate and develop demands that can inspire public 
and political debate on tech regulation, a debate which seems 
growing in both the United States and EU after the 2018 
crises. The basic clarity and obvious fairness of the Santa 
Clara Principles ought to ensure that they have great impact. 
But it also seems necessary that such organizations gain pub-
lic and political influence to enable them to match the tech 
giants’ broad and well-funded lobbyism activity among 
Western politicians.
Another example of the abilities of civil society to inter-
fere is a recent American NGO, Alliance for Securing 
Democracy.5 The organization was founded in 2017  in 
response to the exposure of the Russian “troll factory” 
Internet Research Agency and its massive influence over the 
American voting public via Russian bots on the Internet. The 
organization is privately funded —which is very important in 
the United States—and bipartisan, i.e., it has no privileged 
affiliation with either of the two major parties. In fact, the 
initiative was taken by two experienced former political advi-
sors from each party, Marco Rubio’s (R) Jamie Fly and 
5 Alliance for Securing Democracy. Last visited 08-04-18: http://securing-
democracy.gmfus.org.
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Hillary Clinton’s (D) Laura Rosenberger. The motto is: “We 
are not telling you what to think, but we believe you should 
know when someone is trying to manipulate you”.
One part of the organization’s activity is an ongoing map-
ping of Russian activities on Twitter, the main platform used 
for the Russian bot campaign. The project bears the title 
Hamilton686 after one of the American founding fathers, 
Alexander Hamilton, and his famous essay “The Mode of 
Electing the President”, published in 1788  in The Federalist 
Papers vol. 68, on how to fight foreign interference in US 
democracy. On the project website, people can continuously 
keep an eye on which Russian tweets posted within the latest 
24 hours rank the highest, which hashtags are used and what 
topics are currently addressed in Russian propaganda. The 
Alliance for Securing Democracy website has become a key 
source of information about this activity. For example, it 
broke the news in January 2018 that bots were now set on a 
mission to de-legitimize Robert Mueller III, the Special 
Counsel charged with investigating possible Russian collu-
sion with key players inside the Trump campaign. The fact 
that it is now possible, a bit like a continuous weather report, 
to map out current misinformation is already a strong 
advance compared to the time around the 2016 Presidential 
elections in the US.
In a manifesto on its methods, ASD describes how the 
organization has identified key sources of Russian misinfor-
mation by using three methods. First, by tracking online mis-
information campaigns synchronized with open and obvious 
Russian propaganda sources such as RT (Russia Today) and 
Sputnik. Next, by identifying networks of users who obvi-
ously tweeted support for Russian policy. Finally, by identify-
ing accounts that use automatic forwarding from other 
accounts to multiply signals from Russian sources of influ-
6 Alliance for Securing Democracy—Hamilton68. Last visited 08-04-18: 
http://dashboard.securingdemocracy.org
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ence—by isolating accounts which show unusual amounts of 
interaction with other accounts. Such accounts may be bots 
which automatically forward content according to pre-defined 
rules, or they may be “cyborgs”, partly automated but super-
vised by persons. Triangulation of these three data sets then 
enabled ASD to identify a relatively small group of accounts, 
around 600, as responsible for systematic Russian misinfor-
mation. The organization is especially inspired by experiences 
from Estonia. The tiny Baltic state was probably the first 
place where active Russian cyber war was felt, during a large 
attack in 2007 which paralyzed large parts of the state appa-
ratus. The attack was made possible due to Estonia’s high 
level of digitization. Former Estonian President Toomas Ilves 
is now on the cross-political advisory board of ASD, which 
also features heavy hitters with experience in international 
politics, security and counter-espionage such as neo- 
Conservative intellectual and politician Bill Kristol.
In February 2018, we had the chance to interview media 
analyst Bret Schaefer of the Alliance for Securing Democracy 
in Washington D.C.
 – How did you manage to build up your misinformation 
warning website?7
“We were able to quickly identify about 600 accounts, who 
formed a network of pro-Kremlin misinformation—the most 
well-known is probably RT and Sputnik. The idea of making 
a website with automatically updated information about mis-
information activities was the brainchild of security researcher 
Clint Watts (who has repeatedly testified on Russian interfer-
ence before the Senate), who 3–4 years ago began to be inter-
ested in Russian interference in Syria and in ISIS activity. He 
was then helped by people such as anti-terrorism specialist 
J.M.  Berger, social media analyst Andrew Wiseburd and 
7 The quotes from the interview with Schaefer appeared in Danish in a 
news article by Stjernfelt, F “Systematisk afsløring af systematisk misin-
formation” in Danish weekly newspaper Weekendavisen. 02-23-18.
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Jonathan Morgan—a big data guy who founded “Data for 
Democracy”. Those four guys are the Hamilton team with the 
dashboard, automatically  following different activities on the 
600 accounts we have identified so far.”
 – How can fake news online be fought against without violat-
ing user freedom of expression?
“Yes, that’s the big question. Who should have authority 
and responsibility to determine what is credible and what 
not? We cannot be the ones doing that and you cannot leave 
it to the government. Facebook does not want to or cannot, 
and not even bipartisan NGOs can do it. It is interesting that 
the new flagging, which Facebook tried before Christmas 
proved to be counterintentional. Users would flag sketchy 
online content with a special flag—and it soon became appar-
ent that this sign actually increased Internet traffic to the sites 
in question. People like the two of us might want to visit the 
page out of curiosity—but also people who simply do not 
trust common news sources and therefore actively go look for 
alternative, less credible sources. Facebook’s idea was defi-
nitely not the right way to go. One solution right now is deal-
ing with the automation problem, mainly on Twitter—artificial 
augmentation of content, taking one voice and turning it into 
30,000 votes. That is what we aim to dismantle. So, our fight 
does not threaten freedom of expression, because users can 
easily turn to a conspiracy theory site, if they so wish. But we 
must fight the artificial inflation of this content, so it’s not 
pushed it into people’s news feeds”.
 – How do you discern systematic misinformation from indi-
vidual trolls and your average extreme online voices?
“Trolls are tricky. Who is a troll? It can just be a guy with 
lots of time on his hands tweeting frequently. To us, it’s not so 
important whether the source is ultimately a person or orga-
nization. We expose the artificial multiplication of the con-
tent in question—the goal is not to disclose individual URLs. 
It is a computerized system we use, but it also has a human 
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element checking through the list to avoid including accounts 
which are not relevant, for instance American Alt-right 
accounts from the extreme right. They may feature bizarre 
content, but they are not involved in artificial dissemination 
of the content.
In January, the 600 accounts, which run some 10,000 bots, 
managed to disseminate around 80,000 messages. At the top 
of the list were RT and Sputnik, but many of them are indis-
tinguishable from US accounts from the far right. A bit 
further down on the top-ten came more extreme pro-Krem-
lin sites run out of Eastern Ukraine, such as Donbass News 
and Stalkerzone.com calling Ukrainians fascists and calling 
for ethnic cleansing, and so on. Very extreme views. They 
link to hyperpartisan US websites to give them followers, 
credibility, a way of getting pro-Kremlin viewpoints in front 
of Americans—and to exaggerate tensions between US 
groups”.
 – So, the Russian side is trying to use existing Alt-right web-
sites as a kind of gateway to the US public sphere?
“Yes, but it does not have to be extreme US websites. It 
may also be pro-life antiabortion websites, where maybe 80% 
of the traffic concerns abortion-related topics such as 
Catholicism—but with 20% suddenly addressing pro-Krem-
lin issues. For example, if I put in a link on such a website 
suggesting that the United States is working with IS in Syria, 
it gains more credibility because it appears as if it came from 
within the anti- abortion tribe, so to speak”.
 – What is ASD’s attitude to the current attempts to legislate 
against “fake news” and “hate speech” online—for example, 
the German legislation requiring social media to censor differ-
ent content or the French legislation in the pipeline?
“We’re in the process of making policy recommendations 
also as an organization. It’s a real challenge, approaching an 
area where governments censor content. On the other hand, 
not doing anything and leaving it to the tech companies is 
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also not helpful. None of the two options is a viable one. 
Each month, we get more and more data and we now know 
that a couple of hundred million people on Facebook have 
seen Russian-generated content, and maybe fifty million 
Twitter accounts. Our claim is that automation is the low-
hanging fruit here, and each further solution comes with its 
own problems. As I mentioned earlier, no one can or wants 
to be responsible for deciding what is credible and what is 
not. If you create rules or safeguards that are too stringent, 
people will just jump to other platforms—like in Germany 
with Alternative für Deutschland and Pegida which quickly 
left Facebook after the new law entered into force on 
January 1st, 2018. They’re now jumping to gab.ai and other 
uncensored underground networks. So, the outcome of cen-
soring Facebook is that extreme right-wing activity is forced 
underground where it’s harder to control …”
 – That dilemma was already formulated in the eighteenth 
century: censorship of unwanted positions only strengthens 
them underground ...
“Yes, it’s new technology, but the issue is age-old. And it 
appears again in new ways. We may be close to having the AI 
technology to manipulate actual speech and video—we’re 
still trusting what we see on tv, but in a few years it will fool 
some people and in ten years it is going to be very difficult ... 
That is the next big problem we face”.
 – It never stops, does it? New technology will continuously 
generate new opportunities for the spread of false claims ...
“Yes, there is no definitive solution, but one step that 
should be taken is for the tech giants to start working with 
government organizations that are able to foresee and solve 
the issues before they arise. Facebook and Twitter have been 
caught off guard, they did not see the problems coming at all”.
In our view, the emergence of an organization like ASD 
is a healthy sign. Currently, it only unveils Russian 
 disinformation and it is far from solving all problems, but it 
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may act as a beacon for further public disclosure of system-
atic disinformation campaigns. As we have argued in this 
book, we agree with Schaefer that the right way forward 
cannot be to prohibit, censure, weed out, de-rank, flag, or 
otherwise remove or marginalize “fake news” or false state-
ments online. No authorities have the divine overview of 
true and false required for such a procedure. Therefore, such 
an authority would remove statements as false which then 
later turn out to be true, and it would be impossible to vac-
cinate against political bias. Giving even more power to the 
tech giants would also mean going down the wrong path—it 
would be disastrous to hand them the right to define and 
determine what is true and false. Moreover, it would only 
make censored voices regroup and reorganize underground, 
on The Dark Web or in other places beyond the control of 
authorities and general public oversight, bestowing on them 
the heroic status of persecuted martyrs. As a way of dealing 
with the issue on a higher level, the general public and civil 
society can contribute with a sharpened alertness and sensi-
tivity to systematic disinformation, which is characterized 
by the mass dissemination of repetitive content using bots, 
fake profiles, submitted by clandestine individuals, etc. All 
of this must be exposed and made public, on an ongoing 
basis and as soon as it is identified. This is by no means an 
easy matter, and it will involve a digital arms race because 
disinformers from foreign governments and other organiza-
tions are likely to further develop their tools and are prob-
ably, as we write, already on their way to figuring out how to 
bypass and deceive information services such as ASD and 
Hamilton68. ASD, on their side, is also busy developing new 
tools. In December 2018, they announced a new 
“Authoritarian Interference Tracker” covering 42 countries 
in North America and Europe, revealing further details of 
trends and tactics of Russian government interference in 
each of these countries. The new tool investigates the inter-
connection of Russian government activity in several areas: 
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cyberattacks, political and social subversion and economic 
and financial coercion.8
It may be a bit of a stretch to call the United Nations an 
NGO—but recommendations of this organization are of the 
same non-binding nature as those originating from civil soci-
ety organizations. The UN has independent “special rappor-
teurs” working on a wide range of topics, especially human 
rights, and annual reports of these experts are not necessarily 
consistent. In fact, it is the rule rather than the exception that 
they are not. Still, we would like to point to a report published 
by David Kaye, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression. 
It was presented on April 6, 2018, and addressing the issue of 
freedom of expression online.9 In concise and direct language, 
the report presents a number of key problems with the con-
tent control practiced by the internet companies. Section 41: 
“Private norms, which vary according to each company’s 
business model and vague assertions of community interests, 
have created unstable, unpredictable and unsafe environ-
ments for users and intensified government scrutiny.” In 
Section 46 of the report, the vagueness and lack of transpar-
ency of the policies are especially criticized: “Company rules 
routinely lack the clarity and specificity that would enable 
users to predict with reasonable certainty what content places 
them on the wrong side of the line. This is particularly evident 
in the context of “extremism” and “hate speech”, areas of 
restriction easily susceptible to excessive removals in the 
absence of rigorous human evaluation of context.” Therefore, 
the report recommends that the rules be based on the prin-
ciples of human rights. Section 46: “Terms of service should 
8 “Alliance for Securing Democracy Launches New Tool to Analyze 
Russian Interference Operations” Alliance for Securing Democracy. 
12-06-18.
9 Kaye, D. “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression” UN 
Human Rights Council. 04-06-18.
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move away from a discretionary approach rooted in generic 
and self-serving “community” needs. Companies should 
instead adopt high-level policy commitments to maintain 
platforms for users to develop opinions, express themselves 
freely and access information of all kinds in a manner consis-
tent with human rights law.”
Towards the end of the report, Section 64, the general 
recommendation is: “Opaque forces are shaping the ability 
of individuals worldwide to exercise their freedom of 
expression. This moment calls for radical transparency, 
meaningful accountability and a commitment to remedy in 
order to protect the ability of individuals to use online plat-
forms as forums for free expression, access to information 
and engagement in public life.” With regard to government 
policy, the recommendation, in Section 66, is to avoid clumsy 
regulation of viewpoints and instead only accept content 
removal carried out “by an independent and impartial judi-
cial authority, and in accordance with due process and stan-
dards of legality, necessity and legitimacy” and also to 
“refrain from imposing disproportionate sanctions, whether 
heavy fines or imprisonment, on Internet intermediaries.” 
States should also not activate or take part in pre-publica-
tion censorship, nor delegate legal decisions to political 
departments or to the companies themselves, and finally, the 
state should continuously publish transparency reports on 
all the requirements it imposes on the companies. Regarding 
the companies, in Section 70 the recommendation is that 
they should “... recognize that the authoritative global stan-
dard for ensuring freedom of expression on their platforms 
is human rights law, not the varying laws of States or their 
own private interests, and they should re-evaluate their con-
tent standards accordingly.” Likewise, they should be reor-
ganized in accordance with transparency, through greater 
cooperation with civil society institutions who are con-
cerned with digital rights and avoid involvement in secret 
state-run content management agreements. Finally, the 
Chapter 17. The Role of Civil Society
259
companies should strive to assume public responsibility, for 
example by developing common standards across the 
Internet, monitored by joint “social media councils”—a type 
of complaints commission for Internet companies. Of course, 
there are many details the report does not address, and criti-
cal issues such as the monopoly question are not mentioned, 
but its overall message is completely in line with our conclu-
sions. One can only hope that the report will help guide tech 
companies in an era where they seem to waver about dizzy, 
caught between the intoxication of their own omnipotence 
and the growing number of severe political beatings they 
are taking.
The role of civil society is at risk of being underappreci-
ated in the European debate, as we do not share the American 
tradition for strong private support for think tanks, NGOs 
and the like. Nevertheless, the Santa Clara Declaration, the 
Alliance for Securing Democracy, and the UN report all dem-
onstrate that there is some possibility for different kinds of 
civil society efforts to put pressure on tech giants and mitigate 
the consequences of their sins of omission. Serious media, 
private funds, individual patrons, universities, government 
subsidizers based on the arm’s length principle, etc. must find 
themselves in the new context and contribute to the ongoing 
development and refinement of such independent efforts in 
the public sphere.
A promising but less certain possibility is the idea of a new, 
decentralized Internet. It would have no central servers and 
be based on blockchain technology (much like the crypto- 
currency Bitcoin). This would eliminate the option of any 
joint control efforts and ensure user freedom of expression 
and anonymity beyond the reach of government or tech giant 
control. Among the uncertainties in this idea, however, is 
whether such technology will in fact create an Internet with 
the same scope and potential as the current one. It is also 
uncertain whether it would attract other users beyond 
declared “crypto-anarchists” only, who feel they can only 
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exist freely with encrypted protection from states and compa-
nies.10 Another problem of this utopia is that it would proba-
bly open up new opportunities not only for civil society, but 
also for many types of crimes now more difficult to trace.
10 Cf. Bartlett (2018) chap. 6.
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In 1964, media theorist Marshall McLuhan noted: “The elec-
tric technology is within the gates, and we are numb, deaf, 
blind, and mute about its encounter with the Gutenberg 
technology.”1 Today, this problem is even more urgent with 
the rapid development of digital media. We are witnessing a 
radical shift of paradigms. For a long time, we have been blind 
to the consequences of digital intoxication. We have turned a 
blind eye to the fact that we are being reprogrammed by the 
new digital life. Slowly, sneakily and unnoticed, tech giants 
have been able to change our behavior, our emotions, our 
thoughts, our world views and our relationships with other 
people. The curse of our times is this blindness and dizziness. 
It is time to wake up.
In this book, we have attempted to expose the huge chal-
lenge of the attention economy which dominates the 
Information Age of today. The most valuable asset of the tech 
giants is also our own most valuable asset: our attention. 
These giants are hard at work taking advantage of that asset. 
They have developed a digital panopticon, where everyone is 
constantly being monitored and always distracted. By gather-
ing and processing enormous amounts of data, they draw up 
incredibly accurate portraits of our inner drives and of our 
minds. They use the data to control not only mass behavior 
but also the behavior of individuals, and the aim is to promote 
1 McLuhan (1964) p. 3–7.
Chapter 18
A Digital Hangover
262
their own financial interests. The tech giants preach that their 
real purpose is to assist their users and improve the world. 
But Silicon Valley is no philanthropic endeavor, but simply 
raw business. There seems to be still less doubt about that. 
Recently, more awareness has been raised about the Janus- 
head of tech giants. On the one hand, the massive surveillance 
and data harvesting make up the basic material of free, effi-
cient and convenient platforms. But on the other hand, we 
have the darker side of things; it causes a fatal loss of free-
dom, privacy and autonomy.
The business models, global character, and clandestine 
procedures of the tech giants challenge and restrict freedom 
of expression. In this book, we have argued that this key free-
dom is under pressure. Tech giants capitalize freedom of 
expression, because commercial interests get to determine 
access to information and the rules of public conversation. In 
other words, the users are losing their fundamental right to 
freely seek out information and express their opinions freely 
without interference from a public authority—a status tech 
giants have misappropriated, given their emerging de facto 
monopoly. On the platforms, such interference happens both 
automatically through opaque algorithm systems and manu-
ally through vaguely worded terms of service. The giants act 
as legislator, police, judge and executioner. Today, with social 
media being accused of spreading disinformation, influencing 
elections and allowing—if not in fact promoting—violence, 
the giants have reacted by intensifying internal regulation of 
their content. Still growing amounts of material are subject to 
content regulation—material that is likely to be problematic 
and unpleasant in the eyes of some, but which is at the same 
time part of the ongoing political debate. The criteria behind 
content removal are extremely broad, wasting lots of time 
and labor on over-sensitive complaints about “hate speech”, 
nipples and other completely harmless things, rather than 
directing forces at criminal content associated with immedi-
ate danger. In those cases, the internal regulation borders on 
censorship and counteracts freedom of speech directly. Over 
the same years, the giants have managed to undermine the 
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economic value of knowledge and art. They have even used 
freedom of expression and freedom of information as cloaks 
for their lucrative business endeavors. The first digital losers 
are found among traditional media outlets, musicians, writers, 
filmmakers and other content creators, who either end up 
deeply dependent on the tech giants or robbed of their intel-
lectual property, or both. Lastly the business model and auto-
mated algorithm system of the tech giants have been able to 
trigger serious disturbances of the public sphere. The digital 
echo chamber has shown that it leans towards tribalism, in 
the West represented by a new digital culture war and in third 
world countries by violent upheavals and even lynchings.
The idea that more artificial intelligence on Facebook as a 
miracle cure for maladies caused by Facebook itself is absurd. 
This is akin to saying that the solution to Facebook is even 
more Facebook. Politicians are currently privatizing the prob-
lem by requiring the tech giants themselves to control state-
ments on their platforms, and moreover without a clear 
definition of exactly how to do it. We suggest an alternative 
aimed at winning back our digital autonomy. In our view, tech 
giants ought to be subjected to critical anti-monopoly scru-
tiny. Some possible models for monopoly regulation are 
appearing on the horizon. This is no doubt a strong weapon 
to be used with caution. Therefore, strong voices from the 
public sphere and civil society must also participate in the 
protection of free expression on the Internet and change the 
cynical business models of tech giants. It is important that 
organizations, news media, universities and tech companies 
work together to increase public resilience in the face of the 
new digital challenges. This cooperation must be based on a 
shared commitment to protect free expression and the right 
to express, receive and disseminate differing information or 
views.
Here are some proposals as to what could be done in order 
to guide the tech giants —with or without their consent— 
towards the common standards of freedom of expression of 
modern democracies:
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 –  Commitment to monitoring a significantly more narrow 
and precisely defined set of violations, policed more 
efficiently;
 –  Approximating the terms of service towards enlightened 
standards, e.g. American legislation and legal practice on 
freedom of expression, that is, the First Amendment and 
the legal interpretations thereof, cf. the principle that the 
limits of freedom of expression are drawn at “incitement 
to imminent lawless action”— also aligned with the devel-
opments of the principles of freedom of expression within 
international human rights law;
 – Better trained and better paid content moderators;
 –  Making publicly available and transparent all aspects and 
phases of the content removal process;
 – Transparency of decisions made against users;
 – Clear and realistic avenues to appeal;
 –  Alternatives to removal, such as clear indication of contro-
versial content or explicit filtering as an option available to 
more sensitive users;
 –  Preserving controversial content could be preserved 
behind a barrier one has to click through, so no one runs 
into it spontaneously;
 –  Flagging should not automatically result in demands for 
removal, but may instead contain a menu of options such 
as “mark as controversial”, “mark as not suited for chil-
dren”, and the like;2
 –  Sharing earnings with external content providers who help 
generate advertising activity.
2 Somewhat naively, Gillespie suggests that the circumstances would 
improve if tech giants were to hire only “women, queer people, or peo-
ple of color” (p. 202) in the coming decade. In what way gender, sexual 
orientation or ethnicity would be the solution to all the unrelated prob-
lems of censorship remains lost in the dark—along with the question of 
why the Silicon Valley libertarians should not then add social democrats 
and conservatives to the mix, not to mention anarchists, Nazis and 
communists.
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Large struggles of interests are involved in the transforma-
tion of the public sphere and freedom of expression in the era 
of tech giants. But freedom of expression should not be deter-
mined by conflicting interests alone—but rather by elemen-
tary political principles of how democratic societies are 
organized. The economy of attention online has shown to be 
subversive to freedom, enlightenment and democracy. The 
democratic institutions cannot leave the massive problems to 
the tech giants themselves. Such a cure is likely to make 
things worse than the disease.
The time has come to use freedom of expression to say no 
to monopoly powers and to censorship resurfaced. Consider 
this a call for users, citizens and decision makers to take back 
empowerment and defend the principles of Enlightenment. 
Technology does not decide the future. We do.
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